

CHAPTER I

"Evil" Senators Responsible for World War II

On January 15, 1945, shortly after President Roosevelt had delivered his annual message on the state of the Union and the world, a memorable debate on American policy occurred in the Senate of the United States—that great national forum for the free and uncensored discussion of public affairs. In the course of the debate Senators reviewed the historical backgrounds of the global war then raging, referred to the actions and ambitions of foreign governments, including Russia and Great Britain, and drew into question some of the principal foreign projects advocated by President Roosevelt. Throughout the controversy, the tension which usually marks blunt exchanges of views in the chamber was kept taut by a realization of the fact that in the coming months the Senate would be compelled to act upon the treaties and laws designed to fix the policy of the United States in and for a world of contentious nations.

On this occasion, the task of upholding the Administration in respect of certain issues was undertaken by Senator Claude Pepper of Florida. Mr. Pepper had long been a defender of President Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies, if sometimes a dissenter in matters of detail. A graduate of the University of Alabama, trained in law at Harvard University, an experienced debater, with nearly ten years' service in the Senate behind him, Mr. Pepper ranked high among his Democratic colleagues in learning and dialectical skill. Moreover, he was a vigorous supporter of the internationalism to which President Roosevelt was committing the

1. Here and in the following pages the term *internationalism* is used as meaning: World peace is desirable and possible; it is indivisible and can be secured for the United States only by entering into a positive connection with a league, or association, of nations, empowered to make pacific adjustments of international conflicts and to impose peace, by effective sanctions or by force,

Government of the United States and he assumed the burden

of championing it amid a cross fire of sharp criticism.

In his efforts to sustain his cause against challenges from the opposition, Senator Pepper arraigned the Senate itself at the bar of moral judgment: "It was not on the battlefields of Flanders that the last war and its victory of peace were lost, but in this Chamber."

Immediately after Senator Pepper had launched his indictment

Mr. Millikin [of Colorado]. Mr. President, I challenge that statement, and I should like to have a demonstration of it.

Mr. Pepper. History demonstrates it.

Mr. Millikin. Mr. President, I do not care about the Senator's notions of history. I think that is a terrible accusation to make against this country and against this Senate. . . . In what way was the peace of the world lost on the floor of the Senate? Let us have a demonstration of it.

Mr. Pepper. Very well. It was because, in my humble opinion, the Senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and to provide for our part in the League of Nations. . . .

Mr. Millikin. . . . Will the Senator demonstrate how, if we had been in the League of Nations, any decisions would have been different than those which were made?

Mr. Pepper. I will tell the Senator how I think they would have been different. I think the United States at the conclusion of the last war had the moral leadership of the world. . . . I believe the United States in a world-wide organization would have brought to its councils not only great moral leadership, great physical power, and great natural resources and their strength, but a moral elevation, if you please, and personal disinterestedness which the nations of the Old World do not have. I think we could have brought to bear upon those councils influences without which they disintegrated into a bickering, fighting lot of Old World powers, as they have always been. . . .

After the Senate failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, including provision for the League of Nations, it did not even

on aggressors or peace breakers; the United States cannot maintain neutrality in case of any major war among European and Asiatic powers.

take up the pact to make secure the frontiers of France. We abandoned our allies. We abandoned our objectives. We abandoned our dead. We waited for the next war to come.

That is why I say that if America had taken an affirmative part, at least the probability is that we might have avoided the war which has come to curse this generation.

Mr. Millikin. Mr. President, will the Senator agree with me that the war might have been prevented had France, which had the best and largest army in the world, repelled the German aggression in the Rhineland?

Mr. Pepper. It might have. . . . I am not at all sure that France has any greater obligation to keep a would-be world conqueror in check than we have. . . .

Mr. Millikin. . . . The Senator cannot demonstrate that had we been a member of the League of Nations the course of history would have been any different.

Mr. Pepper. Mr. President, I will leave the Senator to argue with history. . . .

Thus in the development of the controversy, Senator Pepper's original assertion had been reduced to the level of a mere probability and his appeal to history had been questioned. Certainly it had been clouded by ambiguity. But his unequivocal declaration stood firmly in the record: "The last war and its victory of peace were lost . . . in this Chamber."

Later in the year, July 23, 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations came before the Senate for ratification, Senator Tom Connally opened the full-dress debate and, in the manner of Senator Pepper, called history to support his arguments. He reminded his colleagues of the treatment meted out to the League of Nations twenty-five years previously. While he refrained from ascribing World War II to the defeat of the League, he laid the blame for that defeat on the Senate; and in a warning tone lamented that "many representatives of foreign nations are still doubtful as to what the vote on the charter will be here in the Senate. They remember 1919."

Then in a florid style all his own, Senator Connally declared to the Senate that these representatives of foreign nations “know how the League of Nations was slaughtered here on the floor. Can you not still see the blood on the floor? Can you not see upon the walls the marks of the conflict that ranged [sic] here in the Chamber where the League of Nations was done to death. They fear that that same sentiment may keep the United States from ratifying this charter. Our ratification of it will instill hope into the hearts of the peoples of the earth. . . . I trust that the Senate . . . will ratify this charter by a vote so overwhelming as to carry the conviction over the earth that the United States expects to assume its obligations for the purpose of keeping them, for the purpose of living up to them, for the purpose of supporting a world organization for peace with all our spirit and with all our hearts.”

The charge that the peace at the end of World War I had been lost in the Senate was an old doctrine which had been repeated with almost endless reiteration by advocates of internationalism, at home and abroad, since the final vote of the Senate on the Treaty of Versailles in 1920.² In one form or another, during a quarter of a century, it had been proclaimed by members of Congress, publicists, educators, journalists, and radio broadcasters and reasserted on innumerable occasions as if it were an absolute truth. Often it had been narrowed in such a way as to place the responsibility not upon the Senate as a whole but upon a small group of scheming, willful, evil Republican Senators led by Henry Cabot Lodge, who has long been characterized by enemies as a bigoted, ignoble, deceitful, and dishonest politician.[^]

Hence the thesis that a little band of Senators, mainly Republicans, mainly inspired by party malice, wrecked the peace in 1920 has appeared in a veritable flood of “literature.”[^]

2, On the nature of the Treaty of Versailles see William Bullitt, “The Tragedy of Versailles,” *Life*, March 27, 1944, p. 99. W. D. Herridge, former Canadian Minister to the United States, said that “Versailles was not a treaty of peace but a declaration of war.” Herridge, *Which Kind of Revolution?* (1943), p. 23.

Amid the plethora of such assertions it is difficult to choose the most typical document to illustrate the accusation. But from the embarrassment of records may be taken as a fair example an article by Joseph H. Baird, entitled "Will the Senate Hamper the Peace?" published in the *American Mercury* for June, 1945. This article not only stated the case of senatorial guilt in stark simplicity; it also pilloried with the customary severity the wicked minority of willful men. The author, Mr. Baird, had once been chief of the United Press Bureau in Moscow, had previously "covered" the State Department, had served as a member of the United Press in London, and had held a post of night foreign editor in New York City. With good reason it could be supposed, therefore, that Mr. Baird's reporting deserved serious consideration by the public.

Mr. Baird opened his account of senatorial obstruction by recalling the famous words of John Hay: "There will always be 34 per cent of the Senate on the blackguard side of every question." He declared that "the Senate fight over the League is too well known and its deviations are too tortuous to be outlined here"; so he ventured to summarize the long controversies and negotiations in a few words: "In February 1919, Senator Lodge told Senator Borah of Idaho, later to succeed him as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that 85 per cent of the Senate was for the League. He then went on to explain to Borah and to Senator Watson, Republican, of Indiana, who said that 80 per cent of the public favored the League, that adherence could be defeated by a skillful campaign of reservations. . . . As a result of endless reservations and political maneuvering, when the resolution of adherence was finally balloted upon on March 19, 1920, it failed by seven votes to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. Forty-nine votes were cast for the League and 35 against it. Thus a plurality of fourteen Senators favored it."³

3. For the multiplicity of facts that utterly demolish this oversimplification, see the findings of Thomas A. Bailey, below, pp. 7 ff.

For the view that the leaders of the opposition to a ratification of the Treaty without reservations were petty and mean partisans, writers in 1945, such as Mr. Baird, could appeal to the authority of a person no less distinguished than President Wilson. Shortly before the final vote on the Treaty of Versailles, with reservations, was taken in the Senate, the President said to Ray Stannard Baker that the reservations demanded by the Lodge group "are not made by thoughtful men to improve the Covenant; they represent a dishonorable attempt, on the part of leaders who do not speak for the people, to escape any real responsibility, so far as the United States is concerned, for world peace in future years. They are essentially partisan political devices. If I accept them, these senators will merely offer new ones, even more humiliating. These evil men intend to destroy the League." 4

Another stark declaration of the evil men's responsibility for the second World War was made by "T. R. B.," nominally a regular correspondent for the *New Republic*, in his "Washington Notes," June 18, 1945. Without referring to the files of that journal and its own hostility to the Versailles Treaty and accompaniments, the author of the Notes named several of the "evil" men of the Senate in 1919-20: Borah, Lodge, Knox, and La Follette, for example, and then placed the terrible burden of war guilt upon them: "They had joyously hounded Woodrow Wilson to his grave. . . . They had riddled the League with reservations till its own friends couldn't support it. They had hidden behind the two-thirds rule, killed Wilson, restored Normalcy, erected tariff walls, snubbed Russia, rejected a world court, and then had the last say after all, by writing the Johnson Act. . . . And the cost was little enough; only a Second World War." Here is a succinct statement of the theory that the war woes of the terrible years from 1939 to 1945 lay on the heads of a few "dishonorable" and "evil" Senators of the United States^

A version of the formula relative to senatorial guilt for World War II made it less personal and partisan: the "cause"

4. Baker, *American Chronicle* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 474.

of the defeat administered to the Treaty of Versailles was the archaic and undemocratic rule in the Constitution which made the concurrence of two thirds of the Senators present necessary to the approval of a treaty. If it had not been for this two-thirds rule, if treaties could have been ratified by a mere majority of the Senate or of the House and Senate combined, the United States would have joined the League of Nations and World War II would have been warded off. As far as the theory of American responsibility is concerned, however, this version was in upshot the same as the first statement of the case: scheming Senators, mostly Republicans, took advantage of the two-thirds rule, kept the United States out of the League, and hence made it impossible for the other members of the League to stop the coming of World War II.

That the world and the peoples thereof were victimized when the Senate of the United States rejected the League of Nations is the theme of a substantial worthy Thomas A.

Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal*,⁵ published in 1945. This volume presents a stinging bill of moral indictment; but it is no mere defense of party or cause, sustained by avoidance, emphasis, and special pleading. It was written by a scholar of high standing in the historical profession. Although Professor Bailey admits to the record solid evidence which contradicts his own thesis, he files fourteen charges of infidelity against the United States, under the head of "betrayal," an unequivocal term of accusation and guilt. The term "betrayal" stems from the same root as the word "traitor"—the Latin word *tradere*. To betray is to give up to or place in the power of an enemy a person or thing by treachery or disloyalty. Betrayal is a treacherous surrender to a foe, a violation of a trust or confidence, an abandonment of something committed to one's charge. A betrayal is commonly regarded as a human and moral act of the lowest and vilest kind.

Such an act of necessity involves two parties. The party that commits the act of betrayal is bound to the second by a solemn pledge, promise, or loyalty, which by express language or clear implication forbids the performance of, or participation in, such acts of treachery. The second party, the one that is betrayed, of right has indefeasible grounds for trusting the first party—the betrayer—and for expecting that the trust will never be forsworn, dishonored, or broken. As a prelude to his indictment under the head of “betrayal” (Chapter XXII), Professor Bailey contends that President Wilson had authority to make the commitments on behalf of the United States which were incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles, that his commitments were in harmony with his public addresses to the country and the world, and that the people had “warmly applauded or had seemingly accepted” his proposals. Such, it appears, were the elements of a solemn contract entered into by the people with President Wilson—a contract binding on the people in good conscience and in honor. If the President made any mistake in the transaction, Professor Bailey says, it was not so much in giving the pledges at Paris as in assuming that “the same high degree of wartime idealism would continue indefinitely after the signing of the peace.”

In other words, according to this particular passage in Professor Bailey’s volume, a solemn obligation in respect of world peace and an association of nations in some form was assumed by President Wilson and the American people while World War I was raging, and the President afterward made commitments at Paris in keeping with this obligation. But the American people allowed their wartime idealism to decline. They repudiated the commitments made by the President with their authorization. This they did heedlessly, for, presumably, the terms of the Versailles Treaty conformed to **the** specifications laid down in the public addresses of President Wilson which the American people had applauded during the war—conformed to the

the other powers that participated in the drafting of the Treaty agreed to this meeting of minds in the obligation undertaken by the President and the people.

Immediately after offering his brief recital of the way in which “the great betrayal” came about, Professor Bailey became cautious about fixing the blame for the defeat of the Versailles Treaty, (in the simplification he places the blame on the people—on the decline in their wartime idealism.] But at once he introduces uncertainty by saying: “whoever was at fault, the unwillingness or inability of the United States to carry through the promises made in its behalf was catastrophic”—resulted in “the great betrayal.”

This is one of the most puzzling sentences in the history of etymology, syntax, grammar, logic, and philosophy. On its face it seems to declare that *whoever was at fault* the United States was at fault, for it was unwilling to carry through the promises made by President Wilson. Yet Professor Bailey does not say just that, for he couples with the word “unwillingness” the words “or inability.” He thus destroys all the force of moral guilt inherent in the word “unwillingness,” by adding that it may have been the “inability” of the United States which led to “the great betrayal”; for inability means in this case the lack of ability, physical, mental, or moral, the lack of the power, capacity, or instrumentalities necessary “to carry through” President Wilson’s promises.

Having in fact declared uncertain the issue of *who* was at fault and having admitted that perhaps the United States was after all lacking in ability to carry out President Wilson’s promises at Paris, Professor Bailey proceeds as if the betrayer were actually known and as if the United States were the culprit. For, in Chapter XXII, he lists “the results” of “the unwillingness or inability” of the United States to fulfill the commitments made by President Wilson in the Treaty of Versailles:

1. . . . a betrayal of the League of Nations.
2. . . . a betrayal of the Treaty of Versailles.

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3. . . . a betrayal of the Allies.
4. . . . a betrayal of France.
5. . . . a betrayal of Germany.
6. . . . a betrayal of liberal opinion the world
7. . . . a betrayal of American boys who had died, and American boys yet unborn.
8. . . . a betrayal of the masses everywhere.
9. . . . a betrayal of our humanitarian, missionary, and educational interests not only in Europe, but particularly in the Near
10. . . . a betrayal of the legitimate interests of American merchants, manufacturers, bankers, and
11. . . . a betrayal of America's responsibility to assume that world leadership which had been thrust upon her.
12. . . . a betrayal of the nation's plighted word and of good faith in international dealings.
13. . . . a betrayal of our clear moral obligations to finish job.
14. . . . a betrayal of the American people.

After presenting this list of "betrayals" which constitute "the great betrayal," Professor Bailey makes a generous gesture toward his country by saying, as a qualification, that the great betrayal did not "necessarily" mean that "our withdrawal was solely, or even primarily responsible for all the ills that befell Europe from 1919 to 1939." It did mean, however, he added, that the United States "cannot escape a very considerable share of the blame for what happened." Thus the amount of guilt justly ascribable to the United States is made indefinite.

And a few pages later in this volume Professor Bailey introduces more uncertainty. By joining the League of Nations, he says (p. 367), "we had very little if anything to lose . . . ; and everything to gain—possibly a preventing of so-called World War II"—just "possibly," not even "probably."

Then Professor Bailey asks a question that cuts right into

the validity of his betrayal theory: "Would the results⁶ have been essentially different if we had joined the League?" On this issue so crucial to the validity of his whole argument, Professor Bailey remarks that "conclusions here must of course be more speculative" (than in the case of whether the United States had anything to lose by joining the League of Nations). Thereupon, after confirming the speculative character of his thinking on the subject, he makes the statement: "it may legitimately be doubted whether, when the pinch came, the United States [if a member] would have provided adequate support for the League of Nations."

One explanation of the "speculative," or inconclusive, character of Professor Bailey's conclusions may lie in his findings in the twenty-one chapters which precede his Chapter XXII entitled "The Great Betrayal." In preparation for writing his volume, he had studied with meticulous care the debates on the Treaty in the Senate, articles in the press, the unpublished Woodrow Wilson papers, papers of distinguished contemporaries, and indeed a documentation impressive in its range and authenticity. On the basis of this study, he made the following positive statements:

Senator McCormick was "uncomfortably close to the truth" when he said that President Wilson had "stacked the Peace Conference with Democrats" (p. 73).

"It would have been better if he [President Wilson] had been willing to . . . compromise enough to save the pact [Versailles Treaty]" (p. 100-101).

"Wilson's physical and mental condition had a profoundly important bearing on the final defeat of the treaty" (p. 145). "It is hard to understand how Wilson could have insisted that the fourteen Lodge reservations, ten of which concerned the League only, completely nullified the whole treaty" (p. 166).

"Having made up his mind that he was right, he [President Wilson] saw evil in any other course. Personal pride and in

ti. It should be noted again that Professor Bailey called the fourteen betrayals "results" of the unwillingness or inability of the United States to join the League of Nations. Above p. 9.

grained stubbornness partially blinded him to the public weal” (p. 169).

“Some apologists for Wilson claim that if he had not collapsed he would have compromised with Lodge. Perhaps so, but there is nothing to support such a view in his public utterances, in his private papers or in his character” (p. 173).

“If he [President Wilson] told the Democrats in the Senate to vote for the treaty with the Lodge reservations, most of them undoubtedly would do so, and the two-thirds majority would be won” (p. 174).

“Senator Hitchcock . . . privately confessed to Colonel Bonsai, the day before the November vote, that *he and most of the Senate Democrats favored getting the treaty ratified ‘in almost any form’*” (p. 177).

“Wilson bluntly told Hitchcock on November 17 that the Lodge reservations were a ‘nullification’ of the treaty, and that if they came to him he would pocket the whole thing” (p. 179). “It also seems reasonably clear that by this time [November] public opinion favored either the Lodge reservations or some thing rather closely akin to them” (p. 180).

“Wilson’s communication to Hitchcock, dated November 18 . . . told the Democratic majority how they should vote, and it spelled the difference between ratification and non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles” (p. 185).

“If they [the Democrats] had voted for the treaty with the Lodge reservations, *instead of combining with the ‘irreconcilables’*, the Senate would have approved the pact (on the first vote) 81 to 13, or with 19 votes to spare” (p. 195). [Only thirteen or fourteen Senators were “irreconcilable.”]

Important French newspapers favored a ratification of the Treaty even in spite of some of the reservations: “The powerful *Temps*, which often spoke for the Foreign Office . . . believed that the Lodge reservations merely set forth restrictions which would in practice exist anyhow” (p. 205).

Colonel House advised President Wilson that Democratic Senators be instructed to vote for ratification with reservations. “Neither of House’s two letters was answered or acknowledged” (p. 210).

December 14, 1919, President Wilson authorized an official statement that “he has *no compromise or concession of any kind*

in 'mind' but intends to place the whole responsibility on the Republican leaders of the Senate (p. 212).

In his Jackson Day letter, President Wilson declared that if “there was any doubt as to the views of the people,” the way out was “to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum” (p. 217).

William Jennings Bryan, on Jackson Day, branded the “solemn referendum” idea as “folly” and urged working out a compromise on the Treaty (p. 218).

“An impressive number of Democratic newspapers” supported Mr. Bryan’s proposal in favor of a compromise with the opposition (p. 221).

“An appeal from the League of Free Nations Association urged the President to accept the necessary reservations and get the treaty into operation” (p. 225).

“A committee representing twenty-six organizations, with a total membership of fifty million memorialized both the President and the Senate to compromise their differences” (p. 226).

Viscount Grey, after trying in vain to see President Wilson in Washington, published in England a powerful article in which he favored the entrance of the United States willingly with limited obligations as preferable to unwilling partnership with unlimited obligations (pp. 234-237).

Mr. Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, publicly expressed willingness to accept the United States with reservations, provided the other powers were not expressly required to agree to the conditions (p. 240).

In February, 1920, President Wilson told Senator Glass that if the Treaty was approved with the Lodge reservations he would pocket it (p. 256).

The day after the final vote on the Treaty, Senator Hitchcock wrote to President Wilson, saying that it required the “most energetic efforts” on his part to prevent a majority of Democrats from surrendering to Senator Lodge—and thus effecting ratification (p. 271).

“The evidence is convincing that Wilson wanted the issue cast into the hurly-burly of politics”—the election campaign of 1920 (p. 275).

“Minds no less acute than Wilson’s . . . denied that the Lodge reservations completely nullified the treaty” (p. 277).

"By his action, he [President Wilson] contributed powerfully to the ultimate undoing of the League, and with it the high hopes of himself and mankind for an organization to prevent World War II" (p. 277).

"Many elements entered into the legislative log jam of March, 1920. . . . No one of them was solely responsible for the pile-up. *But as the -pile-up finally developed, there was only one lumber jack who could, break it, and that was Woodrow Wilson*" (p. 278).

"Wilson gave orders that the treaty was to be killed in the Senate chamber. And there it died" (p. 281).

In dealing with the influences which may have induced in the minds of Senators a hostility to the Treaty of Versailles, Professor Bailey, however, minimizes a large amount of information respecting the "inside history" of World War I and the settlement at Paris, which reached the American public between 1918 and 1920. Most startling of all was the publication of various secret treaties and understandings entered into by the Entente Allies preparatory to the war, or in relation to the distribution of the spoils at the close of the conflict.

After the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in 1917 they opened the hidden archives of the Tsarist regime and spread broadcast many documents which gave to the political and moral aims of the Entente Allies an aspect wholly different from that expounded in their war propaganda from 1914 to 1918. Particularly significant for its effect on opinion in the United States was the publication, in January, 1918, of certain secret treaties drawn from the Russian archives⁷ and later the dissemination of other documents bearing on the transactions of the governments with which President Wilson carried on negotiations at Paris when the terms of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations were being drafted.

Nevertheless, without carefully estimating the influence

7. In the *New York Evening Post* under the editorship of Oswald Garrison Villard.

of such revelations in arousing American hostility to the Entente Powers and the Treaty, Professor Bailey, in apportioning blame for the rejection of the League of Nations, makes the Senate carry a burden of guilt. Whatever may be the degree of responsibility he ascribes to President Wilson, Professor Bailey leaves the impression that the Senators whom the President characterized as “evil men”—especially Senator Lodge and the “bitter-enders”—are at least to be regarded as among the culprits in the “great betrayal” which brought World War II upon

In the foregoing expressions of opinion that make the responsibility for World War II in some way turn upon “obstructionists” in the Senate of the United States are exhibited both the assurance and the ambiguity that have attended the exposition of this particular thesis. For some time President Wilson attributed the obstruction to “evil men” in the Senate and this view has widely prevailed. Senator Pepper and Senator Connally located the blame *in* the Senate without naming or characterizing the Senators to be held accountable. Professor Bailey represented President Wilson as eternally right in regarding isolation as a mirage and believing that “the next war would surely drag us in”; and, while holding that the President was impolitic in methods, Professor Bailey also portrayed the Senate “oligarchy” as an activating force in “the great betrayal” which eventuated in the second World War.

CHAPTER II

The American People to Blame for World War II

A wider view of culpability in respect of the woes that befell the nations of the earth after 1919, involving them at length in World War II, places the blame upon the American people as a whole, upon the “public,” or upon “the country” at large. This view does not exclude from responsibility the “evil men” of the Senate, or the two-thirds rule for ratification of treaties to which the nation had clung. Indeed, all the Senators, “good” and “evil” alike, are among the offending persons covered by the all-embracing indictment of the American people as the guilty party. While the wider view of culpability takes various forms in actual statement, it generally comprises certain features which, collectively, amount to a thesis: that the American people are responsible for the foreign policy that led in effect to World War II.

Rallying to the leadership of President Wilson, as “the far sighted statesman” of his times—the thesis runs—the American people had waged World War I for the purpose of destroying German militarism, making the world safe for democracy, imposing a liberal program on backward nations,¹ realizing President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, putting a final end to war, and ushering in the age of permanent peace.

While the battles of that war were raging, the American people cheered his projects for a grand association of nations to carry out the aims of the war; and at the Paris Peace Conference the League of Nations was projected in

1, According to Ray Stannard Baker, “Wilson meant to change the world, not by changing the system, as was the proposal in Russia and by radicals in Western Europe, and ‘so shaking every foundation in order to dislodge an abuse,’ but by administering it uprightly according to traditional liberal principles of America and Great Britain and with the guarantee of a league of nations founded upon those principles.” *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922), II, 64.

fulfilment of the President's pledges to the American people and to all "peace-loving" nations.

xBut—the thesis continues—soon after the war the American people forgot their noble professions and resolves, let their war idealism "slump," grew weary of hearing about the woes of the world, turned selfishly to their own affairs, and sank into the mire of "isolationism."² In heroic efforts to marshal the people in support of his policy as against the "evil men" in the Senate, President Wilson toured the West in 1919. He begged the people to remember the war aims he had announced in their name. He asked them to remain faithful to the cause for which he said American soldiers had died, warned them that another world war would come if the United States rejected the League of Nations, and told them that only under the League could adequate outlets be found for American goods in foreign markets. On this tour President Wilson, worn out by his arduous labor, was overcome by a desperate illness. Disregarding his pleas and misfortune, the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. It is true that in 1920 the Democrats in their national convention endorsed the League of Nations and nominated two ardent supporters of the League, James M. Cox and Franklin D. Roosevelt, for President and Vice-President, respectively. But at the "solemn referendum" the American people swept the Democrats out of power in an avalanche of votes. Then, under Republican leadership, they turned to isolation with a vengeance. They remained obdurate in their narrow vision, even after the Democratic party recovered supremacy in 1935; they clung obstinately to the traditional doctrine that the United States should not become entangled in the age

2. *Isolationism* is used in this volume as meaning: Rejection of membership in the League of Nations; non-entanglement in the political controversies of Europe and Asia; non-intervention in the wars of those continents; neutrality, peace, and defense for the United States through measures appropriate to those purposes; and the pursuit of a foreign policy friendly to all nations disposed to reciprocate. An isolationist may favor the promotion of good will and peace among nations by any and all measures compatible with non-entanglement in any association of nations empowered to designate "aggressors" and bring engines of sanction and coercion into action against them.

long quarrels of Europe and Asia; they selfishly wanted peace, neutrality, and defense for the United States in a war ring world.

In vain—the thesis concluded—did Franklin D. Roosevelt, after he became President in 1933, warn the American people that peace could be maintained only by collective action of “peace-loving nations,” by putting a “quarantine” on aggressors. In vain did he tell them that the United States could not defend itself against victorious aggressors if Great Britain fell. In vain did he beseech Congress for adequate measures of defense against aggressors. The American people remained adamant. Congress “stifled” the President’s calls for preparedness. Even after Hitler’s hordes had overrun France in 1940, the people still demanded peace for the United States. For years the people blocked President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in their efforts to enforce a policy designed to restrain aggressors and prevent outbreaks of war in Europe and Asia. The people insisted on holding fast to their “ignorance,” “smugness,” “indifference,” and “isolationism,” until Japanese bombs blasted Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Not until then did the American people see that President Roosevelt had been right from the beginning, rush in a solid body to the support of the war, and display a willingness to assume the moral responsibility to the whole world which they had surrendered and spumed almost immediately after World War I.

The widening of responsibility from the “evil men” in the Senate to include the people as a whole began before the Senate had acted on the Versailles Treaty. As early as the autumn of 1919 experienced editors in New York City informed Ray Stannard Baker, President Wilson’s confidant and aide, that “the American people were ‘fed up’ on the Peace Conference; they didn’t want to be bothered any more with the woes of Europe.”³

Apparently President Wilson himself finally came to the conclusion that it was the people, not merely the “evil men”

3. Baker, *American Chronicle*, p. 463.

in the Senate, who actually defeated the ratification of the Versailles Treaty at the end of World War I. According to a statement given to the press in May, 1945, by his daughter, Mrs. Eleanor Wilson McAdoo, Mr. Wilson said within his family circle a short time before his death in 1924: "It was right that the United States did not join the League of Nations. . . . I've been thinking about this for a long time. If we had joined the League when I asked for it, it would have been a great personal victory. But it would not have worked, because deep down in their hearts the American people didn't really believe in it. The time will come when this country will join such a league because they will know that it has to be. And then and then only will it work." 4

From year to year after 1920 the thesis of popular responsibility in the United States for the world's woes and wars was set forth in articles, books, pamphlets, and leaflets. Illustrations of it were as thick as autumn leaves in the literature of the period from 1920 to 1945. Professors, preachers, editors, publicists, columnists, and propagandists repeated it with a determination that increased in intensity as World War II approached and rose to fury after war broke in 1939.

The thesis of popular ignorance and responsibility was incisively presented many times, for instance, in the voluminous writings of Frederick L. Schuman, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College. In the professor's opinion it was the American people, or the "public," who demanded neutrality legislation and estopped President Roosevelt from leading or joining Great Britain, France, and Russia in a movement for "collective security" that would have prevented the war in Europe.

Speaking early in 1936 of the neutrality legislation then pending, in the *Nation*, February 12, 1936, Professor Schuman described it as "one part lunacy, one part stupidity, and one part criminal ignorance of diplomatic and economic realities." The bill in question as slightly modified passed the House on February 17, 1936, by a vote of 353 to 27. In favor

4. *New York World-Telegram*, May 8, 1945.

of the measure were 273 Democrats, 78 Republicans, and 2 Farm-Laborites; opposing were 11 Democrats, 9 Republicans, and 7 Progressives; the Senate passed the bill the following day without a record vote; and the President signed it on February 28. Judging by the action of Congress it is evident that “lunacy,” “stupidity,” and “criminal ignorance”—to use Professor Schuman’s epithets—were widespread among representatives of the people in the Government of the United States.⁸

Writing after the war had broken out in Europe in 1939, while President Roosevelt was assuring the American people that every effort of the Government would be directed to keeping the United States out of the war, Professor Schuman was again harsh in characterizing the American public and placing on the American people the failure to check the aggressors. In his *Night over Europe*, published early in 1941, the professor said: “No one knew better than he [President Roosevelt in 1940] that passive defense of the United States or of the ‘Western Hemisphere’ would become a strategic impossibility, mathematically certain to insure defeat, the moment that Britain surrendered.” Why was it that President Roosevelt “could say none of these things openly lest he be accused of ‘war mongering’?” The professor answered in language not quite so mathematical: President Roosevelt “knew that the public would flee, as from the devil, from any suggestion of belligerent participation [in the war], and that a motley crowd of pacifists, appeasers, isolationists, enemy agents, and muddleheads would seize upon his every move to impede the march of the aggressors as a basis for charging him with aiming at dictatorship and scheming to send American boys to die on foreign soil.”⁵⁶

While Professor Schuman castigated the American public for adhering to a foreign policy of isolation and non intervention, he did not entirely exculpate President Roose-

5. Vote in *American Year Book* (1936), p. 27. Charles A. Beard, *The Devil Theory of War* (Vanguard Press, 1936), p. 112.

6. *Night over Europe* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), p. 553.

velt. On the contrary he described the President, then facing an election campaign, as “a leader who preferred to follow his followers, as a prospective candidate who felt obliged to march behind the electorate rather than in front of it.”⁷ But this characterization of the President as less than ingenuous in no way softened Professor Schuman’s condemnation of the American people as guilty of criminal ignorance in matters of foreign policy.⁸

Another exposition of the popular-responsibility thesis by a distinguished citizen was set forth in an article entitled “America’s Faith—a Call for Revival,” published in the *New York Times Sunday Magazine* on July 18, 1943. The author of the exposition was Robert N. Wilkin, judge of the district court of the United States in northern Ohio. A loyal Democrat, appointed to his post by President Roosevelt in June, 1939, Judge Wilkin could write on foreign policy with warm feeling and in a tone of authority.

After placing “the chief responsibility for our nation’s default” in 1919-20 on the senatorial minority and after ascribing its opposition to animosity toward Woodrow Wilson, Judge Wilkin represented President Wilson as finally betrayed by the people. That “great intellect” had voiced the aspirations of humanity but could not maintain “the unity of his own people.” “That courageous and patient soul who had gained the acceptance of our faith from all the rest of the world⁹ had to witness the loss of that faith at home.” The President believed that “the people’s relapse would be followed by a revival.” Yet, declared Judge Wilkin, “the American people cannot be absolved from the doom of his prophecy.”

Having brought the American people to book and con-

7. *Ibid.*

8. For Professor Schuman’s later views and doubts, see “The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers,” *American Political Science Review*, XXXIX (February, 1944), 2-30.

9. For what “the rest of the world” demanded at the hands of President Wilson, see Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 324, 330, 331, 336, 350, 354, 363, 365, 372, 398, 403, 411, 413, 415, 421, 423.

victed them of a terrible sin against the aspirations of all humanity, Judge Wilkin asked how "we" could be redeemed. "What can we do to rectify our mistakes and minimize the consequences of our error? What retribution can we offer for the wrongs we have done? What can we do to be saved?"

Judge Wilkin offered his plan of salvation: "We must confess and repent. . . . There can be no spiritual health or strength in us until we are cleansed of our wilful error." The people must support measures in Congress looking to the establishment of a new world organization; they must demonstrate to American soldiers that their hopes are not in vain, "that we have forestalled another relapse into isolationism; that we have solemnly consecrated ourselves to the fulfilment of their sacrifice. . . . If we will give up our national irresponsibility and assume our share of international responsibility . . . we will be able to fill, with gratification to our selves and benefit to the world, the position to which we have been deputized by destiny."

The thesis of American responsibility for wrecking the League of Nations was partly if not fully underwritten by Carlton J. H. Hayes, the American Ambassador to Spain, in his *Wartime Mission to Spain, 1942-1945*,¹⁰ published late in 1945. On the first page of this volume Mr. Hayes says: "I

was henceforth [after 1918] a convinced and outspoken advocate of the League of Nations and of any agency or measure which might forward the cause of collective security and lessen the danger of another World War in which many more millions of Americans were sure to be involved. It seemed to me then, and it still does, that we who were decried in the partisan strife of 1920 as 'idealists' and 'dreamers' were far more realistic than those 'realists' who wrecked the League of Nations and pursued narrowly nationalist ends. Unfortunately for the present generation, there proved to be more 'realists' in those days than 'idealists.' "

Here in a brief passage are the presuppositions so com-

10. Published by The Macmillan Company.

monly taken for granted without analysis, namely, that the contest in the United States over the League of Nations was a “partisan” strife; that it was a struggle between idealists who were realists and alleged realists who did not know what they were doing; and that the United States was “sure” to be involved in the next war, in other words, fated to be involved in that war, as if it made no difference what policy other than internationalism was pursued by the Government of the United States. Leaving aside the problem of ontology implicit in the Ambassador’s assumptions as to realists and idealists and as to fate, here also is the clear intimation that American partisans, presumably Republicans on the whole, “wrecked the League of Nations” and were in some measure at least responsible for World War II.¹¹

One of the accompaniments of the thesis that the United States or the American people were responsible for World War II is the proposition, often associated with it, to the effect that the same American people who betrayed their responsibility to the world in 1920 or thereabouts were and still are capable of asserting superior moral leadership. Senator Pepper gave voice to this idea when he laid the blame for World War II on the Senate of the United States. In an address before the New York City College alumni on November 17, 1945, Abe Fortas, Under-Secretary of the Department of the Interior, declared: “We are the one nation in the world that can successfully assert the moral leadership necessary to guide the world to peace and

11. In respect of his own party views, Mr. Hayes wrote, on p. 7: “though I had voted for him [Mr. Roosevelt] in 1932 and 1936 and again in 1940, I had never taken an active part in politics, and my adherence to the Democratic party had been more ‘independent’ than regular. At no time then or afterwards did he or any other official of our Government ask me about my ‘politics.’”

12. *New York Times*, November 18, 1945. Mr. Fortas also warned his auditors that there was danger of another world war and added: “The burning question before us is whether we have the ability ... to change the world sufficiently to avoid this disaster. The answer is so largely dependent upon the people of the United States that every one of us shares an immediate and compelling responsibility.” About the same time Dr. Max Lerner, formerly a professor in Williams College, likewise indicated the way for exculpating Russia

An official document that in effect lent support to the thesis of popular responsibility for World War II, without mentioning it, was issued in March, 1942. It was presented in the Senate by John H. Overton, of Louisiana, and printed as Senate Document Number 188. The volume is entitled *Development of United States Foreign Policy* and embraces "Addresses and Messages of Franklin D. Roosevelt compiled from official sources, intended to present the chronological development of the foreign policy of the United States from the announcement of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933, including the War Declarations." Sixty-nine pages of the volume are given to addresses from 1933 to 1940 inclusive, and the remainder of the pages (70-150) to the years 1940 and 1941.

This official collection of pronouncements which purports to represent the foreign policy advocated by President Roosevelt from 1933 to 1942 contains only selected addresses and messages. With few exceptions, such as the Chautauqua speech of August 14, 1936, the selections showed consistency in President Roosevelt's foreign policy and revealed him as pursuing a substantially unbroken course from 1933 to 1942. The editor of the volume, whose name does not appear on the title page, not only confined the selections almost entirely to official messages and addresses; he omitted all of President Roosevelt's campaign speeches in which the President's foreign policy was repeatedly proclaimed to the people, from 1932, when he was seeking the Democratic nomination, to and including his campaign speeches of 1940; unless the Chautauqua address of 1936 be characterized as a campaign speech. In net result this exercise of the selective principle foreshadowed other statements of the thesis of popular responsibility, semi-official and official, which were to follow the publication of Senate Document Number 188.

and putting the blame for coming troubles and wars on the American people. Appealing to workers, farmers, businessmen, scientists, teachers, preachers, fathers and mothers, Dr. Lerner said on November 18, 1945: "The stakes are yours. The victims will be yours. The final decisions must be yours." *PM*, Sunday, November 18, 1945, p. 3.

The verdict that the American people, or at least a dominant portion of them, were afflicted with smugness and ignorance in matters of foreign policy, hampered President Roosevelt in pursuing his own policy, and were responsible for the catastrophe that marked the opening of the all-out war for Americans at Pearl Harbor was given semi-official confirmation by Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley in their volume, *How War Came: An American White Paper*, published in the summer of 1942. This work, if not officially inspired in a strict sense, was written by two well-known journalists who had easy access to the White House and the State Department.

In fact, both Mr. Davis and Mr. Lindley had what was called by reporters “an inside track” with the Roosevelt Administration. Mr. Lindley in particular had long been in sympathy with New Deal policies and had written extensively in defense of them even while he was connected with an opposition newspaper. His work of this nature had been duly appreciated by President Roosevelt. Although, like many New Dealers, Mr. Lindley had once been actively opposed to foreign entanglements and had favored concentration on domestic measures of reform, he later changed his mind and became a vigorous exponent of collective security. As an acknowledged supporter of the Administration’s foreign and domestic policies, Mr. Lindley was in a strategic position to secure inside information on the views and designs of the Executive Department.

The subtitle of the Davis and Lindley volume, *An American White Paper*, was so framed as to convey the impression that it had at least a kind of official *imprimatur*; for the words “White Paper” mean, in diplomatic usage, a government document containing selected papers on foreign affairs issued presumably for the information of the public. Hence in the case of *How War Came* the clear implication was that it constituted an official account of the war’s origins.

It is true that the authors in their Foreword declared that the book was “unofficial” and that they alone were “account

able.” But other statements in the Foreword, innumerable passages in the book, advertisements of the work, and various circumstances connected with its preparation and publication demonstrated that the volume was more than an “unofficial” report by two journalists who had at their command only the ordinary information available to all their colleagues in the profession.

On the jacket of the book the publishers were permitted to say: “This book tells the inside story of American foreign policy from the fall of France to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

. . . Never has such a job been reported in such intimate detail, so soon, and with such authority. *How War Came* abounds in news scoops and off-the-record revelations. It tells how President Roosevelt negotiated the destroyer-for-bases deal with Ambassador Lothian . . . tells who wrote which phrase in the Atlantic Charter and gives the historic circumstances in colorful and intimate detail. It discloses that Churchill, not Roosevelt, favored an immediate break with Japan. It explains why the Germans called Admiral Leahy the real ruler of unoccupied France. It lifts the veil on the Kurusu-Nomura conferences with Secretary Hull. . . .”

In an advertisement in the *New York Times*, August 25, 1942, the publishers of the Lindley-Davis volume said: “This book is a report to the American people, based on official records and the confidences of the men who made and are making American history. It is the first uncensored story of what has been going on in our own country and in our government from the fall of France to Pearl Harbor.”

In their American White Paper, Davis and Lindley emphatically presented the view that President Roosevelt, in 1940 and 1941, was committed to a foreign policy at variance with the policy to which the American people in general were committed. The conclusions of the authors in this respect may be summarized in the following statements:

1. President Roosevelt believed that a strong policy in the

period under consideration, but was obstructed in his proceedings by the sentiments of neutrality, peace, and isolationism all but universally cherished by the American people (p. 317).

2. The American people were afflicted by a “trancelike unawareness of peril” in 1941; and their attitude toward the Japanese peril in particular “may be attributed to a national sense of sufficiency, a smugness based on a continental state of mind, an indifference to and ignorance of the world about us” (p. 316). Davis and Lindley attributed this attitude in part to the “simple, kindly” and “optimistic” nature of the American people, given to ignoring “evil”; but they put smugness and ignorance in their catalogue of American characteristics.

3. Furthermore, Davis and Lindley said, during the pre war months the isolationists “helped to disarm the American people psychologically.” Forces “personified by Wheeler and Lindbergh”—two marked men on the White House list—“dinned the public’s ears with assurances of our immunity from danger” (p. 317).

4. It might have been better if “we” had “gone to war earlier, on our own volition,” instead of waiting for “the physical attack” (p. 317).

Here, then, in *How War Came*, is what purports to be the official view of President Roosevelt’s Administration on responsibility for the making of foreign policy and on war guilt: the American people in their “smugness” and “ignorance” insisted on a policy of peace and neutrality, and so prevented the President from effectively pursuing the correct line of strong action in conjunction with other powers arrayed against “aggressors,” until the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. In other words, the President was convinced that collaborative intervention in the conflict of Europe and Asia was the right policy but the American people, with contemptible stubbornness, clung to an opposite doctrine—non intervention and neutrality despite the wars raging in Europe and Asia.

The Davis and Lindley formulation of the theory that the American people's sentiments of isolation hampered President Roosevelt in the correct conduct of foreign affairs was given a certain official confirmation by the State Department, with caution and circumspection, in its edition of *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, published in July, 1943, Chapter I, entitled "The Fateful Decade."

In its statement the Department declared that, while the powers of the President and Secretary of State over foreign affairs are very great, they are nevertheless constrained by public opinion:

The conduct of the foreign relations of the United States is a function of the President, acting usually through the Secretary of State. The powers of the Executive in this field are very broad and sweeping. Yet the President and the Secretary of State have by no means entire freedom in matters of foreign policy. . . . They must closely approximate the prevailing views of the country.

Although the State Department did not, like Davis and Lindley, speak scornfully of American "ignorance of the world about us," it referred to the superiority of the Executive in matters of knowledge and to the duty of the President and Secretary of State to explain to the public "the forces at work." It said:

In the history of our country situations have arisen in which the Executive, with wide access to many sources of information from abroad, has known of or foreseen developments in foreign relations of which the public had not yet become aware. In such cases the President and the Secretary of State have exercised such executive powers as they possess and have endeavored to explain to the public the forces at work and the probable course of events and to outline the policies which need be pursued in the best interest of the United States. In such cases, if and as legislation has been needed, the executive branch of the

soon as practicable asked of the Congress legislation to make possible the pursuit of the proposed policies.¹³

During a large part of the period between 1931 and 1941, the State Department revealed, the President and the Secretary of State differed from the thesis respecting foreign affairs that was accepted by “much of public opinion,” and held views relative to foreign policy in conflict with this popular thesis:

During a large part of the period with which this volume deals [1931—41], much of public opinion in this country did not accept the thesis that a European war could vitally affect the security of the United States or that an attack on the United States by any of the Axis powers was possible. In this respect it differed from the President and the Secretary of State, who early became convinced that the aggressive policies of the Axis powers were directed toward an ultimate attack on the United States and that, therefore, our foreign relations should be so conducted as to give all possible support to the nations endeavoring to check the march of Axis aggression.

Our foreign policy during the decade under consideration necessarily had to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of public opinion in the United States away from the idea of isolation expressed in “neutrality” legislation and toward realization that the Axis design was a plan of world conquest in which the United States was intended to be a certain, though perhaps ultimate, victim, and that our primary policy therefore must be defense against actual and mounting danger. This was an important factor influencing the conduct of our foreign relations. Of determining importance also was another factor, namely, that in many nations outside the United States a similar complacency of view had originally prevailed and likewise was undergoing a gradual modification.

13. The President and the Secretary did not call for an abrogation of the Neutrality Act in principle when, in 1939, they asked for the repeal of the clauses laying an embargo on the export of munitions. On the contrary they both agreed with the opposition that the maintenance of neutrality was the great objective. They contended then that the supreme issue was merely one of the *method* most likely to achieve the objective of neutrality. See below, Chap. IX.

The pages which follow [of text and documents] show the slow march of the United States from an attitude of illusory aloofness toward world-wide forces endangering America to a position in the forefront of the United Nations that are making common cause against an attempt at world conquest unparalleled alike in boldness of conception and in brutality of operation.¹⁴

The interpretation as to the course of foreign affairs and policies between 1931 and 1941 thus given by the State Department is difficult to analyze in concrete terms of time (years, days, and moments) and of relevant facts and events which occurred in that decade. Yet a microscopic examination of the passages quoted above from the State Department's explanation and of the several sentences which make up the paragraphs yields some definite conclusions, while leaving unanswered many queries immediately pertinent to what the Department said.

The State Department's exposition declared that the President and Secretary of State were, in some measure, controlled in the conduct of foreign affairs by public opinion: "They must closely approximate the prevailing views of the country." The word "country" is abstract. The country holds no views: persons hold views—American people. The views which the President and Secretary had to approximate were "prevailing views," that is, views held by so many people, or by so many people of noteworthy influence, that the President and Secretary felt bound to "approximate" the said views.

In this sentence the President and Secretary are represented as if standing outside the public whose views they must approximate in conducting foreign affairs. Since the word "approximate" means "approach" or "nearly conform to," the sentence is to be understood as stating that the President and Secretary had some freedom of action in forming foreign policies and maneuvering under them, but not much.

14. *Peace and War*, pp. 2-3.

Or to put it in another way, their conduct of foreign affairs, whatever their own views, was in the main or on the whole determined by views prevailing among American people—views that came into being by some process beyond the control of the President and the Secretary.

In the third paragraph quoted above the State Department says that during “a large part of the period” from 1931 to 1941 “much of public opinion” in the United States accepted a “thesis” of foreign affairs which was not held by the President and the Secretary of State.

What was the thesis with regard to which much of public opinion differed from that of the President and the Secretary? Summarily, the thesis was this: a European war could not “vitally affect” the security of the United States and an attack on the United States by any of the Axis Powers was impossible.

It would be difficult to prove by an examination of the available evidences of public opinion from 1931 to 1941 that this was a correct formulation of the thesis held by “much of public opinion” against the view of the President and the Secretary of State; but the formulation by the State Department must be taken as it stands, as the State Department’s formulation.

Some other questions are immediately pertinent. Where among the available evidences of public opinion was this conviction as to immunity from danger of European war impacts on the United States so frequently proclaimed that it had to be accepted as truly or even fairly representative? Who among the people furnished much of the public opinion in support of the conception of the war’s meaning for the United States? What Senators and Representatives, what party platforms, what journals of opinion, what makers of opinion expounded the foreign policy of “isolation” from which the President and the Secretary dissented or began to dissent “early” in their official careers? In short who joined issue with the President and the Secretary over this “thesis”?

The State Department proffers no answer. Nor does it indicate by what process of inquiry, analysis, and documentation it arrived at its statement of the thesis.

This “thesis,” however judged as a statement of fact, evidently did not form the whole of the issue over which much of public opinion differed from the President and the Secretary of State. For in the next paragraph the State Department makes it clear that its first statement of the “thesis” was not entirely comprehensive. In that next paragraph it says: “our foreign policy” during the period, as shaped by the President and the Secretary, “necessarily had to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of public opinion in the United States away from the idea of isolation expressed in ‘neutrality’ legislation.”

It would seem, then, that the difference between “much of the public opinion” and the official policy of the President and the Secretary was over the idea of isolation or neutrality; for the purpose of the neutrality legislation was to “isolate the United States from war,” to preserve the neutrality of the United States in case of war. Therefore it must be inferred that what the President and the Secretary of State had to do in shaping foreign policy was to move gradually away from isolation and neutrality in an opposite direction.

The language of the State Department’s explanation yields with difficulty to the tests of etymology, philology, and grammar, but it appears to say that “early,” some time in advance of much of public opinion, the President and the Secretary privately came to the conclusion that isolation or neutrality for the United States was incompatible with “the best interest of the United States”¹⁶ and that some policy other than isolation or neutrality was desirable and necessary.

15. For an attempt to discover the meaning of “interest” as used in the diplomatic language of the United States from early times, see Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest* (The Macmillan Company, 1934). This study, which occupied about a year and a half, was made with the collaboration of two competent investigators, George H. E. Smith and John D. Lewis, with valuable assistance from experts in the Government of the United States. What the State Department meant by “best interest” of the United States

What was that other policy which the President and the Secretary “early” decided was in the best interest of the United States? Judging by the State Department’s exposition it consisted of two features: (1) the President and the Secretary “early became convinced that the aggressive policies of the Axis Powers were directed toward an ultimate attack on the United States and that, therefore, our foreign relations should be so conducted as to give all possible support to the nations endeavoring to check the march of Axis aggression”; and (2) that our primary policy . . . must be defense against mounting “danger” and must take the form of a “slow march . . . to a position in the forefront of the United Nations that are [1943] making common cause against an attempt at world conquest” by the Axis governments.

In sum and substance, assuming that all the sentences of its exposition have meaning, the State Department says: [“the President and the State Department “early” became convinced that the isolationism represented by neutrality legislation would have to be discarded; that “all possible support” would have to be given to the powers aligned against one or more Axis governments; and that the United States would have to take a position at the forefront of the nations engaged in conflict with one or more Axis governments. For, “all possible support” necessarily involves measures of war as well as measures short of war, and taking a position at the forefront of nations at war necessarily involves going to war.¹⁶

[In any event, it would appear from the State Department’s explanation, at some point in time between 1933 and 1941 President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull reached a great decision; namely that the policy of isolation, neutrality, and non-intervention in European-and Asiatic conflicts must be

by which the President and the Secretary learned that isolation or neutrality **was** not in the best interest of the United States set forth anywhere explicitly In that volume.

16. *If the statement of the State Department does not mean this, then just*

discarded and an opposite policy pursued by the Government of the United States, despite "much of public opinion" in the country arrayed against this policy. When was this great, indeed revolutionary, decision reached by the President and Secretary Hull? The State Department merely says the decision was reached "early." How early? In 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, or 1940? As to the exact year, or even the approximate time, the State Department's exposition gives no hint.

On what grounds was this decision reached at some time during the period in question? The State Department provides its answers: [the Executive had access to information from abroad through special sources and thus had knowledge of developments with which the public was unacquainted[^]

But the public, according to the State Department's report to the nation, was not kept in ignorance of the course of affairs abroad which warranted a reversal of the previous policy—neutrality, non-intervention, and peace for the United States—in favor of a different, or opposite, policy. On the contrary, to use its own words: "In such cases [of special knowledge pertaining to foreign affairs] the President and the Secretary of State . . . have endeavored to explain to the public the forces at work and the probable course of events and to outline the policies which need be pursued in the best interest of the United States."

[^]Taking these words as commonly understood, the President and the Secretary of State endeavored to explain to the people the nature of affairs abroad which called for a reversal of the foreign policy, then generally held to be sound, and endeavored to outline to the people the other policy which they deemed it necessary to carry out in the best interest of the United States. This version of the controversy is clear and intelligible. The only pertinent question left unanswered is: When and in what public documents did the President and the Secretary "outline" to the people the particular foreign policy upon which they had decided?

ptice justificatif appeared in 1943, President Harry S. Truman, more tersely, more bluntly, confirmed the thesis of popular responsibility for adherence to the wrong foreign policy prior to December 7, 1941. This confirmation he made at a press and radio conference on August 30, 1945.¹⁷ The immediate occasion of his remarks on this subject was a discussion of the reports on the Pearl Harbor catastrophe issued by the War and Navy Boards during the previous day, August 29, 1945; but his statement was broad in scope. It ran as follows in full:

I have read it [the Pearl Harbor reports] very carefully, and I came to the conclusion that the whole thing is the result of the policy which the country itself pursued.

The country was not ready for preparedness.

[Every time the President made an effort to get a preparedness program through the Congress, it was stifled.¹⁸]

Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of preparedness, he was vilified for doing it.

I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.

Terse and blunt though his statement was, President Truman exhibited doubts in his own mind as to where the war guilt lay. His first sentence makes "the whole thing . . . the result of the policy which the country itself pursued," but his last sentence apparently divides responsibility: "I think the country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor." Even so, taken in connection with the exposition of foreign policy given in *How War Came* by Davis and Lindley and in *Peace and War* by the State Department, President Truman's statement conforms to the thesis of popular responsibility for the course of affairs that eventuated in war.¹⁹

17. Official White House "Immediate Release," dated August 30, 1945. Paragraphing supplied in the above quotation for emphasis.

18. See Appendix to this Chapter.

19. On an earlier occasion Mr. Truman had said: "I am just as sure as I can be that this World War is the result of the 1919-1920 isolationist attitude."

Appendix to Chapter 11

President Truman's statement that "Every time the President made an effort to get a preparedness program through Congress, it was stifled," deserves technical consideration here. It is true that in loose conceptions of public affairs foreign policy is often treated as standing apart from "preparedness," from the appropriations of Congress for military and naval purposes; but in fact foreign policy and preparedness are inseparably linked in any wise and efficient administration of the national government. Foreign policy, whatever its nature, bears an intimate relation to the military force that can be brought to support it; and expenditures for military and naval purposes are in themselves, if rationally determined, expressions of actual or potential foreign policy.

In the financial practices of the United States Government the regular proposals for preparedness, for military and naval expenditures, are formulated in detail by the War Department and the Navy Department respectively, often in consultation with the President. These formulations are reviewed, approved, or modified by the Bureau of the Budget under the immediate direction of the President; and the final results in the form of "estimates" for military and naval appropriations are transmitted to Congress by the President in a regular message or in supplementary messages in case of special requests to Congress. These "estimates" from the President's office are used as the basis for "appropriations" by Congress, which may increase or decrease the amount of the expenditures proposed in the Executive's "estimates."

The "estimates" for military and naval expenditures for each year, therefore, represent the President's "preparedness program" at the time; and the actual "appropriations" by Congress for such expenditures show whether or how far Congress "stifled" the President's particular "preparedness program."

Both the estimates and the appropriations are matters of public record in the official documents of the United States. Thus in disputable mathematical data are at hand for testing the accuracy of President Truman's declaration that "Every time the President made an effort to get a preparedness program through Congress, it was stifled."

The essential facts bearing on President Truman's allegation

are set forth below in a table which was compiled by the Legislative Reference Library in the Library of Congress. In column 4 appear the estimates for military and naval expenditures presented to the session of the Congress indicated in column 1; and in column 6 are given the appropriations made by Congress after its consideration of the estimates. A comparison of the figures in these two columns shows how much Congress in its actual appropriations decreased or increased the amounts requested in the Executive estimates.

During five of the eight years under review Congress failed to grant to the President all the money he requested for preparedness but in no year was the reduction so drastic as to "stifle" his preparedness program.²⁰ In three of the eight years Congress appropriated more money than was requested in the Executive estimates. And in the grand totals for the eight years, it is evident, Congress exceeded Executive estimates by \$1,874,513,033. In deed as war approached Congress became more lavish than the President in conceiving the needs of preparedness. At all events the figures in gross and detail show that President Truman's statement on August 30, 1945, was lacking in the accuracy that becomes a declaration by the President of the United States, at all events in denouncing Congress, a coordinate branch of the national government.

A special incident often associated with the alleged congressional "stifling" of President Roosevelt's preparedness proposals involved a scheme to fortify Guam, that came up early in 1939 and has frequently been cited as an example of the way in which Congress refused to heed the President's requests for additional military and naval appropriations in the interest of national defense. It was said at the time and later that President Roosevelt actually called for the fortification of Guam. But records of his press conference in January, 1939, dispose of that contention.

Asked at his conference on January 17, 1939, about a report from Tokyo to the effect that the Japanese fleet would smash the American fleet if an attempt was made to fortify Guam, the President said: "Has an appropriation been asked of this

10. In some cases there were legitimate grounds for differences of opinion as to the need and utility of specific items in the list of requests, particularly when the Navy Department had not started the construction of ships already authorized and provided for in appropriations previously made.

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for the fortification of Guam? Answer yes or no. Let's stick to facts and brass tacks. . . . When the Navy goes up on the Hill, I will be able to say whether an appropriation is to be requested."

At a press conference three days later, January 20, 1939, the President was asked to say whether he favored the appropriation of \$5,000,000 for the fortification of Guam. According to a stenographic record, he "turned back the question to inquire whether it had been proposed to 'fortify' the island and explained that the money was largely for dredging the harbor." He then explained to the reporters the fundamental difference between an "authorization" by Congress and an "appropriation." Asked whether there need be any confusion in anyone's mind as to where he stood on the proposed fortification of Guam, the President said: "I don't think there is any confusion; I am in favor of deepening the harbor at Guam. . . ." Asked whether he favored the other appropriations for Guam including a million dollars for a landing-field improvement and the same amount for barracks, the President said he favored the whole appropriation because the barracks were in bad shape and were inadequate to house the small number of marines who were sitting on the islands. In other words Congress was not called upon by President Roosevelt in January, 1939, to appropriate money for the *fortification* of Guam.

It is fair to say that President Truman later changed his mind about the way Congress stifled President Roosevelt's preparedness programs. August 30, 1945, he said: "Every time the President made an effort to get a preparedness program through Congress, it was stifled." In his Jackson day address, March 23, 1946,

President Truman said: "At that time [before the United States went to war], our isolationists were still debating, and *almost* defeating, *most* efforts of Democratic leaders to improve the national defenses." (Italics supplied.) *Congressional Record*, March 25, 1946, p. A1682.

According to this version, the isolationists almost, but not quite, defeated, not all but most of the preparedness measures advanced by Democratic leaders. It would seem that President Roosevelt's preparedness program was not stifled every time, but *almost* defeated in *most* cases, that is, not defeated or stifled. So, at least it appears in President Truman's latest redaction of

CHAPTER III

Problems Posed by Charges of War Guilt

Whether the guilt of bringing on the second World War was in fact attributable to the “evil men” in the Senate, to the “undemocratic” provision of the Constitution which requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate for the ratification of treaties, to the refusal of President Wilson to accept reservations to the proposed Treaty of Versailles, to his resolve to make the matter of ratification a partisan issue, to the “ignorant” and “smug” adherents of isolationism among the people at large, to “much of public opinion” which opposed renewed entanglements in European and Asiatic quarrels, to the “country,” to the “United States,” or to “America,” a multiplicity of charges certainly lodged the culpability somewhere in the United States after 1919.

There is a conjuncture of allegations relative to the making of foreign policy and the conduct of government unparalleled in the history of great nations: a multitude of people within a great society ascribe to that society or to some persons, some things, or some events in that society the responsibility for bringing on a world war. Being an unparalleled historic phenomenon intimately related to the fate and fortunes of the American Republic among the nations of the earth, it presents to American citizens a question of origins and meanings with intellectual and moral ramifications that run to the very roots of constitutional government. How did it happen, how could it happen, that so many American citizens looked homeward for the sources of this evil doing? How did it happen, how could it happen that they fomented or accepted a thesis which, in upshot, acquitted foreign nations of guilt, put the burden on or in the United States, and set the American people at variance with their own representative government? Here is posed a primary problem in

history and political science that calls for a searching examination, if the matter of how we are governed under the Constitution continues to deserve consideration.

Owing to the profusion and, in some instances the vagueness, of the charges involved in the indictment, it is difficult to present the thesis with precision. The matter is further complicated by the introduction of partisan interpretations into the allocation of guilt. For example, Walter Johnson, historian of the battle against isolationism, says: "The Republican party during the interval between the two wars was predominately isolationist. A few notable exceptions, like Secretary of State Stimson, Elihu Root, Nicholas Murray Butler, and William Allen White, were internationalists. . . . However, the isolationist attitude of such men as William E. Borah dominated the Republican party. When the Democratic party came back into power in 1933, it was still the party of Wilsonian internationalism. From 1933 to 1939 the United States Government followed a policy of attempting to improve international relations and thus prevent the collapse of world peace. . . . President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were avowed internationalists. . . ."¹

Another difficulty encountered in efforts to formulate the thesis with precision is due to the fact that many critics, who located the responsibility for World War II in the United States, at the same time brought charges of guilt against the "aggressors," namely, Germany, Italy, and Japan. It was these offenders, they said, who first disturbed the peace of the world after 1919; while the overwhelming majority of nations were in fact "peace loving" all along. If, then, a share of the war guilt must be assigned in truth to Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito, the whole responsibility for the second World War can scarcely be placed on or in the United

1. *The Battle against Isolation*, pp. 10 ff. On the jacket of Mr. Johnson's book, published by the University of Chicago Press (1944), the following judgment is expressed: "Isolationism, which here stands condemned by its own lies, must not have another chance."

States. In this case the thesis of war guilt is made more complicated for seekers after the truth of the business.

Should the thesis of responsibility for World War II be so formulated as to lay a share of the blame on other nations² or on the three aggressors, an examination of its validity would assume Herculean proportions. It would involve, first of all, an informed judgment on the most perplexing questions of historical interpretation, including the issues connected with "causation" and "free will" in the making of history, national and universal.³ It would also raise special questions of challenging intricacy; for example, at what point in time should history of the "blameworthy" nations be taken up in search for the characteristics to which war guilt is to be ascribed? Or again, for instance, how did Japan, after clinging to a hermit-like foreign policy for more than two hundred years, rather suddenly acquire, near the end of the nineteenth century, the propensities of a rabid imperialism and crusade against "white" supremacy in the Far East? Moreover, an inquiry so broad in scope would call for a mastery of languages, documentation, and philosophic thinking which few, if any, students of history or political science command.

Undoubtedly the matter of the responsibility attributable to other nations has a direct and great relevance to the problem of responsibility in general; and unless it is seriously considered, the discussions of the subject are not likely to rise above the level of mere clichés, empty abstractions, and partisan or sectarian slogans. Relevant also to the larger view

2. The State Department, while attributing much of the difficulty encountered by the Roosevelt Administration to isolationist opinion in the United States, also lays some of the blame on other peace-loving nations: "Of determining importance also was another factor, namely, that in many nations outside the United States a similar complacency of view had originally prevailed" during the period in question. *Peace and War* (July, 1943), p. 3.

3. As to the complications of historical interpretation and efforts to determine "causes" in human affairs, see R. Aron, *Introduction d la philosophie de l'histoire*; especially sections on *la pluralite des systemes d'interpretations*, *le determinisme historique et la pensee causale*, and *les limites de l'objectivite causale et de la causalite historique*.

is the question as to how the American people originally acquired a tenacious attachment to the doctrine of hemispheric independence on the one side and non-entanglement in the conflicts of Europe and Asia on the other side. But an investigation of these broader phases of war guilt is beyond the scope of the present volume.

Another limitation on this survey is to be emphasized. It is responsibility for *foreign policy* that comes into purview; and foreign policy is to be carefully distinguished from *foreign affairs*. A policy is a rule, plan, or program to be followed in practice, to be implemented by actions, affairs, deeds done under its direction and control. Policy is also to be distinguished from ambiguous pronouncements respecting peace, good will, friendly relations, promotion of commerce, encouragement of cultural intercourse, adherence to international morality, and approval of universal philanthropy, such as the State Department issued with profusion between 1933 and 1940/ Policy is a definite design which has meaning in the concrete terms of the actions necessarily signified and conveys to common understanding the practical purport of the language used in expressing it.

Whatever may be said of responsibility for foreign policy, in general, the thesis that locates in the United States the responsibility for the policy that eventuated in World War I¹⁸ is the thesis that has the most immediate relevance to

4. For example, Secretary Hull's peace manifesto to the world on July 16, 1937, the "principles" of which were quickly accepted, with apparent cordiality, by the great powers that were soon to be at war. Portugal alone raised **Issues**. It joined the other governments in approving what it called "the assertions, advices, or wishes" of Secretary Hull but filed objections against "the habit of entrusting the solution of grave external problems to vague formulae." State Department press release, September 18, 1937.

y. The contention that World War II would not have occurred if the United States had joined the League of Nations is, of course, a mere matter of opinion, informed or uninformed. The hypothesis cannot be tested by repeating the events and conditions of 1919-39, with the United States in the League, and thus proving the case the one way or the other. If the United States had been a member of the League after 1919, would it have quickly recognized Russia as a make-weight in Europe or would it have cooperated with Great Britain in the rehabilitation of Germany and the appeasement of Hitler from 1934 to

American character and the conduct of government in the United States. Insofar as this thesis applies to the period from 1933 to 1940, it involves the following features:

1. The country or, to use the State Department's language, "much of public opinion," insisted that the President and the State Department must pursue the policy of "isolation expressed in 'neutrality' legislation"; that is, the policy of neutrality, non-entanglement, non-intervention, and peace for the United States in the presence of conflicts and wars among European and Asiatic powers.

2. At some point in time—"early," according to the State Department report—President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull adopted and endeavored to outline to the American public a policy at variance with "the idea of isolation." If they had been permitted to carry it into effect, they would have served due notice on all aggressors and, in collaboration with the peace-loving nations, prevented the outbreak of World War II—that is, maintained the peace of the world.

3. But the country or the people or much of public opinion or the isolationists blocked President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in pursuing their policy effectively, stifled the President's preparedness program, kept the neutrality legislation on the statute books, lulled the country into a false security, and hence must bear the responsibility for the progress of aggressors in Europe and Asia which finally and inevitably "drew" the United States into the war in spite of peace.

In any attempt to test the validity of the thesis of popular responsibility for foreign policy formulated in this manner certain questions become self-evident. Under whose influence or sponsorship did the policy of non-entanglement, peace, and neutrality for the United States in a warring world secure and maintain so strong a hold on the people or the country, especially between 1933 and 1940? Did Presi*

1939? The best of answers can be nothing more than calculations of probabilities. «

dent Roosevelt and Secretary Hull or the Democratic leadership with which they were affiliated consistently oppose the development of the isolationism expressed by this policy? Or did they contribute in any material way to the strength of the grip which that policy had upon the people or the country? At what point in time during these "fateful years" did the President and the Secretary decide that the policy of neutrality and isolation cherished by the people of the country was untenable and announce to the public that another foreign policy—one opposed to it—was in the best interest of the United States? In what addresses, speeches, or statements did the President and the Secretary present to the country their fateful decision and their outline of a foreign policy adverse to isolation, neutrality, and peace for the United States?

These questions point to matters that are public in nature and answers to them are to be sought in the public speeches, addresses, papers, and other documents of the time, which are available to all citizens. The questions are questions of plain historical facts. A search for answers calls for no special {lowers of insight or cognition, and conclusions having at cast a high degree of relevance and sufficiency can be easily drawn from public records strictly germane to the problem under consideration. It is to an examination of these records that the following pages are devoted.

Although the inquiry thus undertaken is historical in character, it is concerned directly with the making of American foreign policy—with methods, personalities, parties, interests, and tactics involved in the process. At the same time it has a distinct bearing on the conduct of foreign affairs by the Government of the United States; on the responsibilities of officials and party leaders to the people of the United States; on the relations of the Executive and Legislative Departments in practice and with reference to measures best calculated to assure the fulfilment of the obligations assigned to each Department by the Constitution; on the procedures of diplomacy appropriate to a country dedicated to popular

government, freedom of the press, and the education of the people in matters of the public interest; and, finally, on the fortunes of constitutional and representative democracy in the United States and also in the world, to which, many Americans urge, this system is both fitting and applicable.

CHAPTER IV

Preliminary: Attitudes of Democratic Leadership in 1924 and 1928

Judging by party platforms in 1916, surveys of editorial views, and other indices of public opinion, a large majority of the American people then agreed in principle that the United States should join some kind of league or association of nations in the hope of preventing another great war. After President Wilson presented to the country in 1919 the Treaty of Versailles, with the Covenant of the League of Nations incorporated in the text, many Americans, however, shrank from just that type of organization and expressed unwillingness to approve the Treaty without reservations, minor or major. Nevertheless, in the campaign of 1920 the Democrats endorsed the League, while allowing for limited reservations, and the Republicans advocated an undescribed form of "agreement among nations to preserve the peace of the world." Hence it could be reasoned, with historical justification, that, despite the Republican landslide which overwhelmed the Democrats in the election of 1920, internationalism had not been definitely rejected by the people of the United States at the polls.

Not until 1924 did the Republicans put into their platform an official declaration that appeared to reject the League Covenant once and for all: "This government has definitely refused membership in the League of Nations or to assume any obligations under the Covenant of the League. On this we stand." But as against this categorical assertion, their platform also hinted at the desirability of cooperation with the League in certain limited respects. At all events numerous distinguished Republicans still clung to internationalism, and hoped that the United States would gradually move in the di-

reaction of closer "cooperation" with the League of Nations, and perhaps at length enter it formally.

As the Democrats assembled in New York for their convention of 1924 they found themselves sharply divided over internationalism in the specific form then presented—the League of Nations. One group, including Thomas Taggart, national committeeman from Indiana, stood out against incorporating in the platform any plank that tied the party to the League.¹ Another group, associated with William G. McAdoo, an aspirant for the nomination, was conveniently vague on the issue, for it was claiming, or at least seeking, the active support of William Randolph Hearst, a persistent foe of the League. In an address to delegates who were supporting his candidacy, Mr. McAdoo avoided endorsing the League but declared that one of the real tasks before the country was "to end the era of isolation and to begin the era of cooperation in foreign affairs; to promote peace and further reduce the burden of both land and sea armaments to the lowest point compatible with national safety."² This may not have been entirely satisfactory to Mr. Hearst, but it was more politic than an explicit approval of the League. ; ;

A third group of Democrats at the New York convention of 1924, led by Newton D. Baker, favored a straightforward endorsement of the League and American adherence to it, with moderate reservations. With this group of delegates various propaganda organizations, such as the League of Nations Association and the Foreign Policy Association, cooperated in the hope of pledging the Democratic party once more to internationalism.³ §

To the aid of Mr. Baker's group came the *New York Times*. In an editorial on June 23, 1924, it criticized those Democrats who were inclined to sidestep the League issue^{<^} and asserted that they now had even better reasons for'

1. *New York Times*, June 23, 1924.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

espousing it than they had in 1920. "It is at such a time," the editorial went on, "that Democrats are advised to soft-pedal the League in their platform! The League does not need endorsement from them, but they need to associate themselves more positively than ever with its advancing success. Of little use will be vague and pious platitudes holding out the hope of cooperating with Europe in restoring peace and stability, ways and methods not mentioned. If we honestly mean to cooperate, how is it possible to shut our eyes to the one great cooperating agency already in existence and functioning well?"

In stating his own case for a positive commitment to the League Mr. Baker said that he would work out a modified plank on the League of Nations; that he would not be uncompromising in his position but would be willing to accept a League platform with reservations which would satisfy those who were opposed to Articles X and XVI. Mr. Baker was obliquely supported in his strategy by Col. E. M. House who sent the following suggestion to Cordell Hull: "The Democrats should declare in their platform that if successful at the polls next November they will pledge the President to ask Congress by joint resolutions to authorize the United States to become an associate member of the League of Nations, without in any way committing the country to the covenant. Thus the fears of the timid could be dispelled regarding a superstate and an entangling alliance. . . ."4 Colonel House also declared that it was not enough for the United States to adhere to the World Court without making use of the machinery of the League of Nations.®

When the resolutions committee of the Democratic convention was organized- on June 24 to hear proposals for planks in the platform, the pro-League forces, headed by Mr. Baker, then advocated the adoption of a plank identical with that incorporated in the 1920 platform. In presenting the

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

plank of the Woodrow Wilson Democracy, Judge Westcott declared that Woodrow Wilson would have succeeded had it not been for the betrayal by Henry Cabot Lodge, "the Judas Iscariot of humanity," and wanted to know whether there were any Henry Cabot Lodges in the Democratic party.⁶

A fourth group of Democrats at the convention, while expressly favorable to the League of Nations, urged that the commitment of the United States to the League could be hastened by taking the question out of party politics. The foremost leader of this group was William Jennings Bryan, who in 1920 had pleaded with President Wilson to make terms with Republican Senators, secure a ratification of the Treaty of Versailles with reservations, and avoid making a strict partisan issue of the League in the election campaign of that year. In 1924 Mr. Bryan was still convinced that by removing the League from the arena of partisanship many Republicans would be won over and that with their help the two-thirds vote might be obtained in the Senate. As head of the subcommittee of the Resolutions Committee, Mr. Bryan was able to effect a substantial agreement on a plank which reaffirmed President Wilson's faith in the League, declared for adherence with reservations, and proposed an independent referendum on the question, free from personalities, candidates, and party interests.⁷

Mr. Baker refused to accept the proposed plank and announced that he would offer a minority report to the full committee advocating immediate entrance into the League.⁸ The full committee, however, rejected Mr. Baker's project by a decisive vote in favor of a plank including a provision for a referendum. Thereupon Mr. Baker resolved to carry the fight to the floor of the convention.⁹

Mr. Baker's impassioned plea for the League of Nations

6. *Ibid.*, June 25, 1924.

7. *Ibid.*, June 26, 1924.

8. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1924.

9. *Ibid.*, June 28, 1924.

proved to be one of the most dramatic events of the convention. Of the majority's scheme for a referendum he spoke scornfully:

. . . what does the majority report do? With praiseful and perfumed voice it praises the League of Nations as a lover would address his sweetheart. Everything that fanciful words and artistic and cunning expressions of praise can do is done to express the admiration and approval of the majority of the committee for the League of Nations. . . .

. . . after having said that there is no substitute for the League of Nations, that the world will be a wreck unless war is prevented, that the only path to peace is the League of Nations . . . there is not one syllable in this that proposes that we shall go into the League of Nations until after a fanciful, illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary referendum shall have been called, operated either by postal cards or through the Census Bureau or in some other way, for there is neither constitutional basis for a statute nor a statute which provides for a national referendum.

I know what my associates on this committee thought as they sat over and drew that. They said the people who will be in that convention at least are people who four years ago were willing to have died for the ideal of the League of Nations. We must speak well enough of it to satisfy their devotional affection for it, and so they have spoken, and then after having marched through the dictionary with all these superb epithets of praise and approval, they give it their confidence, but promise it no aid of any kind. 10

Mr. Baker also maintained that those who favored a League only after a referendum had been taken were, in effect, following the method Lodge had adopted to defeat the League.

In the contest Mr. Baker lost. The convention adopted the plank which the majority of the Resolutions Committee presented. As it finally appeared in the platform the plank affirmed the desire of Democrats to see the United States

10. Text of debate on League, *New York Times*, June 29, 1924.

resume her place of "moral leadership" in the world, and then added:

There is no substitute for the League of Nations as an agency working for peace; therefore we believe that, in the interest of permanent peace, and in the lifting of the great burdens of war from the backs of the people, and in order to establish a permanent foreign policy on these supreme questions, not subject to change with change of party Administrations, it is desirable, wise and necessary to lift this question out of party politics and to that end to take the sense of the American people at a referendum election, advisory to the Government, to be held officially under act of Congress, free from all other questions and candidacies, after ample time for full consideration and discussion throughout the country, upon the question, in substance, as follows:

"Shall the United States become a member of the League of Nations upon such reservations or amendments to the Covenant of the League as the President and the Senate of the United States may agree upon?"

Immediately upon an affirmative vote we will carry out such mandate.¹¹

By separating the League of Nations from the political contest the Democrats, in effect, divorced their party from a definite pledge to take the United States into the League if victorious at the polls in November. In other words they now repudiated the tactics which President Wilson had insisted upon in 1920 and refused to put the fortunes of their party at stake on any such turn in American foreign policy.

The disaster which overtook the Democrats in the election of 1924 was even greater than the landslide that crushed them in 1920. When they brought their shattered ranks to gether in convention in 1928, they decided to give inter nationalism a cold shoulder and let it drop into innocuous desuetude; while the Republicans toyed with a brand of limited international cooperation all their own.

Before the platform was formally presented at the Demo-

11. *New York Times*, June 29, 1924.

cratic convention in 1928, Newton D. Baker, who had led a forlorn struggle for the League four years previously, announced that he would not oppose eliminating the League issue from the party's obligations. "I do not plan," Mr. Baker stated publicly, "to try again for a plank favoring immediate entrance into the League. I do not think this is the time for it. I would favor a plank urging sympathetic and effective cooperation in the task of preserving the peace of the world. I will not oppose the dropping of the League of Nations plank from the 1928 platform, but I wish to say that I have not changed my mind as to the desirability of the United States joining the League and taking its place as one of the leaders in this movement that developed as the result of the war." Mr. Baker also assured his Democratic colleagues that he approved membership in the World Court; and while American sentiment was not yet ready for joining the League, in his opinion, it would eventually endorse such a step when the League showed its effectiveness.¹²

In their platform of 1928 as finally drawn, the Democrats charged the Republican Administration with having no foreign policy, applauded the outlawry of war, expressed abhorrence for militarism, conquest, and imperialism, denounced interference with the purely internal affairs of Latin-American countries, favored international agreements for the reduction of armaments, and asserted that in our foreign relations "this country should stand as a unit." The platform made no reference to the League of Nations. It did endorse "full, free, and open cooperation with all other nations for the promotion of peace and justice throughout the world, and approve international conciliation, arbitration, and conference." But it countered this clause of convenient vagueness by committing the party to that central principle of isolationism: "freedom from entangling political alliances with foreign nations."

In his numerous campaign speeches reported in the *New York Times* the Democratic candidate, Alfred E. Smith,

dealt only twice with foreign policy at some length; and a careful search of the *Times* files for the year reveals no reference in his speeches to the League of Nations by name or in deed any Statement which even a vivid imagination could construe as expressing any sympathy with the contention that the United States should then consider joining it. Although at one point Mr. Smith appeared to approve the idea that the United States should be willing to attend "any meeting where fifty-five nations come together," by no verbal adroitness could this remark be interpreted to mean an appeal to the country for a rally to internationalism, particularly in view of all that Mr. Smith said to the contrary.¹³

On August 22, 1928, in his address accepting the nomination, Mr. Smith said:

I approve the effort to renew and extend the arbitration treaties negotiated under the Administration of President Wilson. But the usefulness of those treaties as deterrents of war is materially impaired by the reservations asserted by various nations of the right to wage defensive wars, as those reservations are interpreted in the light of President Coolidge's record. Defending his policies he announced on April 25, 1927, the doctrine that the person and property of a citizen are a part of the national domain, even when abroad. . . . Our unwarranted intervention in internal affairs in Latin-America and this specious reason for it constitute the basis upon which other countries may seek to justify imperialistic policies which threaten world peace and materially lessen the effectiveness which might otherwise lie in the multilateral treaties. The real outlawry of war must come from a more substantial endeavor to remove the causes of war, . . . I am not a jingo. I believe that the people of this country wish to \$

13. The results of an independent search of the *New York Times* files mentioned above are confirmed by an authority in the field of international affairs, Arthur Sweetser, *American Year Book* (1928), p. 71. As a member of the League of Nations Secretariat, Mr. Sweetser was always on the lookout for any political utterances that indicated a tendency toward internationalism on the part of candidates for the presidency and the Government of the United States. He had to report that in 1928 the Democrats omitted even the name of the League from the platform and that in his campaign speeches, Mr. Smith "avoided specific reference."

live in peace and amity with the world. Freedom from entangling alliances is a fixed American policy. It does not mean, however, that great nations should not behave to one another with the same decent friendliness and fair play that self-respecting men and women show to one another. . . .

I believe the American people desire to assume their fair share of responsibility for the administration of a world of which they are a part, without political alliance with any foreign nation. I pledge myself to a resumption of a real endeavor to make the outlawry of war effective by removing its causes and to substitute the methods of conciliation, conference, arbitration and judicial determination.¹⁴

At another point in his acceptance address, Mr. Smith assailed the practice of making Executive agreements with Latin-American governments, subject to no action by the Senate:

To no declaration of our platform do I more heartily commit myself than the one for the abolition of the practice of the President of entering into agreements for the settlement of internal disputes in Latin-American countries, unless the agreements have **been** consented to by the Senate as provided for in the Constitution of the United States. . . .^{1B}

It was only at Baltimore, October ; 9, 1928, that Mr. Smith gave a full exposition of his views respecting correct foreign policy for the United States; and these views, to say the least, afforded no more comfort to internationalists than had the orotund phrases of Warren Gamaliel Harding in 1920.

. . . in my speech of acceptance I said that any foreign policy finally adopted by this country had to spring from the majority will of the rank and file of the people and could not be handed down to them from the head of the Government.

I could go a step further and amplify that for you just a bit by

¹⁴. *New York Times*, August 23, 1928,
Ibid.

calling your attention to the fact that the Constitution of the United States provides for a two-thirds vote in the Senate for a ratification of a treaty with a foreign power.

It unquestionably was the intent of the forefathers, when they put that provision into the Constitution, to raise treaty making above the level of mere legislative or of partisan politics, and to make the vote of the Senate express the overwhelming majority sentiment of the American people. . . .

At times I found it difficult to escape the conclusion that in the handling of our foreign affairs it is largely the personal equation; plus that, the desire behind it to do the right, fair, square thing; plus that, I regard it as necessary that we have an administration of our public affairs that will adhere to a definite policy as far as one can be enunciated. . . .

Now, we are all prepared to agree with the declaration that it is the foremost duty of the Government to protect the life and property of the citizens of our country, but at the same time we must subscribe to the undoubted and indisputable theory that; we have no right to meddle in the internal affairs of any other country. . . .

I believe just as firmly as a man can in the great brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God, and I am satisfied that the American people are prepared and ready to do their full share in the administration of a world of which they are a great part; In that belief, and with that in mind, it would be the duty of the Democratic Administration to make every effort and every endeavor to make the outlawry of war an effective thing.

And this, we hold, can be done by removing the causes of war and substituting the methods of conciliation, arbitration and', judicial determination. . . .

Only by executive leadership, only by Congressional cooperation and only by public support can we hope or even think of a solution of the problems that lie before us. . . .

Only by that method can we hope for arbitration and concilia-^{*} tion and a peaceful settlement of all disputes. Only by- that?- method can we hope for an agreement between the great naval powers that will lift from all the backs of the people the crush-^{*} mg burden of naval armament. . . .

The Democratic Party, in its platform and in its declaration of

principles, promises ... an open, an honest, a fearless and an unprejudiced approach to every one of these questions absolutely on the basis of their merit.¹⁶

One of the major events of the campaign in 1928 was the return of Franklin D. Roosevelt to active political life after a heroic battle with a crippling illness. Before that affliction forced him into retirement, he had risen rapidly in the councils of the Democratic party. In 1910 he had been elected to the Senate of New York and was serving there when President Wilson called him to the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1913, which he held for about seven years. In 1920 he had accepted his party's nomination **as** candidate for Vice-President and made an extended campaign, giving ardent support to the party's position in favor of the League of Nations, with minor reservations, and the type of internationalism represented by that association. Shortly afterward he was laid low by a stroke of paralysis **and** not until 1928 did he resume his political career. In that year he championed the candidacy of Alfred E. Smith; he placed Mr. Smith's name before the Democratic convention **as** an aspirant for the nomination; later, on the insistence of Mr. Smith, he became the Democratic candidate for Governor of New York; and he entered enthusiastically into the campaign, state and national.

During the period of his political inactivity Mr. Roosevelt had taken little or no part in the internecine conflict among Democrats over the League of Nations and internationalism, and with considerable expectancy the warm advocates of the League awaited from him a statement of his position on the subject in 1928. But he failed to satisfy that interest. Not once in his speeches reported in the *New York Times* did he endorse or even mention the League of Nations by name. In only two of his reported speeches during the campaign did he make any material reference to foreign affairs; and after

16. *Ibid.*, October 30, 1928.

the tariff issue became “hot” he lent support to Mr. Smith’s position on that controversial theme.¹⁷

In calling upon the Democratic convention to nominate Mr. Smith as the party’s candidate for the presidency, Mr.

Roosevelt said: “If the vision of real world peace, of the abolishment of war, ever comes true, it will not be through the mere mathematical calculations of a reduction of armament program, nor the platitudes of multilateral treaties piously deprecating armed conflict. It will be because this nation will select as its head a leader who understands the human side of life, who has the force of character and the keenness of brain to take, instinctively, the right course. . . .”¹⁸ Mr. Roosevelt insisted that the election of Mr. Smith would be the “greatest possible step forward in our relations with the other nations of the world.” He described Mr. Smith as “one who believes that nations are not very different from individuals and who believes that more can be accomplished by sitting down around the table and talking matters over than fighting it out with their fists.” To this he added that if we want to end war “let us take up with the other nations the elimination of the cause of war.”¹⁹

At Manchester, Georgia, on October 2, 1928, Mr. Roosevelt discussed foreign affairs at some length and, without mentioning the League of Nations, except as “a plan” advanced by President Wilson, contented himself with refer-

17. In an article in *Foreign Affairs* for July, 1928, Mr. Roosevelt joined issue with Ogden Mills on the subject of “Our Foreign Policy,” and stated “A Democratic View” of it. In this article Mr. Roosevelt said that even without our participation the League of Nations had become “for the rest of the world the principal agency for the settlement of international controversy,” but he did not advocate the entrance of the United States into the League; he defended, as excellent pieces of “constructive work,” and yet declared that as net result of these instances and recently of the far less justified intervention in Nicaragua the United States had fewer friends in the Western hemisphere,” (pp. 573 fl.). Although it was favorable to internationalism, at least for Europe, Mr. Roosevelt’s article gave no consolation to Democrats who advocated joining the League of Nations. At all events, since *Foreign Affairs* had only a small circulation among “intellectuals,” his exposition of foreign policy had little if any influence in the campaign.

18. *New York Times*, June 28, 1928.

19. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1928.

ences to the resumption of moral leadership under the auspices of the Democratic party. The principal passages of the Manchester address follow:

There has been a change in the attitude of the rest of the world toward this country. Ten years ago we held a position of leadership among all the nations of the world. This was because we were seeking an ideal, the ideal of bringing about such an organization among the peoples of the world that there never again would be another war such as the one which had just been concluded.

Once in 1919 I was talking with Premier Clemenceau of France on the subject of disarmament.

"Mr. Roosevelt," he said to me, "do you realize that in a thousand years there has never been a generation of Frenchmen who went through life without seeing their nation involved in war?"

We can't say much better for ourselves, can we? The Revolution, the so-called war with France in 1800, the War of 1812, the Mexican War in 1846, the war between the States in the Sixties, the Spanish-American War in 1898 and the World War in 1917. Yes, we are a very peace-loving people, aren't we?

But in those days we were looked to for leadership and we were liked by the nations of the world, and the President of the United States advanced a plan which was accepted by all the nations except Mexico, Soviet Russia and the United States. That plan is in effect today. It has its faults, but it has brought about improvements in a great many things.

In these ten years the position of the United States in its relations to the rest of the world has changed. Now the United States is not loved anywhere outside of its own borders. This is no exaggeration, it is a fact.

The people of Europe speak of us as money-grabbers and self-seekers, and think we are concerned only with our own pocket books.

The nineteen or twenty republics to the south of us in Latin-America do not scorn us, they hate us. They have seen us in Haiti, Nicaragua and San Domingo. They have seen what they call our *imperialism*.

hurt itself with the rest of the world. We are asked in the election a
to choose between a continuance of the present American policy |
toward other nations and a change in this policy. ... |

In voting for the Republican ticket we are voting to retain the
complete lack of ideals in our dealings with other people of the |
world. |

It is a clearly announced Democratic policy, announced both |
in the nominee's speech of acceptance and the party platform, to |
undertake to resume our friendship with the other nations and to |
assume again the position of moral leadership. |

It is an announced Democratic doctrine not to interfere in the |
internal affairs of our neighboring sister republics.²⁰ |

In two campaign addresses, one at Bridgeport and the J
other at Boston, Mr. Roosevelt sought to assure the public |
that the Democratic platform and Mr. Smith were sound on J
the protective tariff—the policy generally regarded as in- a
compatible with internationalism. In accordance with their -a
wont, Republicans had charged the Democrats with intend-
ing to break down the trade barriers that protected |
industrial J
capitalists and industrial workers against the influx of cheap |
goods made by cheap labor abroad. It is true that neither J
the Democratic platform of 1928 nor the speeches of Mr. |
Smith had lent any countenance to free-trade doctrines; on |
the contrary both were decidedly protectionist in letter and
spirit. But Republicans persisted in raising the specter of |
“pauper labor,” and at the manufacturing city of Bridgeport J
Mr. Roosevelt squarely faced it: “Does any man with any 3
common-sense think if the Democratic Party is returned to 1
power it is going to commit political suicide by putting in
will do nothing that will take one dollar away from any.;®
American wage earner.”²¹

At Boston, on October 12, Mr. Roosevelt was even more J
emphatic: “I am here to tell the people of New England j
that if we have a Democratic President and a Democratic '

10. *Ibid.*, October 3, 1928. |

21. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1928. 1

Congress during the next four years they need not fear that a Democratic tariff will do them the slightest conceivable harm. I will go further and say that if there is any conceivable way of changing the tariff laws of the United States so that the great industries of the New England States can be revived, we Democrats are in favor of that change.”²²

Other Democratic speakers in the campaign conformed to the framework of foreign policy set by Mr. Smith and Mr. Roosevelt. Newton D. Baker, who had fought the great battle for the League of Nations in the Democratic convention of 1924, heartily supported the party ticket in 1928. An examination of the *New York Times* reports of Mr. Baker’s campaign speeches discloses no reference to any party obligations in respect of entering the League of Nations. President Wilson’s biographer, Ray Stannard Baker, former leader in the propaganda for the League of Nations, came out for Mr. Smith with an avowal that Woodrow Wilson would have supported the Democratic candidate on account of his “stand on prohibition.”²³

In a radio address on October 12, 1928, Walter Lippmann said: “So far as I can see from reading the two platforms and what little the two candidates have had to say in their acceptance speeches with regard to foreign policy, there is no clear-cut dispute between the two parties.” At the same time Mr. Lippmann assured his auditors that it would be infinitely safer for those who favored an idealistic program of international cooperation, as Woodrow Wilson did, to vote for Mr. Smith, the Democratic candidate for President.²⁴

On the other side of the line in 1928 the Republicans repeated the pledge of 1924 to reject membership in the League of Nations, while favoring cooperation in humanitarian and technical services undertaken by the League. The Republican candidate, Herbert C. Hoover, took his stand on this platform and expressed a willingness to work with the

Ibid., October 13, 1928.

23. *Ibid.*, October 21, 1928.

24. *Ibid.*, October 13, 1928,

League “in its endeavors to further scientific, economic, and social welfare, and to secure limitation of armaments.”

Owing to Republican references to cooperation with the League and to the fact that Mr. Hoover had once been known, in 1920, as a supporter of the League, critics of Alfred E. Smith could allege that the Republicans were more internationalist than the Democrats. But a respect for the meaning of words and for the history of Republican operations in foreign affairs after 1898 gave little warrant for this allegation unless imperialism was by definition to be identified with internationalism. For, as an eminent expert in internationalism, Arthur Sweetser, remarked, “The Republicans [in 1928] began to return to the policy which had led to America’s most active foreign development, as shown in the expansion of foreign trade, the Spanish war and first overseas development, and leadership in the Hague Peace Conference.”

25

Whatever love of peace could be ascribed to Republicans in 1928, one thing was certain at the close of the campaign:

Democratic leadership had abandoned internationalism as represented by the League of Nations and had returned to the independence which they had followed for many years prior to President Wilson’s departures. During that period Democratic leaders had fiercely opposed Republican imperialism as an insidious betrayal of the American Republic, rejected “the white man’s burden” as hypocritical cant, denounced “the greedy commercialism” of the Republican policy, and spurned the idea that the United States must resort to imperialism in order to demonstrate its “maturity,” its

zj. *American Year Book* (1928), p. 71. Since documents for the inside history of the Hague peace conferences are now available, any student of history willing to spend a few weeks examining them can readily discover how much “internationalism” there was in Republican “leadership” at the Hague “peace” conferences.

26. It seems unnecessary to lay much emphasis on the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928. In that year a specialist in foreign affairs, John M. Mathews, noted: “It is possible to find so many legal loopholes in the Kellogg pact that, from a legal point of view, it may be considered a mere futile gesture.” Its moral influence, to which Mr. Mathews then referred, was indicated by current and subsequent events. *American Year Book* (1928), p. 54.

“responsibility to the world,” or its superior virtues as a nation. In the campaign of 1928 Democratic leaders had again denounced imperialism and they had deserted the League of Nations. But they had not openly and specifically repudiated the League as constituted. This climax in the trend of Democratic leadership was soon to come.

CHAPTER

Franklin D. Roosevelt Repudiates the League of Nations in 1932

As the presidential campaign of 1932 approached, a number of circumstances conspired to direct the attention of political leaders and the people away from foreign affairs and concentrate it on domestic issues. Since the panic of 1929 the country had been floundering in the morass of a great depression and as the campaign drew near there seemed to be no letup in the economic distress that afflicted the country.

According to estimates presented at a congressional hearing by William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, the total number of unemployed stood at 6,800,000 in October, 1931, and at 10,900,000 in October, 1932. The plight of the farmers, if not worse, was certainly no better; besides being ridden by debts and bankruptcies, they were receiving for their produce prices ruinously low, when they could find any market at all. Millions of people were on relief and physical suffering was widespread. Banks by the hundreds had closed their doors. Stocks of thirty prime industries had fallen from 364.9 to 62.7 dollars a share. Bankruptcies among business concerns had risen to a staggering figure.¹ For the first time in American history, persons of first rank in the business world were wondering whether the capitalist system could weather the storm.

When this calamity fell upon the nation, Franklin D. Roosevelt was Governor of New York. Urged by Alfred E. Smith to lend his strength to the Democratic ticket, he had entered the lists in 1928 and had carried the state, despite the large plurality of votes cast in New York for the Republican candidate for President, Herbert C. Hoover; and in 1930

1. C. A. Beard and G. H. E. Smith, *The Future Comes* (The Macmillan Company, 1933), chap. 1.

Governor Roosevelt was reelected by the largest plurality ever won by any candidate for the office of governor in the history of the state.² And New York was a pivotal state in the politics and economics of the country. In New York City was located the financial capital of the United States. New York had a large farming population and was at the same time a highly industrialized state. It was, therefore, badly shaken when the panic came in the autumn of 1929; and, during the period of mounting misery that followed, Governor Roosevelt had to wrestle with every kind of ordeal that tormented the people: unemployment, agricultural depression, financial dislocations, disorders among utilities, bankruptcies, and social insecurity in menacing forms. Moreover, by the very nature of his office, he was called upon to deal with domestic affairs, not the foreign relations of the United States.

From the autumn of 1929 to the autumn of 1931 Governor Roosevelt sponsored and secured the enactment of numerous measures designed to mitigate the effects of the economic depression in the State of New York; and he demonstrated to the country a resolve to employ the agencies of government in the interest of recovery from the domestic calamity. This fact in itself illustrated a new stage in the history of governmental action with reference to panics and depressions. In former times it had been the fashion for Democrats to lay the blame for economic disasters on Republican tariff policies, if Republicans were in power at the moment; and the process had been reversed if misfortune had befallen the country while Democrats were in power. Under Governor Roosevelt a new pattern was set: other government measures must be employed to overcome the domestic crisis.

By his public addresses and actions in respect of unemployment, economic disturbances, and poverty, Governor Roosevelt attracted the attention of progressive leaders in all parts of the country, then eagerly searching for ways and means of overcoming the depression. He also captured the loyalty

1. *American Year Book* (1932), p. 2.

and confidence of men and women from the younger generation who regarded agitations over the tariff and foreign affairs as little more than subterfuges for avoiding an effective attack on the economic crisis.

In his capacity as Governor and at length as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, Mr. Roosevelt gathered around him a small group popularly styled "the brain trust," which included such men as Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and Adolf Berle, three professors from Columbia University. He did not neglect the methods of politics; on the contrary, he caught the affection of practical politicians within his party, notably James A. Farley, who knew how to win friends and keep them. But for ideas, policies, and plans, the Governor relied heavily on the advice and labors of a few young men, most of them Democrats, who firmly believed that economic recovery and the maintenance of a high standard of life for the American people were to be achieved, first and foremost, by domestic measures of reform. Although these young counselors by no means left foreign affairs out of account, their emphasis was on domestic measures of recovery and reform, and Mr. Roosevelt was in accord with them on this crucial matter of policy. It is true that many "old-line" Democrats, particularly Cordell Hull, clung to the idea that America could and should recover from the depression and reach a high level of prosperity by lowering at once the tariff rates on imported goods. This meant no government interference with the historic processes of capitalism, the introduction of no "novel" and "dangerous" ideas into politics and economics. As the Republicans had once wrung victories from "the bloody shirt" of the Civil War, many Democrats in 1932 hoped to wring a victory out of a tariff debate in the traditional style. Yet, while this hope was cherished by older Democrats during the years of the great depression, it had little appeal to the younger generation and none whatever to Governor Roosevelt's most intimate associates in "the brain trust."

Such was the general state of facts and opinions when in 1931 preparations for the presidential campaign got under way. Progressives—Democratic and Republican alike—“planners,” men and women in economic distress, and *novi homines* of various kinds were turning to Governor Roosevelt. If the country on the whole was in no radical mood, the dissenters and experimenters were numerous enough to make a substantial diversion in politics. They were aware that victory would not be easy for them and that allies had to be sought in many directions, as they cast about for the necessary quota of delegates to nominate Mr. Roosevelt at the Democratic convention.

But at the opening of 1932, the chances for the nomination of Governor Roosevelt as the Democratic candidate for President were at best highly speculative. Other influential candidates were in the field. Despite his defeat in 1928, Alfred E. Smith was a powerful contender and felt himself entitled to the honor now that a Democratic triumph seemed definitely at hand. In the Southwest friends of John Nance Garner put him forward for the presidency, if not with the hope of being able to nominate a Southern man, at least with a view of winning for him the second place on the Democratic ticket. The name of Owen D. Young was frequently mentioned, although his associations with great capitalism in the East cast a shadow on his availability. In the Middle West, Newton D. Baker commanded a following strong enough to organize an effective drive for him, particularly in case there was a deadlock between the major aspirants, Alfred E. Smith and Governor Roosevelt. More **than** once in history a man with only a few votes on the first ballot at a convention had overcome two or more mighty foes in the final showdown.

On January 1, 1932, no seeker after the Democratic nomination could be sure of winning it and all who entered the **race** had to reckon with the most powerful journalist in **their** party, William Randolph Hearst, the ruthless publisher

whose chain of newspapers stretched from coast to coast. Mr. Hearst had started his journalistic career as a radical and had once been regarded as a red terror by Republicans of Mark Hanna's school; but in 1932 he was entrenched in the camp of conservative Democrats. In respect of foreign affairs, he was an intransigent isolationist, hostile to the League of Nations, an inveterate enemy of everything that savored of internationalism. His influence was enhanced by the fact that many conservative politicians of Democratic leanings had shared his sentiments on foreign affairs even during the second Administration of President Wilson. The general disillusionment that followed the first World War added to Mr. Hearst's strength as a doughty foe of internationalism; and in any case, owing to the immense circulation of his journal in strategic centers, he was a force to be reckoned with by at candidates for the Democratic nomination in 1932.

In a radio broadcast to the nation on New Year's Day, Mr. Hearst "cracked his whip" by serving due and sufficient notice to all and sundry aspirants for the Democratic nomination that they must repudiate internationalism if they wanted his support. With characteristic vehemence, he denounced Woodrow Wilson and his foreign policies as dangerous to the United States. President Wilson, he declared, was "a theorist, a visionary, with no deep-seated conviction—certainly none that interfered with his personal ambition and advancement; a brilliant speaker, an unstable thinker and unreliable performer; an advocate at some time or other of both sides of almost every public question; at, opportunist in his support of any principle at any time." Wilson, he continued, led the nation into "the morass of complication and catastrophe." His successors in leadership Cox, Davis, and Smith, as Democratic candidates for President, had encountered "disastrous defeats," for the reason that "Mr. Wilson led his party up a political blind alley, and everyone who has followed in his footsteps has crashed against a stone wall of defeat at the end of that blind alley." Besides condemning Mr. Wilson as a visionary whose!

nomination was “the greatest misfortune” that had befallen the country, Mr. Hearst turned his battery on President Hoover. He attacked Mr. Hoover as “a Wilsonite,” who had led the Republican party up Mr. Wilson’s blind alley into the Democratic wreckage at the end of the alley. Lest the aspirants for the Democratic nomination overlook his notice, Mr. Hearst named them. He said that Governor Roosevelt, Newton D. Baker, Alfred E. Smith, and Owen D. Young were “all good men in their way,” but were “all, like Mr. Hoover, disciples of Woodrow Wilson”—men who had “fatuously followed Wilson’s visionary policies of intermeddling in European conflicts and complications.” After warning these four men by name, Mr. Hearst proposed the nomination of John Nance Garner.

Doubtless aware that the nomination of Mr. Garner was a forlorn hope, Mr. Hearst confessed that he did not know who would be the next President; but he appealed to his national audience for the nomination of a man committed to “America first”: “Do not allow the international bankers and **the** other big influences that have gambled with your prosperity to gamble with your politics. Unless we American citizens are willing to go on laboring indefinitely merely to provide loot for Europe, we should personally see to it that a limn is elected to the Presidency this year whose guiding motto is ‘America first.’ ”³ Such was Mr. Hearst’s warning to the Democratic aspirants then preparing for the nomination campaign.

Although in messages to the annual convention of the League of Nations Association in mid-January, 1932, New **ton D.** Baker had reiterated his contention that the national **interests** of the United States demanded full participation in **the** affairs of the League, and had called for sympathetic Cooperation with the League,⁴ later in the month he definitely read the question of the League out of practical poli-

New York Times, January 3, 1932.

tics. In a release to the press on January 26, 1932, Mr. Baker reversed the position he had taken in 1924.

Any opinion that I entertain on the subject of America's relationship to the League of Nations must be such as any private citizen is entitled to entertain. I have stated publicly several times within the past two or three years that the question of America's joining the League is at present not a matter in the field of practical political discussion.

I repeat what I frequently stated previously. I would not the United States into the League if I had the power to do so until there is an informed and convinced majority sentiment in favor of that action by the United States. I am not in favor of plank in the Democratic national platform urging our joining the League. I think it would be a great mistake to make a issue of the

I think that we will go into the League some day, and I we ought to, but I don't think we should take that action until the people of the United States have had a chance to see the League in action, and to study its action enough to be fully satisfied as to the wisdom of such a course.

I do not think that the Democratic party should advocate our entrance into the League just because Woodrow Wilson favored it. On the other hand, I do not think that the Republican party ought to be for or against the League for any like reason. Republican membership or Democratic membership in the League based on a sharp division of partisan sentiment in this country would be a feeble thing, and would not give the United States the opportunity to exercise whatever power for good our membership there might be hoped to produce.

In the meantime, I feel that it is wise for the United States to cooperate with the League with the utmost sympathy in its efforts to preserve peace, and for the American people to study the League and so overcome some of our unwarranted against it.

In the issue which contained Mr. Baker's press release excluding the League from "the field of practical political discussion"

mission,” the *New York Times* commented editorially on his statement as a bid for the nomination: “. . . his friends have undoubtedly told him that, since he may be nominated, it is best that his League position be exactly defined to remove any handicaps which misinterpretation might bring. That yesterday’s statement has made Mr. Baker much more available as a candidate with the practical Democratic politicians is, of course, a significant result of having made it. I henceforth, whatever his personal preferences, Mr. Baker will be regarded as at least a receptive candidate.”⁶

Prominent Democrats such as Colonel House, Frank Polk, and John W. Davis endorsed Mr. Baker’s manifesto excluding the issue of the League from the coming campaign. And the chorus of endorsers was joined by eminent Democratic leaders in Congress. According to the report of their opinions in the *New York Times*:

Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana declared: “I know of no one who is attempting to raise the League issue at this time. In fact, it has been pretty generally ignored since the 1920 campaign.”

Senator Clarence Dill thought it “extremely encouraging that such extraneous issues as the League are to be taken out of the political situation at this time so that we may concentrate on the hard-times issue. It is gratifying that the leading proponent of the League is willing to submerge that issue in the interest of harmony. The economic issue greatly affects the great mass of our people who are out of work and it should not be beclouded by any other issue.”

Senator Walter George expressed the opinion that Mr. Linker “is entirely correct in saying that the League is not and ought not to be a vital question in this campaign.”

Senator William King gave his approval: “It is a wise statement. I always have been a supporter of the League, but it should not be made an issue until a majority of the people have a larger understanding of it. It would be futile to project it into political discussions now.”

6. *ibid.*

The Democratic floor leader of the House, W. R. Rainey/ said he had heard of no agitation for a League of Nation^ plank in the national platform.⁷ /

While, in his release to the press on January 26, Mr. Bakerij publicly abandoned the position he had so stoutly maintained at the Democratic convention in 1924⁸ and declared thi League issue to be out of practical politics, he also expressed the private conviction that the United States ought to ge into the League “some day.” This was sufficient to warrant his followers in believing that Mr. Baker was still the besj! hope for the ultimate success of the internationalist cause if the United States. For example, Wendell Willkie, of Ohidj then a regular Democrat and ardent advocate of Preside^ Wilson’s internationalism, who had supported Mr. Baker a the Democratic convention in 1924, now plunged into th< campaign with a resolve to win the nomination for his hen at the Democratic convention of 1932, if possible. In a stated ment made public in the late summer of 1944, Mr. Willkii described himself as one of the enthusiastic “Baker Boys” o’ 1924, and told how hard they had worked to secure th victory of Mr. Baker at Chicago in 1932?

Whatever the merits of Mr. Baker’s statesmanship qi strategy, his pronouncement on January 26, 1932, was un satisfactory to William Randolph Hearst, who demanded -j candidate prepared to cast off all allegiance to the League oi Nations idea and adopt unequivocally the motto of “AmeriiJ! first.” And while Mr. Baker’s statement on the League wsi under discussion, Mr. Hearst’s representative was in com munication with another aspirant for the Democratic nomj nation at the coming convention of the party—Govern^ Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York.

Few men were better acquainted with the range of M,’

7. *Ibid.*, January 28, 1932.

8. Above, pp. 48 ff.

9. First printed in the Birmingham *Age-Herald* and reprinted a week lat in *The United States News*, September 8, 1944. For a fuller account see belcfl pp. 100 f.

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Hearst's power than Governor Roosevelt and his immediate associates. It was in New York City that Mr. Hearst had started his journalistic career on the national stage, after an experiment in California, and, although he had suffered reverses, he still wielded telling influence in the State of New York as well as in its great metropolis. At some time, not yet fixed on the basis of documentary records, a representative of Governor Roosevelt approached a representative of Mr. Hearst with a view to winning the journalist's support for the Governor's nomination at the Democratic convention. Immediately there arose the question of the Governor's stand on foreign affairs: Was Mr. Roosevelt in fact an internationalist and did he really believe that the United States should join the League of Nations? Or was he prepared to renounce his former position in favor of "America first"?

Such was the tenor of the inquiries directed to Governor Roosevelt's agent. From the document printed below, only one inference is permissible: either at the time these inquiries were made or later, Mr. Hearst was privately assured that Mr. Roosevelt was not an internationalist and was not in favor of American participation in the League of Nations. But Mr. Hearst was not satisfied with this assurance as to the Governor's views, conveyed privately. He insisted on a public statement from Governor Roosevelt to that effect, and he published an ultimatum.

Mr. Hearst's demand that Governor Roosevelt take a public stand against the League of Nations and internationalism came in the form of an open letter to Mr. **E. D. Coblentz**, dated San Simeon, California, January 21, 1932. **It** was printed in the *New York American* ten days later, **January 31, 1932**. The portion of the letter that contained **the** personal challenge to Mr. Roosevelt follows:

Dear Cobbie:

Please give my compliments to Mr. Farley, but tell him I **beg** leave to say that if Mr. Roosevelt has any statement to make **about** his not now being an internationalist, he should make it to **the** public publicly and not to me privately.

He made his numerous declarations publicly when he said that he WAS an internationalist and WAS in favor of our country; joining the League of Nations even at the sacrifice of some portion of our nation's sovereignty. J

He should make his declaration publicly that he has changed^ his mind and that he is NOW in favor of keeping the national independence which our forefathers won for us; that he is NOV in favor of NOT joining the League or the League Court.

I must say frankly that if Mr. Roosevelt is not willing to make public declaration of his change of heart, and wants only to make his statement to me privately, I would not believe him.

My experience has proved that a man who is running for office and is not willing to make his honest opinions known to the public, either has no honest opinions or is not honest about them.

If a man is hiding his opinions from the public, and only expressing them privately to people whose support he wants, would consider him either not courageous or not trustworthy.

If he does not want to express his opinions publicly, because he thinks they would hurt his candidacy, then he is certainly not courageous, while if he is privately playing Peter to one and Pat to another, or rather Peter to one and Judas to another, then he is certainly not worthy of public or private trust.

I do not think any man has a right to ASK to be elected to public office unless he is willing to let the public know exactly what kind of man they are electing.

Otherwise politics merely becomes a shell game in which the public is made to pick out the shell which the pea is NOT UNDER—a gold brick game where the brick which is sold to the public is not gold but merely gilded; or as the Bible more exaltedly expresses it, "Like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness."

I do not see why politics cannot be open and honest, and clean inside and out.

I am for Mr. Garner in this campaign . . .

I am for him because he is plain and direct and sincere and HONEST—morally and mentally honest. ,k

His record is an open book. His convictions are in the record without compromise, without contradiction.

WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST.

In an address to the New York State Grange, on February 2, 1932, two days after Mr. Hearst's open call upon him for a public repudiation of internationalism and the League of Nations, Governor Roosevelt squarely met the challenge. About two thirds of the speech was devoted to a discussion of farmers' problems, ending in an emphasis on the desirability of securing additional outlets for agricultural produce. This enlargement of the market, the Governor argued, could be achieved by reciprocal bargaining with other nations for mutually advantageous exchange of commodities. Although such an economic operation obviously did not in itself involve any political entanglements with European countries or with the League of Nations, Mr. Roosevelt went on to assure his auditors that he was definitely opposed to such entanglements in any form.

That part of the Grange address which dealt with this subject is here given in full. The passage printed in italics appears in the portion of the address reprinted in *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, I, 157; and the passages in roman are the supplementary passages omitted by President Roosevelt and Samuel I. Rosenman, his associate in compiling the *Papers*.¹⁰

Let me at the same time make it clear [Governor Roosevelt declared in his address to the Grange on February 2, 1932] that a trade conference with the other nations of the world does not and should not, by any stretch of the imagination, involve the United States in any participation in political controversies in Europe or elsewhere. Nor does it involve the renewal in any way of the problem of twelve years ago of American participation as a member of the League of Nations.

In common with millions of my fellow countrymen, I worked **and** spoke, in 1920, in behalf of American participation in a **League** of Nations, conceived in the highest spirit of world

10. The co-editor, Mr. Rosenman, explains that owing to the large number **if** the Governor's addresses a selection had to be made and that "those were **vloien** which most clearly show his general policies and objectives in so far as **they** forecast what was to come later in the Presidency." Foreword to Vol. I.

friendship for the great object of preventing a return of world war. For that course I have no apology to make.

If today I believed that the same or even similar factors entered into the argument, I would still favor America's entry into the League; and I would go so far as to seek to win over the overwhelming opposition which exists in this country today.

But the League of Nations today is not the League conceived by Woodrow Wilson. It might have been, had the United States joined. Too often through these years its major function has been ; not the broad overwhelming purpose of world peace, but rather a mere peering place for the political discussion of strictly European political national difficulties. In these the United States should have no part.

The fact remains that we did not join the League. The League; has not developed through these years along the course contemplated by its founder, nor have the principal members shown disposition to divert the huge sums spent on armament into the; channels of legitimate trade, balanced budgets, and the payment; of obligations. American participation in the League would not serve the highest purpose of the prevention of war and a settlement of international difficulties in accordance with fundamental American ideals. Because of these facts, therefore, I do not favor American participation.

What the world needs most today is a national policy which will make us an example of national honor to other nations. The first lesson for all the world is recognition that a treaty is a nation's word of honor to another nation and that all just nations debts are "debts of honor"; that, therefore, no honorable nation may break a treaty in spirit any more than they may break it in letter; nor, when it is a debtor, may repudiate or cancel a nation's debt of honor. On the other side it should be remembered also that the creditor on his part should use every honorable means to help the debtor set his house in order.

Europe owes us. We do not owe her. Therefore, we should call a meeting of our debtors here and not in Europe and demand an understanding. If it were considered advisable in the present condition of world finance to postpone the payment of debts for a while, we should nevertheless insist upon an accord as to when payments should begin and in what amount.

Europe has indulged herself in an orgy of spending and finds herself at the moment in a crippled financial position. She should look at the facts of her spending and bring about a change of policy to restore her financial equilibrium and enable her to meet her just obligations. She should cease to blame us for all the ills which have followed this reckless course of spending and try to remember the aid we gave her in time of need; aid for which she was once grateful but which she has forgotten.

The world ship of state cannot regain its safe course to port by reckless spending and by reckless vituperation, but it can steer safely home by unity of action and a determination eventually to meet its just obligations.

By economic cooperation this Nation can revive the trade of the world as well as trade within our own borders. In so doing we can extend a helping hand to our debtors as well as to ourselves. The highest ideals of America demand that, with strict adherence to the principles of Washington, we maintain our international freedom and at the same time offer leadership to a sorely tried humanity.¹¹

In contrast to Newton D. Baker's public statement on the League of Nations, January 26, 1932, Governor Roosevelt's announcement of February 2, 1932, constituted a categorical denunciation as a matter of personal opinion and national policy. Mr. Baker had made it clear to the American people that he still entertained his private opinion in favor of the League, that he believed "we will go into the League some day," that it was wise to cooperate with the League in its efforts to preserve peace, that the American people should study the League and so overcome some of their "unwarrented prejudices against it." Governor Roosevelt, on the other hand, while justifying his former position on the

11. This text appears in the *Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Forty-first Governor of the State of New York, Second Term, 1932*, pp. 551 f. This volume was published by the State of New York in 1939, with a Fore word by President Roosevelt dated September 13, 1939. The passage italicized, *« published in President Roosevelt's *Public Papers*, I, 157 (Random House, 1939), ends with . . . » to indicate an omission.

League, declared that the League was not the League conceived by Woodrow Wilson; that it too often served as a meeting place for the discussion of strictly European national political difficulties; that “American participation would not serve the highest purpose of the prevention of war”; that he did “not favor American participation in the League”; and that Europe had not been dealing honorably in respect of her debts to the United States.

The repercussions of Governor Roosevelt’s address to the Grange were swift and resounding. It was taken to mean just what Mr. Hearst had demanded of the Governor’s agent: unconditional rejection of membership in the League of Nations and of internationalism as represented by that form of world organization; a call for the collection of the debts owed to the Government of the United States by former associates in the first World War; an endorsement of non-entanglement in the political controversies of foreign countries; and a firm adherence to the principles of George Washington¹² respecting foreign relations—in short an acceptance of the isolationist program, except perhaps a high protective tariff. Judging by the comments of public men and the newspapers and by protests from internationalists, the Grange address was a political “bombshell.”

A dispatch from Albany to the *New York Times*, dated February 3, the day after the Grange address was delivered, reported: “Governor Roosevelt said tonight that he had received many messages from different parts of the country commending his stand in opposition to American entry into the League of Nations and the remission of war debts . . . He would not authorize publication of the missives.”

To this paragraph quoting Governor Roosevelt directly, the *Times* reporter added a long story in the customary political style, as if on the record and yet off the record, in the manner of “it is said”:

12. Washington’s foreign policy, particularly his Farewell Address, was regarded in 1932 as the very foundation of the isolationist philosophy.

Moreover, the Governor, who was and is an ardent Wilson Democrat, *is said* to have received assurances prior to the writing of his speech that his attitude was shared by a large number of prominent Democrats who were and continue to be enthusiastic admirers of the ideals and program for world peace of which Woodrow Wilson was the exponent.

The Governor *was said* to have communicated with some of these Democrats before delivering his address, is well aware of their support in his stand and would not be surprised if there were, before long, public expression to make this clear.

When the challenge was issued to Mr. Roosevelt to speak out in open meeting, and set at rest speculation with regard to his attitude on what some have termed "internationalism," he, *according to a close friend*, was greatly surprised that there should be any doubt as to his views.

He was so firmly convinced that he had defined his opinion in a public address that he had a search made of newspaper files for the last half-dozen years, expecting they would reveal material that would constitute a complete reply to the challenge. Much to

his disappointment and chagrin, *it is said*, the search was fruitless. Today, however, *it was recalled by a person at the Capitol*

•*who was closely identified with the 1928 campaign* that while it was in progress Mr. Roosevelt had expressed his views on the League of Nations and American membership in it much along the lines that he spoke last night.

The occasion *was said to have been* a conference held behind closed doors at which many prominent Democrats identified with the Smith campaign spoke without fear of publicity. Mr. Roosevelt, with a group of four or five others whose names were not disclosed, contended vigorously against an "internationalism" slant in Democratic campaign speeches, especially those of Governor Smith. Thus, *it was stated here tonight*, how Mr. Roosevelt stood on membership of the United States in the League could hardly have been a secret or a matter of doubt to former Governor Smith.¹³

The subject under discussion at the conference, *it was stated*, was not as to participation of the United States in the League's work, but the stand the Democratic party should take in the

national campaign regarding the entry of the United States into the World Court.

Mr. Roosevelt, holding the League had been diverted from the idealistic purposes advocated by President Wilson, opposed Democratic advocacy of entry into the World Court, because of the popular conception, right or wrong, that once a member, the United States might become entangled in European politics to an extent where, by force of circumstances, entry into the League itself would become the corollary.¹⁴

Conforming to immemorial party custom, Republican newspapers greeted Governor Roosevelt's renunciation of the League of Nations as a bid for the Democratic nomination for the presidency and grew ironical over his performance. In an editorial under the heading "Lovers Once," the *New York Sun*, February 3, 1932, commented:

In the campaign of the "great and solemn referendum" of 1920 no voice was raised more earnestly or frequently for Americans entrance into the League of Nations than the voice of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was running for Vice-President of the United States. He and Mr. Cox made the League the big issue of the day, Mr. Roosevelt, then only 38 years old and imbued with the idealism of President Wilson, traveled the country trumpeting the glories of the League and challenging every opponent of Mr. Wilson's internationalistic program. Nor did Mr. Roosevelt's enthusiasm for the League die with the passing of Mr. Wilson. He became, and we believe still is, a trustee of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, which so recently as 1929 awarded its peace prize to the League in recognition of its ten years' work in behalf of peace. Indeed, he served as the Foundation's national chairman, for one

Last night Franklin D. Roosevelt, now fifty and the leading candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, laid the League ideal on the ash heap of the past, where it keeps company with the recent renunciation of another Presidential candidate, **Newton D. Baker**. If Governor Roosevelt's rejection of his **old** ideal looms larger than that of Mr. Baker it is because he made it

more complete, less tied with strings. The League, he says, is not the League conceived by WILSON. It has not developed along the lines laid down by its founder. . . . We remember no murmur of dissent from Trustee Roosevelt when the Wilson Foundation laid its laurels at the League's foot two years ago. But let that go; the acolyte of other days finds that the League is not what it used to be. We may add, with due reverence to *Punch*, that it never was.¹⁶

The following day the *New York Herald Tribune* treated the Grange address under the caption, "Not an Eggshell Broken":

For treading a devious course among the political eggs of the hour, Governor Roosevelt's first major effort in the national field deserves the highest praise. At a dozen points he might have said something that would alienate votes. Not once did he so much as graze a risky topic. His score was perfect.

In two cases he achieved this end by the simple expedient of resolutely turning his back on the danger spots. He ignored both prohibition and Tammany Hall. In another case his acrobatics might be criticized as almost too nimble. No one asks a public man, or any one else, never to change his mind. But for Franklin D. Roosevelt, ardent Wilsonian advocate of the League of Nations, to come out as a complete enemy of the League, damning it for all time as a dangerous European contraption, seems a little bit thick. Mr. Baker certainly showed more sincerity and we suspect lost less by his realism than has the Governor by his recantation.

All the passages relating to Europe, to debts and to reparations, suggest a similar resolve to join the procession and never mind the haste. We regret to say that they suggest *little more* either in the way of study, understanding or candor. . . .

Republican politicians, like the editors of the party press, hailed Governor Roosevelt's "recantation" with ill-concealed derision. Senator William E. Borah, the irreconcilable of

if. New York Sun, February 3, 1932.

¹⁶, *New York Herald Tribune*, February 4, 1932.

1920, seemed to be especially pleased and inquired about the next step:

“Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” I presume the Governor is seeking the kingdom of heaven in the Presidency. When these gentlemen get through explaining their positions on the League I would like them to say where they stand on the World Court.¹⁷

Senator George Moses, whose claim to historical eminence lay partly in his characterization of Western radicals as “sons of the wild jackass,” jeered at the Democratic leaders who appeared to be denying their principles:

The Reno-like celerity with which Democratic leaders—and especially Democratic candidates—are seeking to divorce themselves from the League of Nations is interesting and amusing. It has apparently dawned upon their consciousness that the 7,000,000 majority by which the American people repudiated this issue in both 1920 and 1924 has a validity as applied to the election of 1932.

Death-bed conversions, however, smack of the theatrical, and are generally as unreal as most theatrical performances. As further evidence of the genuineness of the Democratic views which are now coming so belatedly to light, I suggest that there should be added to their renunciation of the League of Nations an equally emphatic renunciation of the League’s pet baby—the so-called World

Governor Roosevelt could afford to ignore the Republicans who ridiculed his conversion, for many powerful members of his own party, after learning about his speech to the New York Grange, rallied to his support. From an influen-

rial Democrat of Montana, Burton K. Wheeler, came high commendation and, what was more, aid in marshaling sym-

17. *Ibid.*

18. *New York Times*, February 4, 1932.

In later years Senator Wheeler, the isolationist of 1932, was to draw down upon his head severe denunciations from his party brother on account of his own resolute adherence to the doctrine of non-entanglement in Europe's wars; but in February, 1932, things were different.

At that moment the two men saw eye to eye, for Senator Wheeler thoroughly approved the Governor's declaration of independence for the United States: "I am glad Governor Roosevelt has taken this position on the League of Nations. I am opposed to American entry into the League myself, but I was one of those who once favored the League and have changed my mind after seeing it in operation. The attitude of Japan and the fumbling manner in which the League has handled the Far Eastern situation should be enough to convince anyone that the United States should have nothing to do with the League." 19

Senator Wheeler's position on the League was upheld by Senator Kenneth McKellar, of Tennessee, in almost the same language: "I was also strong for the League when it was being formed, but in view of its recent performances, then in the Japanese-Chinese controversy, I do not see how any one could uphold it. I commend Governor Roosevelt for speaking out plainly about it." 20

Thomas Walsh of Montana, colleague of Mr. Wheeler in the United States Senate, agreed with Governor Roosevelt that adherence to the League was no issue in 1932, but he evidently felt that the less said about it the better: "I see no occasion for the statements by either Governor Roosevelt or Mr. Baker. No one, so far as I know, is at present urging membership by the United States in the League. I see no prospect of it developing into an issue in 1932." 21

Advocates of American membership in the League of Nations, to whom the labors and prophecies of Woodrow Wilson remained a precious heritage, were apparently as much

19. *New York Herald Tribune*, February 4, 1932.

io. *Ibid.*

ai. *New York Times*, February 4, 1932.

shocked by Governor Roosevelt's act of renunciation as
William Randolph Hearst was pleased with it. The editors
of the *New York Times*, in a long "leader" on February 4, 1932, treated the "public recantation" as a political maneuver
and assailed the logic of the argument made in support of it:

Plato reasoned well, but it can't be said that Governor Roosevelt
does in explaining why he has given up his former ardent ad-
vocacy of the League of Nations. A public man is entitled to
change his mind. He may announce that he has done so, and let it
go at that. But if he attempts to argue the case, his reasoning
ought to hold water. Mr. Roosevelt's is all aleak. He asserts that
the League of Nations has not developed along the lilies of
President Wilson's hope that it would prevent war, and has been
merely an organization to discuss "strictly European national
difficulties." With a straight face the Governor adds: "In
United States should have no part."

Was not the outbreak of war in 1914 a strictly European
difficulty? How can we be sure that another one like that might
not as inevitably as the first draw the United States into the con-
flict? The fact is that every peaceful settlement made in Europe
by the League of Nations—and it has made several important
ones—has contributed to the welfare of the United States. And
what can Governor Roosevelt have in mind when he declares that
the members of the League have not "shown a disposition to di-
vert the huge sums spent on armament into the channels of
legitimate trade . . ." If there is any one thing which the League
has steadily sought to do it is to bring about limitation of
military expenditures. . . . If Mr. Roosevelt had said that the
given too much time and energy to efforts to bring about
armament, without having achieved large results, there might
have been some force in this particular complaint of

It will be generally regretted, we think, that Governor Roose-
velt should have been so plainly swayed by political motives in
this public recantation. He frankly admits that in 1920 he worked
and spoke and was a candidate for the Vice Presidency with
entire commitment to the policy of America joining the League.
Now he has suffered a sea-change, but his account of it is not at
all convincing. People will see in him merely an inclination to
ever strong upon the stronger side. They will even express thra

suspicion that he is resentful of the way in which Newton D. Baker got ahead of him in reaching the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to have a League of Nations plank in the Democratic platform this year. There is, however, a difference in the cases of these two men. Mr. Baker has not abandoned his early faith. He still believes in the League of Nations, and hopes that the time will come when the American people will be convinced of the need of casting in their lot with it. Before that can happen, time will have to pass and the work of education be done. For the present, therefore, Mr. Baker holds that it would be futile to promise to do what cannot now be done. This is an intelligible position, if not very inspiring. But Governor Roosevelt was content to renounce the whole project of the League, and to defend his course by arguments which could easily be shown to be fallacious. It would have been better for him if he had merely announced his decision without giving any reasons for it, and had stood solely on the ground of his personal political advantage as a candidate for the Presidency.²²

Three days later, February 7, 1932, the editors of the *Times* came back to the "recantation" and warned Governor Roosevelt that he had embarked on a "dangerous adventure." Under the heading of "A Perilous Passage," they made an other classical reference and reminded the Governor and Newton D. Baker of the passionate devotion to President Wilson's memory that still existed in many parts of the country, as if suggesting that they were tacking carefully between the whirlpool and the rock:

Because this is the year when Presidential candidates will be nominated, two distinguished Democrats, who have been more than "mentioned" as their party's possible choice, explained their present views concerning the League of Nations. They selected their words with extreme care because the requirement was just that. For a Republican it is a simple political thesis; for a Democrat, and particularly a Democrat who was associated with Woodrow Wilson in an official capacity, it is a complex and

11. "The Governor and the League," *ibid.*

dangerous adventure. There are whole States in this country where the name of the War President is still revered The War President's Assistant Secretary of the Navy Governor Roosevelt, steered his course more carefully [than Baker] between the Charybdis of the League's unpopularity and the Scylla of passionate devotion to Wilson's memory existing in many parts of the country

Neither could possibly have mentioned the League without naming its founder. . . . Wilson has been dead for nearly decade But, even though Democratic conventions dodge or forswear the League, the late President is a living issue within his party.²³

The views expressed in the columns of the *New York Times* were shared by the editors of the *Christian Science Monitor*. They too compared the pronouncements of Mr Baker and Mr. Roosevelt on the League question and likewise attacked the logic and validity of the latter's argument!

Both Mr. Newton D. Baker of Ohio and Governor Roosevelt of New York are possible candidates for the Presidency on the Democratic ticket this year. Perhaps they are the two leading candidates, although the figure of former Governor Smit steadily grows more and more prominent in the struggle for the honor. But Mr. Baker and Mr. Roosevelt alone have been making formal proclamation of their positions on certain issues likely to be prominent in the campaign.

It is rather significant that each of them is very desirous of leaving out of controversy the question of the United States participation in the League of Nations. For a time advocacy of such action seemed likely to crystallize into a standard plank of the Democratic platform. But as the great figure of Woodrow Wilson recedes farther into the background and perhaps as American impatience with the complications attending any relationship with Europe increases, there is a growing tendency on the part of politicians to thrust this issue out of consideration.

Mr. Baker, not very long ago, reaffirmed his personal fealty to the League, but declared he did not think the time was propitious

23. *New York Times*, February 7, 1932, Sec. III, p. 1.

for making a political issue of it. He indicated, by implication at least, that if he should be the nominee of his party, he would do nothing to thrust the League forward as a campaign issue, but, on the contrary, would take the ground that it must yield place to more pressing matters of domestic concern.

Governor Roosevelt assumes a different attitude. He frankly abandons the League altogether as a matter of personal advocacy, declaring that it is no longer the League which Woodrow Wilson founded. One might discern in this attitude a desire to hold that very large Democratic support which still insists upon loyalty to the last of the Democratic Presidents while at the same time getting rid of an issue which may be embarrassing.

How can Governor Roosevelt support his contention that there has been any material change in the League? Wherein has there been any change? He complains that it has done nothing but discuss "the political difficulties of Europe in which the United States should have no part." It could not very well discuss the political difficulties of the United States, although perhaps had America been a member some of its more embarrassing problems might have been clarified by League discussion.

Nor for that matter has the United States itself escaped discussion of political difficulties in Europe by not being a member of the League. . . .

Both of these eminent Democrats may be, and probably are, exceedingly sagacious in attempting to keep the League issue out of the campaign. While there are an immense number of believers in the League in the United States, it cannot be held to be so popular an organization that advocacy of it would tend to increase a candidate's strength. But it is observed that Mr. Roosevelt also would keep the concrete tariff issue out of the campaign by advocating an international conference. . . . One begins to wonder **der** what the Democratic Party is going to present to the people **aa** its issue? . . .24

With alacrity and anger, President Wilson's former Secretary, Joseph Tumulty, shortly after Governor Roosevelt's address to the New York Grange, sprang to the defense of **the** internationalist cause against Democratic leaders who

14. "The League in American Politics," *Christian Science Monitor*, Boston,

pursued the course of “expediency.” Commanding first-hand knowledge of Democratic politics, James Kerney had said: “Of all the insiders, no other ever reached the point of intimacy held by [Colonel] House and [Joseph] Tumulty and of course no other so long had such close association with Wilson.”²⁵ At all events, in 1932, it is highly probable that no Democrat was more loyal to President Wilson’s internationalist ideals than Mr. Tumulty or more passionately attached to his memory. Stirred to wrath by the renunciations made publicly by Mr. Baker and Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Tumulty told these candidates for the Democratic nomination just what he thought of them and their tactics:

When the only agency for peace now available is working to prevent a world catastrophe in the Orient, it is a sad commentary upon American politics that some Democratic leaders, lured on by circumstances, find it expedient, by an artful kind of indirection, to run away from the peace ideals of Woodrow Wilson.

As I consider the matter, I am picturing the plight and distress of these leaders should the League of Nations, after all, bring peace to the world. Should that great thing happen, what picture these leaders would present, standing in sackcloth and ashes before the shrine of Woodrow Wilson, saying: “You are again the captain of my soul!”

Surely these leaders have chosen a most inopportune time to throw sticks and stones at the League of Nations. While I agree that the League of Nations should not be made an issue in 1931 and that handsome compromises are sometimes necessary to bring great reforms, I am wondering if the time selected for this act of surrender, in giving aid and comfort to the enemies of Woodrow Wilson, does not proclaim the act one of expediency. Surely a leadership like this, that is afraid to fight, that is afraid to stand firm against the crowd, does not captivate one like myself who had the privilege of being associated with President Woodrow Wilson, who, to use his own words, would rather “lose in a cause than inevitably lose.”

²⁵. *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson* (The Century Company 1926), p. 485.

The Democratic leadership of 1932, I beg leave to say, must be made of finer stuff. That leadership must have in it the blend of courage and fortitude, and the vision of a new world.

Fortunately, the tides of peace running in the hearts of men, women and children throughout the world cannot be held in check by leadership like this—so foolish, so inept, so impotent. Behind the League of Nations lies deeper still the cause of peace, a cause that has been greatly embarrassed by statements that have recently appeared by men high in the councils of the Democratic party.

How mighty and majestic appears the figure of Woodrow Wilson in the present situation. The leadership of 1932 must not have in it the base metal of expediency, that kind of expediency that has brought the world to its present plight of unhappiness and misery. If we are to, be successful in 1932, we must shake off the sterile curse of expediency. . . .

These leaders have surrendered the cause of peace to the mob. There is not one who will say that there is anything fine, hand some or courageous in that kind of surrender. Time, and time alone, will decide these things and vindicate the far-flung vision of Woodrow Wilson.²⁸

The day after Mr. Tumulty's blast—for such it was—Governor Roosevelt replied brusquely to the “denuncia tion,” saying: “Does he [Mr. Tumulty] want to go into the League? That is the main idea.” Having dismissed Mr. Tu multy in a few words, the Governor added that he had re ceived several thousand letters and telegrams from all over the country expressing a favorable reaction to his statement opposing United States membership in the League.²⁷

Thus brushed aside curtly, Mr. Tumulty, several days later, took advantage of a public occasion again to character **ize** Governor Roosevelt and his renunciation in harsh language. In an address before the Democratic Women's Luncheon Club of New Jersey, February 17, 1932, which **was** broadcast, Mr. Tumulty, while declaring

•6. *New York Times*, February 5, 1932.

17. *ibid.*, February 6, 1932.

wish to project the League issue into the campaign, expressed his sentiments in this fashion: j

With the first shot from the gun of the arch-enemy of the League, Mr. William Randolph Hearst, with whom I have no quarrel because he has hated the League in the past, a former devotee of the League cried "Kamerad, Kamerad!" and weakly surrendered. With the world on fire, with tinder lying about that might quickly ignite into a world conflagration, a real lover of peace would have refrained from attacking the League when, by the merest chance, it might have checked a world in the Orient. fl

With a critical situation confronting us; with the administration at Washington, to its everlasting credit be it said, attempting to reach a solution through the League that would prevent a war,®

retreat ... ®

And what a time for personal ambition to thrust its ugly head into a critical world situation. At the very moment when this attack came sixty nations were meeting at Geneva to attempt to bring about a reduction of armaments, a commission containing an American was under way to investigate conditions in Shanghai; Senator Swanson, that sturdy Democrat from Virginia; a member of the Disarmament Conference, stated that the whole atmosphere at Geneva was Wilson. ®

After remarking that the average voter was disturbed by the "double-dealing, pretense, and hypocrisy" in our politics! ® Mr. Tumulty came down to cases: "Always with some cam® didates in these days, when great decisions have to be madti® affecting the peace and prosperity of the world, the main® question seems to be, How easily can I win an election? Ho'qj® easily can I gain power and office without risking anything!®

. . . All things to all men, Mr. Facing-Both-Ways on the principle." j®

Continuing in this vein, Mr. Tumulty charged "aile® expediency-serving candidate" with appeasing certain jourj® nalistic leaders and currying favor with nationalists instead®

of thinking about service to the nation. He wondered how this candidate could shake hands with “bitter-enders,” the foes of Woodrow Wilson, and “at the same time stand in reverence” before the shrine of the late President. Then taking up one of the main points in Governor Roosevelt’s Grange address, Mr. Tumulty retorted: “The League of Nations as it exists today, which at this time is trying to settle questions in the Orient that may sweep into a great conflagration, is exactly the League of Nations as conceived by Woodrow Wilson.”²⁸

In the weekly journals of “opinion,” the comments on Governor Roosevelt’s address before the New York Grange were scarcely less caustic than those made by Republicans and the opposition newspapers. The New York *Nation*, then under the management of Oswald Garrison Villard, charged the Governor with trying to catch votes for himself and with a lack of realism in his thinking:

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who stood with Wilson in 1920 for the League of Nations and the new internationalism, has now gone **over** to the nationalists and isolationists. He has turned against **the** League of Nations, and he insists that Europe must pay its **debts**. He seems to realize that the trend in American sentiment today is away from Europe, and if we may take his speech before **the** New York State Grange at its face value, he apparently means **to** cater to this growing nationalist sentiment in the hope of catching votes for himself as a Presidential candidate. The League today “is not the League conceived by Woodrow Wilson,” he **Wild**. “It might have been had the United States joined.” But as **we** did not join, “the League has not developed through these **years** along the course contemplated by its founder.” Therefore, **I** do not favor American participation.” Just what does this mean? Clearly nothing except that Governor Roosevelt has not **the** courage to stand out bravely for the internationalism he once sponsored. His attitude on the war debts is equally unrealistic. He Would grant the European nations a respite “if it were considered advisable in the present condition of world finance,” but he Would “insist upon an accord as to when payments should begin

18. *Ibid.*, February 18, 1932, p. 2.

and in what amount.” The high spot of his address was his denunciation of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, which he correctly pointed out was adding to the cost of living in this country. But instead of urging that the American tariff be reduced, or pledging himself to work to that end when and if he becomes President, he vaguely recommended that an international tariff be called.²⁸

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Later in the year 1932 Henry F. Pringle, in an article entitled “Franklin D. Roosevelt—Perched on the Bandwagon,”* published in the *Nation*, spoke of compromises and of the relation between William Randolph Hearst’s demand and Governor Roosevelt’s reply in his address before the Grange:

The habit of compromise grows. The intelligent politician gives in, at first, only when the probable result justifies it. After a time he bends his head when there is very little real need for it. SoqS he is doing it constantly. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, has not for years been identified with the League of Nations. New ton Baker was carrying the onus of that troublesome issue and was, in all probability, justified in his public statement that 11| he would not force the United States to join. But on the 16th of February 1 of this year a letter lay on the Governor’s desk in Albany, a letter in which William Randolph Hearst demanded an expression on the League. It is true that Hearst had published the letter in all his newspapers. It is also true, however, that his political influence is waning. If Roosevelt had declined to make a statement, the matter would have been forgotten in short order. On the night after receiving Hearst’s letter, however, Roosevelt announced that he did not favor the League. S

The truth is that Franklin Roosevelt hauls down banners under which he has marched in the past and unfurls no new ones to the skies.....⁸⁰

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Under the heading “Democratic Light Horses,” the *Republic*, commenting on steps recently taken by Democratic aspirants for the presidency, treated Mr. Baker fittingly

29. *The Nation*, Vol. 134, February 17, 1932, p. 182.

30. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1932, p. 489.

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Governor Roosevelt as playing the well-known trick of politicians:

Three men, all of whom have been discussed as possible Democratic nominees for President, have lately taken steps in furtherance of their various candidacies. Newton D. Baker, who has been fulfilling what is supposed to have been a personal pledge to President Wilson by recommending the League of Nations in season and out, has suddenly come down to earth and announced that the League, of course, is not an issue in this year's campaign. Thereupon Governor Franklin Roosevelt, presumably alarmed by the impetus thus accorded Mr. Baker's cause, has given the League an even more vigorous repudiation, and one which, considered purely as fact and not as political propaganda, has much to commend it. It is not, he explains, the League Mr. Wilson envisioned; if it were, he would still be for it. It is dominated now by selfish European Powers and America must keep clear of it. And as though to clinch his position as a Little American, Governor Roosevelt adds that the war debts must be paid in full—something which he, as an intelligent realist, must know cannot end will not happen, not even though, as he suggests, the tariff should be lowered to make it possible.

... The statements of Messrs. Roosevelt and Baker give good examples of the old trick of the politicians—trying to be all things to all men, to seem isolationist to those who want isolation

Among thoughtful and earnest advocates of internationalism, Governor Roosevelt's renunciation of the League on February 2, 1932, dropped with a crash. And, while they were deeply concerned with the political aspects of the Governor's declaration of faith, they sought especially to **refute** the argument he had made in support of his new position. A fairly representative illustration of their case against his contentions was supplied by Manley O. Hudson, elected **Judge** of the World Court in 1936, and a defender of the **League** and international cooperation, in a letter to the *New*

York Times, dated February 10, 1932:

Governor Roosevelt's address to the New York State Grange! must be a profound disappointment to many Americans interested in our foreign policy. As a program, it contains no constructive suggestions. Instead, it expresses a negative attitude which would turn the clock back on advances already made by the United States in international cooperation.

To explain the reversal of his own attitude, Governor Roosevelt said that "the League of Nations today is not the League conceived by Woodrow Wilson," that it "has not developed through these years along the course contemplated by the founder." Even if that were true, it would not be a justification for his position. Only if Mr. Wilson had been omniscient could he have foreseen all of the post-war developments.

"Too often, through these years," said Governor Roosevelt "the League's major function has been not the broad, overwhelming purpose of world peace . . ." The major function of the League has never been anything else than safeguarding the world's peace. For ten years it has been engaged in an effort to complete our law concerning pacific settlement. It has functioned in numerous disputes, not all of which have been between European States. For months the Council has been earnestly seeking ways of securing peace in the Far East. Surely Governor Roosevelt does not disapprove the Council's making such an effort. Does he approve the hot-and-cold attitude of our government? Does he really believe that at Shanghai, for instance, our government should play a lone hand? Or that if we cooperate with other powers, as we are doing, such cooperation is more effective outside the League?

"American participation," Governor Roosevelt said, "would not serve the highest purpose of the prevention of war . . ." He does not mention the World Court, created by the League of Nations. Nor does he mention the General Act for Pacific Settlement, adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1928. Are these accomplishments not "in accordance with American ideals"?

Governor Roosevelt shows no appreciation of the extent to which the government of the United States is now participating in various activities of the League of Nations. Our government has gradually and laboriously, over a period of ten years, worked out methods by which the United States is taking a large part in the activities at Geneva.

Nor does Governor Roosevelt offer any positive policy. He says that "what the world needs most today is a national policy which will make us an example of national honor to other nations." Suppose his policy were adopted by all of the fifty-five members of the League of Nations. Logically it would mean that they should abandon the League. How can the United States better make herself an "example" than by pushing forward or ganized international cooperation to meet the day-to-day needs of the world?

Governor Roosevelt envisages a "trade conference with the other nations of the world" at which other nations "will meet us half-way and put all their cards on the table." He seems to be unaware of the fact that many such conferences have been held in Geneva during the past few years, and that the United States has participated in some of them, and has even signed and ratified some of the treaties drawn up at such conferences.

He wants us to "call a meeting of our debtors here, and not in Europe, and demand an understanding." He reminds the farmers that they are "dwellers in a world in which economic and political conditions that affect one nation affect many nations." Yet he repudiates the possibility of our joining with other nations to deal with such conditions by sharing a common international responsibility.

Governor Roosevelt states that "the world ship of state . . . can steer safely home by unity of action." He thinks it possible that "by economic cooperation this nation can revive the trade of the world as well as trade within our own borders." Yet he states that "the highest ideals of America demand that, with strict adherence to the principles of Washington, we maintain our international freedom." Apparently, our cooperation to meet the needs of the twentieth century must be chained by eighteenth century ideas.³²

During the turmoil over internationalism in January, 1932, Mr. Hearst's New York papers continued to discuss the theme with reference to the fortunes of the Democratic Party. In the issue of the *New York Evening Journal* for January 28, 1932, Claude Bowers, the distinguished political³¹

31. *New York Times*, February 18, 1932.

writer from Indiana, declared with reference to the League of Nations that "as a party issue it is as dead as Pharaoh," and then laid stress on the central problem, as he saw it, namely the crisis in domestic economy: "If the Democrats are wise in their generation they will not inject into the platform any controversial topic having no relation to the solution of the economic problems of these days. The politicians cannot make issues after all. They can put planks in a platform that no one thinks about, cares about, or talks about; and that is one of the vices of modern platforms When millions are anxious about their ability to buy bread and prevent the eviction of their families for non-payment of rent, it is sheer nonsense to try to turn their attention to any academic questions. The next Democratic platform should be brief, positive, and confined to economic questions and only such political questions as are fundamental. . . ." 33

While the controversy over the action of the Government of Roosevelt in repudiating the League was raging, the *New York American* added fuel to the fire by chiding the Democrats for not having decided "which or what kind of main they will offer for President," and expressed wonder that "Wilsonite" was still being considered: "The extraordinary thing is that, with the country now paying the gigantic bill incurred through the folly of the Wilson Administration many Democrats actually advocate the choice of some League of Nations Wilsonite. The most conspicuous ones mentioned are men that have committed themselves to the theory that this country is not able to take care of itself, that it should join the League of Nations and be governed by the decisions of other countries. It is the fact." 34

Under the caption, "Baker's Japanese Boycott a 'Sure Way to War,'" the *New York American*, on February 25, 1931, devoted an editorial to attacking Mr. Baker as an

33. "The League Is Out" by Claude G. Bowers. *New York Evening Journal*, January 28, 1931.

34. *New York American*, February 7, 1931.

alist bent on pursuing internationalist doctrines despite his recent rejection of the League of Nations as a political issue. That was not enough for Mr. Hearst: he demanded nothing less than a whole-hearted renunciation of internationalism as a creed, and a commitment to the basic tenets of isolationism. Mr. Baker had recently approved the idea of an attempt to bring Japan to book by a resort to the boycott, and of this excursion into foreign affairs the *American* editorial declared:

Newton D. Baker's new pair of "spring heel" League of Nations gum shoes, that he now wears for 1932 campaign purposes, do not conceal the cloven hoofs of his internationalism.

In joining the demand upon Congress for a boycott of Japan he reveals himself in his true light.

He, like all the other internationalists who have half-heartedly abandoned the League of Nations for reasons of expediency, is still dominated by the passion for foreign entanglements.

They are too completely saturated in Wilsonian doctrines to wring themselves out on a mere political wringer.

- Wherefore Mr. Baker, availing himself of the first opportunity for meddling in foreign affairs that has been presented since his recent back-tracking on the League of Nations issue, promptly proposes that the United States Government pursue the course of action which, in the opinion of the soundest thinkers in the Senate, **WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR.**

The ink scarcely dry upon his announcement that he would **not seek** to put the United States into the League of Nations until American public opinion favored the adherence of this Government to the League, the petition which he has now signed, and which has been presented to the President in favor of a war making boycott against Japan, reveals Mr. Baker as deliberately **locking** to influence that American public opinion upon which, **according** to his own statement, he was willing to wait until it **should, of** its own accord, become favorable to membership in **the League. . . .**

Even as late as April 24, 1932, Mr. Hearst, in a signed editorial, "**A Plague o' Both Your Houses,**" paid his respects to

both Alfred E. Smith and Governor Roosevelt. He charged Mr. Smith for attacking Mr. Roosevelt in a recent speech, charged him with having been an internationalist himself in 1920, when the latter was a candidate for Vice-President on an internationalist platform, and with having supported Mr. Roosevelt in 1928 when he was a candidate for Governor of New York. Mr. Hearst also accused Mr. Smith of favoring "the international bankers' policy of European debt cancellation."

Having disposed of Mr. Smith as a candidate for the Democratic nomination at the coming party convention, Mr. Hearst gave an additional warning to Governor Roosevelt

Mr. Roosevelt, on the other hand, repudiated the League of Nations this year, but not the League Court.

The Hearst papers accepted his repudiation as sincere, or at least opportune, but most of the press found it difficult to conceive how a gentleman who had been a fanatical friend of foreign nations all his political career could suddenly adopt the principle

of George Washington and genuinely become imbued with loyal American spirit just on the eve of a Presidential election. The fact, therefore, that Mr. Smith is still an adherent of the international bankers' policy of debt cancellation, while Mr. Roosevelt adheres merely to the devious policy of projecting the United States into foreign entanglements by the back door of the League Court, is probably not the real reason for the

tween Mr. Smith and Mr. Roosevelt. . . .

Mr. Roosevelt is concerned about the unknown American man.

He might well be concerned also about the American spirit which seems to be equally unknown to him.

And he might become interested in the elemental principles of political economy, which seem to be likewise unknown to him.

The unknown American man is not going to be benefited by Mr. Roosevelt's plan to put this country into foreign complications by the trap door of the League Court.

He is not going to be benefited by Mr. Smith's plan to cancel foreign debts while the American man, known or unknown, makes up the amount cancelled in added taxes.

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But the whole country will be benefited by putting eight million men to work and so starting prosperity on its way back to us . . .

In the meantime the days are passing, and Democratic opportunity is passing with them, while these Broadway and Bowery politicians quarrel over their own small policies and their own petty ambitions.

A plague on both their houses.

The Democratic Party needs a genuine leader—and also some genuine Democracy.³⁵

About two weeks after this challenging editorial appeared in the *New York American*, it became known that one of Governor Roosevelt's leading sponsors, Joseph P. Kennedy, was in touch with Mr. Hearst in California. By that time it had been made evident that the Hearst-Garner-McAdoo combination had control of ninety delegates to the convention—forty-six from Texas and forty-four from California. Nominally assigned to Mr. Garner, who had no chance whatever to win the nomination, they probably could make or break Mr. Roosevelt at Chicago, by swinging one way or another.

In a dispatch from Warm Springs, Georgia, dated May 8, 1932, the *New York Times* stated that Mr. Kennedy was a guest of Governor Roosevelt there over the week end, and then reported on their negotiations in the following terms:

The visit of Mr. Kennedy excited some attention here [Warm Springs], as he had just come from California on a business trip, in which he paid a call on William Randolph Hearst. Mr. Hearst was one of the original figures behind the boom to swing the California delegation for Speaker Garner. After the Speaker won, the question of what his managers planned to do with his votes became vital.

The Roosevelt forces have expressed the opinion that the Garner votes will not be allied with the group backing former Governor Smith in a "stop-Roosevelt" drive and that they will be handled independently. Whether this subject was brought up in

35. *Ibid.*, April 24, 1932.

the conversations between Governor Roosevelt and Mr. Kennedy was not learned, although considerable curiosity on the point was manifested.⁸⁶

The extent to which Governor Roosevelt's repudiation of the League of Nations, after Mr. Hearst's open demand upon him, influenced the results at the Democratic convention in Chicago is and must remain a matter of conjecture. Nor can its effects in the election be measured.* Undoubtedly the action fell with shocking impact upon the faithful band of men and women who still believed in the League, in the advocacy of American membership, and in the ideals expounded by President Wilson; but the Governor's party men in that group could minimize its importance. One of them, for example, Professor James Hart, of the University of Virginia, referring to that subject, remarked: "He [Mr. Roosevelt] had little to say about foreign relations in this campaign, though before his nomination he had apparently won the favor of Hearst by a weak statement opposing the League of Nations. To some Wilson Democrats his addresses had the flavor of Woodrow Wilson diluted with water." This at least put the case in its mildest and most favorable terms.

What purported to be an inside account of Governor Roosevelt's triumph at Chicago was given to the public in 1944 by Wendell Willkie in a brief but significant article headed, "Democratic Party's Share in Isolationism."⁸⁷ Willkie said that he and other "Baker Boys" worked at the Chicago convention in 1932 for a deadlock between Governor Roosevelt and Alfred E. Smith in the hope of winning the nomination for Mr. Baker, "the leader who almost alone

36. *New York Times*, May 9, 1932. In *After Seven Years* (Harper & Brothers, 1939), pp. 30 ff., Raymond Moley describes the dramatic scene in Chicago when the votes of the ninety delegates from Texas and California were cast for Governor Roosevelt. Mr. Moley leaves Mr. Hearst out of account in dealing with the negotiations which preceded the nomination of Mr. Roosevelt.

37. *American Year Book* (1932), p. 12.

38. *The United States News*, September 8, 1944; see above, p. 72.

through the dark isolationist twenties had fought consistently for world cooperation.” But their labors, Mr. Willkie explained, were in vain: “Again we lost. For Garner and McAdoo and Hearst and Joe Kennedy and Jim Farley got together and no subject interested them less than the cause of world cooperation.” At all events, although Governor Roosevelt’s supporters were far from sure of victory when the Democratic convention assembled in 1932, they managed, with the aid of “Garner and McAdoo and Hearst and Joe Kennedy and Jim Farley,” to nominate the Governor after a brief season of “agonizing” uncertainty.

In planning the strategy of his campaign for President, Mr. Roosevelt decided to say no more about the League of Nations. He had squarely met Mr. Hearst’s terms and that was deemed sufficient. For this resolve to avoid foreign affairs, we have the testimony of Raymond Moley, a member of the Governor’s inner circle, who told an intimate story of the campaign in *After Seven Years*. Speaking of plans for the campaign, Mr. Moley said: “After further consideration Roosevelt decided to sidetrack the idea of a speech on foreign relations. The Republicans had scrupulously avoided the issue. Public interest in it, during the fall, was at a low point. It seemed needless to raise the question. A declaration of what I understood to be Roosevelt’s views on the subject was likely to cost him more undecided votes than it would make for him. He was already sure of the West and Middle West, where his views on foreign affairs would be immensely popular. There was no advantage in alienating those Eastern elements which would shy at his policies” (p. 62).

An examination of Mr. Roosevelt’s campaign speeches printed in the first volume of his *Public Papers and Addresses* confirms Mr. Moley’s version of the strategy. The League of Nations is not cited in the index of that volume (although a reference to it appears on page 157 of the text where a partial report of the February 2 speech of repudiation is given); and apparently it was not mentioned by Mr. Roosevelt during the campaign. He delivered no campaign address devoted

to the League or to any phase of foreign affairs involving **an** attitude to the League or to the principle of collective security. A line-by-line scrutiny of the speeches contained in Volume I of the *Public Papers* reveals no words that could offend the stoutest isolationist in the West or anywhere **in** the country and no words that could give aid and comfort to any citizen who still believed that the United States should be associated with the League. Nor is reference to the World Court to be found in the index.

•During his quest for the nomination and election, Mr. Roosevelt, in the fashion consecrated by party custom, paid tribute to the great leader, Woodrow Wilson; but not to Woodrow Wilson as the advocate of the League of Nations? Speaking at Richmond, Virginia, in April, 1932, he quoted a passage from Mr. Wilson's writings on George Washington (pp. 592-593). In an address at Saint Paul, Minnesota, during the same month he cited a comment by Mr. Wilson on the Federalists as "a group 'possessed of unity and informed by a conscious solidarity of interest'" (p. 628). At Chicago, in his speech of acceptance, Mr. Roosevelt declared: "Let us feel that in everything we do there still lives with us, if **not** the body, the great indomitable, unquenchable, progressive, soul of our Commander-in-Chief, Woodrow Wilson" (p. 648). In an address to the Commonwealth Club at San Francisco, September 23, 1932, he appealed to the authority of Mr. Wilson on the issue of great combinations in industry and added that "had Mr. Wilson been able to devote eight years to domestic instead of to international affairs—would he might have had a wholly different situation at the present time" in respect of concentrated financial power (pp. 749-751). At Baltimore, October 25, 1932, Mr. Roosevelt referred to "the nomination of our great leader, Woodrow Wilson" (p. 831). But in none of his appeals to the electoral did Mr. Roosevelt manifest the slightest sympathy for internationalism or the League of Nations which President Wilson had espoused with singleness of devotion.

It was especially with regard to the protective tariff

Mr. Roosevelt touched upon international relations to foreign affairs during his campaign for election. The Democratic platform of 1932 had condemned the "protectionism" approved by the party platform in 1928 and advocated by Alfred E. Smith, the party's candidate. By terms quite explicit the tariff planks of 1932 gave the country the right to expect a rather drastic downward revision of the Republican tariff then in effect. In his campaign speeches Mr. Roosevelt, however, took another line, much to the chagrin of those Democrats who firmly expected an immediate reduction in the rates of duty levied on imports. He did, it is true, pour scorn on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. But he proposed no immediate scaling of the rates by congressional action. On the contrary he advocated a resort to bargaining with other nations under the principle of reciprocal interest? He rebuffed the efforts of men such as Cordell Hull to force upon him a commitment to a direct and immediate lowering of trade barriers—a cutting of all rates by at least a flat 10 per cent.³⁹ As the campaign grew hotter and his attacks on the tariff in force were widely publicized, Mr. Roosevelt was called upon to name the specific rates which he proposed to cut by reciprocal arrangements. After one speech in the Middle West in which he had characterized the Republican tariff rates as "outrageously excessive," hundreds of telegrams from farmers and processors descended upon him, asking for particulars, especially as to agricultural products. From the industrial East and Northeast came a number of inquiries about his suggested reductions in the rates on manufactured goods.

Late in the campaign, at Baltimore, October 25, Mr. Roosevelt replied to the clamor from the West: "Of course, it is absurd to talk of lowering tariff duties on farm products. . . . I promised to endeavor to restore the purchasing power of the farm dollars by making the tariff effective for agriculture, and raising the price of the farmers' products. I know

39. Moley, *op. cit.*, *vm.* 47 ff., for an account of the rebuff administered to

of no effective excessively high tariff duties on farm products. I do not intend that such duties shall be lowered.” At Boston a few days later he reassured farmers and added some; assurance for manufacturers: “I favor—and do not let the false statements of my opponents deceive you—continued!

protection for American agriculture as well as American industry. I favor more than that. I advocate, and will continue to advocate, measures to give the farmer an added benefit called a tariff benefit, to make the tariff effective on his products.”⁴⁰

•A careful reading of Governor Roosevelt’s speeches on the one phase of foreign affairs which he discussed at length—reduction of the tariff in the interest of prosperity for Americans and better relations with foreign countries—could give no satisfaction to internationalists of the Wilsonian school. The third of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points!

read: “The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.” Nationalistic commercial prime objectives and guarantees of peace offered by the League of Nations. But by the close of Mr. Roosevelt’s campaign in 1932, this kind of economic internationalism had gone into the discard, along with talk about the League itself. The Cobden-Bright-Hull program of world peace through world free trade, Mr. Roosevelt had made clearly evident, formed no part of his policy and would receive no support in case of his triumph at the polls in November. 1

As Mr. Roosevelt’s campaign for election proceeded according to the strategy just described, William Randolph Hearst’s papers waxed more and more enthusiastic, and

40. *Public Papers*, I, 836, 853—854; and Moley, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 f. Mr. Moley remarks: “For the student of statesmanship the process (of reverse action) will be instructive.”

wound up on the eve of the election with an unqualified paean. Immediately after the nomination of Governor Roosevelt and Speaker Garner at Chicago, Mr. Hearst, in a signed editorial, gave this whole-hearted endorsement of the two men:

Franklin D. Roosevelt will make a great President of the United States, and John N. Garner will make a splendid Vice-President and presiding officer of the Senate.

Both men are eminently qualified for these positions by long years of skillful public work and faithful public service.

It will be an enormous benefit to this nation of ours to have two such men in commanding public positions,—men who not only have the democratic spirit to desire to serve the public in terest, but who have also the experience and the proven competence to be able to do it. . . .

Governor Roosevelt and Speaker Garner will bring to bear upon the present situation and upon every situation which may arise not only distinguished ability, but a lifelong experience in legislative and executive means and methods. . . .

Governor Roosevelt and Speaker Garner are both competent public mechanics and it probably will not take them long after they are ensconced in authoritative office to fix our stalled national engine and set it going smoothly again.

Surely we need not be niggardly in the only compensation they will require, which is public approval.

As practical evidence of his executive competence, Governor Roosevelt can point to the most notable record which has been made as Governor of New York State since the days of Grover Cleveland. . . .

Governor Roosevelt has much of the calm and conscientious attention to the business in hand, no matter what office he occupies, as had President Coolidge, and he has also, like his distinguished cousin and namesake, Theodore Roosevelt, what has been described as Theodore Roosevelt's distinguishing characteristic,—the faculty of being unerringly right on questions affecting the popular welfare.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, like Theodore Roosevelt, is not only "right" in his desire to do the right thing, but "right" in his in-

tuition and in his experienced knowledge of what is the right thing. . . .

"Words are good when backed by deeds and only so," said Theodore Roosevelt.

The patriotic words of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John N. Garner are backed by their record of patriotic deeds.⁴¹

Two days later, July 5, 1932, the *New York American** hailed Mr. Roosevelt as the man qualified to deal with the economic crisis, as safe for "honest, conscientious business men and financiers," and as safe for "the people of the United States":

Is Roosevelt a safe candidate?

This question echoes a similar inquiry which used to reverberate through Wall Street concerning the Democratic nominee's illustrious cousin.

Before the query can be satisfactorily answered one might counter, "Safe" for Whom?

If Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct as President, if elected, squares with his past acts and expressions he will not be altogether safe for heartless, heedless speculators and pyramided and blue sky operators or for the greedy gangsters in the power industry who seek to appropriate to themselves public facilities.

Governor Roosevelt's "Forgotten Man" radio speech indicates that he will not be complacently safe for and in smug harmony with those who, like President Hoover, preach the doctrine of "rugged individualism" to needy persons who are without employment, while practicing tender paternalism in the direction of financing the financiers.

But everything in Governor Roosevelt's record and program indicates clearly that he will be constructively and comfortably safe for honest, conscientious business men and financiers. . . .

As the Presidential election looms, economic and labor problems are the dominant issues of the campaign. If voters want to use intelligent discrimination they will examine the record to test how Messrs. Roosevelt and Hoover reacted to the economic catastrophe. . . .

41. *New York American*, July 3, 1932, p. 1.

Now that time gives an opportunity to check up on the prognostications of the two men, the record plainly shows that Mr. Roosevelt has been far nearer right than Mr. Hoover.

In time of crisis, it is prudent to rely on men of proven worth, not on bunglers.

Franklin D. Roosevelt is safe for the people of the United States.⁴⁴

As the campaign advanced, Mr. Hearst's *New York American* commended Governor Roosevelt's stand on the three issues of the conflict which had a bearing on foreign affairs: the cancellation of the debts owed to the Government of the United States by its former associates in World War I; tariff revision; and the expansion of the American Navy. The first of these issues—debt cancellation—would inevitably confront Mr. Roosevelt if successful at the polls in November, and Mr. Hearst rejoiced that in this case cancellation would be opposed: "The Democratic national platform declares against such debt cancellation. The Democratic Presidential candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt, declares against such debt cancellation."⁴⁵

On August 4, 1932, before Governor Roosevelt had toned down the language of his assault on the high protective tariff then in force, Mr. Hearst's *New York American* rejoiced in the Governor's suggestion for a "thoroughgoing revision of tariff policies," and connected it approvingly with the collection of the debts owed to the United States by foreign governments:

Franklin D. Roosevelt has given an American interpretation of **the** progress toward sound economics in international affairs which was attained at the Lausanne Conference.

Though suggesting a formula for resumption of more friendly economic intercourse, Governor Roosevelt unequivocally turns his back on the suggestion that Uncle Sam assume all of the unliquidated cost of the great war.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, July 5, 1932, p. 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, July 23, 1932. See below, Chap. VI.

The policy of standing pat was a plausible one when conditions were satisfactory. It is an unsatisfactory policy when aggressive action is necessary to insure business recovery.⁴⁵

Long an uncompromising opponent of Republican efforts to block the naval race among the great powers and an ardent advocate of a "big navy," with an eye to a possible war against Japan, Mr. Hearst's *New York American* attacked the Hoover Administration for "the destruction" of the American people's navy; and, under the heading "Democratic Victory Will Save American Navy and Give Ship workers Jobs," made a plea for the election of the Democratic ticket: "Roosevelt and Garner will be inaugurated none too soon to save what is left of the American Navy and put thousands of jobless American wage earners to work replacing the ships that have become obsolete, and restoring to strength the strong right arm of America's national defense." ⁴⁰

Taking up this theme again two weeks later, the *New York American* assured the country that "Roosevelt Leadership Will Restore America's Historic Naval Policies".

Today's observance of Theodore Roosevelt's birthday as Navy Day has a new meaning for the American people.

Theodore Roosevelt was not a "Little Navy" man. His policy was at all times a powerful Navy. Out of his policy developed our historic policy of a Navy at all times "equal to the strongest."

That policy was established by Congress, reaffirmed by treaties and repeatedly endorsed by the American people at the polls. But under the Hoover Administration, our sound and patriotic policy has been scrapped in favor of a fatuous pacifism. . . .

This disgraceful chapter of neglect and naval deterioration will be ended next March, when the American people will have put another Roosevelt in the White House.

Ever since he entered public life as a young man, Franklin D. Roosevelt has emulated the example of his illustrious kinsman

⁴⁵J. *New York American*; September 28, 1932.

⁴⁶. *Ibid.*, October 12, 1932.

no *American Foreign Policy in the Making*

urging upon his countrymen the imperative duty of maintaining a strong Navy as "the surest guarantee of peace. . .

Navy Day finds our people this year fully resolved to end the steady decline of the American Navy in both men and ships, and to begin its restoration to complete equality with the strongest foreign power in every class of combatant ships. i

And during the next four years, in fulfillment of this high purpose, the American people will observe the birthday of Theodor Roosevelt as Navy Day with a new spirit and a new patriotism under the quickening leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President and Commander-in-Chief.⁴⁷ |

On November 6, 1932, after Governor Roosevelt had closed his campaign and the election was at hand, Mr. Hearst in a signed editorial, commended the Governor to the American people in terms personal and unequivocal: I

. . . Franklin D. Roosevelt was good enough to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Wilson. |

He was good enough to be nominated by the Democrats for Vice-President in 1920. foi

He was good enough to nominate the Democratic candidate for President in 1928. I

He was good enough to carry New York for Governor that year, although the National ticket lost it. ,i

He was good enough to be renominated for Governor of New York State in 1930 and to carry the State by over seven hundred thousand plurality. a

He was good enough to have the Democratic delegates vast majority of the States of the Union nominate him at Chicago in 1932 for President of the United States. l

He has always been honest and frank and sincere with the public. .ffl

He has always been true to his principles and faithful to his pledges.

He has always been constructive and always conservative in the way which would best conserve the public interest. i

What has he done in all his years of public service which is not constructive and conservative? na

...

If you want to select a President to lead us out of the depression and to protect your interests now and hereafter, do not pick the man whom Wall Street wants, but vote for Franklin D. Roosevelt—capable, conscientious and conservative—and ever faithful to his public trust.⁴⁸

/ By a curious shift in events, President Hoover, the Republican candidate in 1932, was widely represented, especially by the Hearst press, as an internationalist, while Governor Roosevelt was made to appear a simon-pure American. It is true that, in the campaign of 1932, the Republican party and Mr. Hoover stood fast by the platform promise to refuse membership in the League of Nations; while offering to cooperate with it in scientific, humanitarian, and economic undertakings, including the reduction of armaments. But before the campaign opened and while it was in progress, President Hoover's Administration or, at all events, his Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, was skirting around the edges of political cooperation with the League; and advocates of internationalism were insisting that the incorrigible isolationists of 1920 were more internationalist in 1932 than the Democrats.⁴⁹

This turn in Republican foreign policy during President Hoover's Administration was due to special circumstances. Republicans had been the chief abettors of imperialism in the Far East since the war with Spain in 1898. They had employed that form of American intervention in China known as "the Open Door." Despite vehement protests from Democrats against this imperialism as foreboding tragedy for the American Republic,⁵⁰ Republican Administrations had forged

48. *Ibid.*, November 6, 1932, pp. 1-2.

49. The literature of this apparent shift in Republican tactics is large; but brief reviews of it by competent authorities are to be found in the *American Year Book* for the years 1931 and 1932, especially in the sections dealing with the United States and the League and World Affairs.

50. Under the leadership of William Jennings Bryan the Democrats made Imperialism the paramount issue in 1900. In their platform they declared: "we warn the American people that imperialism abroad will lead quickly and inevitably to despotism at home"; they condemned "the greedy commercial-

ahead, encouraging and lending diplomatic support to capitalistic struggles for markets, investment opportunities, and commercial advantages in the Far East. With increasing zest they pursued this course as the United States became more and more industrialized and as Japan, having adopted machine processes of manufacturing, pressed harder and harder for commodity outlets on the mainland of Asia in competition with American business enterprise.

The growing friction between the United States and Japan, augmented by the manner in which Congress in 1922 passed legislation excluding Japanese immigrants from the United States, moved swiftly toward an explosion as time passed. In 1931 Japanese militarists, after a clash with Chinese forces in Manchuria, seized that province and, the following year, they transformed it into a puppet state, Manchukuo, headed by a puppet dictator, Henry Pu Yi, formed

the boy Emperor of China. These "incidents," for many reasons, immediately excited the Hoover Administration.

Both President Hoover and Secretary Stimson had acquired special knowledge of Oriental affairs. From 1895 to 1913 Mr. Hoover had been engaged in promoting business enterprises in China, India, and other parts of the world. Secretary of Commerce under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, he had expanded the agencies for pushing foreign commerce and, while issuing warnings against unsound financing, had supported what were regarded as the "legitimate" drives of American capitalists for commercial and investment opportunities in foreign countries. His Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, had been Secretary of War under President Taft in the age of "dollar diplomacy," and Governor General of the Philippines.

Owing to his long absences from the country, during the

they referred to the use of American armed forces to put down the Philippine insurrection, as "the war of 'criminal aggression.'" The Democrats also protested that Republican imperialism, if not checked, would lead to militarism, a vast military establishment, "a sure forerunner of compulsory military service and conscription." E. Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency* (1897-1913).

chap. 1, "'Imperialism' the 'Paramount Issue.'" b

years from 1895 to 1913, Mr. Hoover, whatever his political sympathies, had not been involved at first hand in the imperialist politics of the Republicans and had taken no public part in it. At all events, his personal opinions on the subject in 1932 remained undisclosed. Secretary Stimson, on the other hand, though well advertised as an advocate of international peace, was, in fact, an imperialist of the Theodore Roosevelt-Mahan-Beveridge school.⁶¹ He advocated a “strong” policy in the Far East and was vehemently hostile to independence for the Philippine Islands.

At a hearing on a Philippine independence bill held in 1930 by the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Mr. Stimson gave the classical reasons of imperialism for blocking Philippine independence: “First, I am opposed to it, because I believe it would be disastrous to the Philippine people; second, I am opposed to it, because I believe it would be disastrous to the interests of the United States both on the islands and in the Far East; and, third, I am opposed to it, because I believe it would inevitably create a general unsettlement of affairs in the Far East, in connection with the present conditions in the different countries having interests in and exercising sovereignty there,” including, of course, the imperialist powers, Great Britain, France, and Holland.⁵²

President Hoover likewise opposed independence for the Philippines as projected in the bill which was finally passed by Congress in December, 1932; but on different grounds. As far as the public record stood, he had been in times past no advocate of imperialism backed by the engines of government, with war as the *ultima ratio*. The bill in question had been designed and pressed largely under the drive of Democrats, who then had a majority in the House of Representa-

Ji. *Imperialism* is used in this volume as meaning: employment of the engines of government and diplomacy to acquire territories, protectorates, and/or spheres of influence occupied usually by other races or peoples, and to promote industrial, trade, and investment opportunities in competition with other imperialist powers or on occasion in collaboration with them where there is mutuality of interests or perils.

p. *Hearings*, Pt. 7, for May 22, 1930, pp. 658 ff.

tives and, in combination with insurgent Republicans⁵³ controlled the Senate. Although accompanied by noble professions made in the name of liberty, the measure had been especially supported by agricultural and labor interests as a bar to Philippine competition.

As finally formulated, the independence bill was, in any case, debatable. It was no clear-cut proposal for liquidating the imperialist interests of the United States in the Far East, once and for all. In respect of Philippine independence as provided for in the bill, President Hoover took the position maintained by the old school of "isolationists" who had condemned the imperialist adventure since 1900; namely that independence should be granted to the Philippines, that the separation should be "complete and absolute," that the United States should hold no naval bases there and should henceforth assume no responsibility for Islands.⁵³

But whatever may have been President Hoover's attitude to American imperialism as policy, Mr. Stimson was his Secretary of State; and Mr. Stimson took the lead in dealing with the controversy over Manchuria in 1931-32. With an invincible persistence he eagerly sought support for his program of checkmating Japan from all favorable quarters, including the League of Nations and especially Great Britain and France as great powers with "vital interests" in the Far East and as members of the League. He entered into communications with the Governments of Great Britain and France; and, presumably as a representative of the Hoover Administration, he went to Geneva in April, 1932, to seek for help. There he was greeted with enthusiasm by internationalists; and his appearance was treated as if foreshadowing a turn of the United States in the direction of political cooperation with the

53. W. S. Myers, *The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), pp. 169 ff. By 1932 even Democrats had it so much of their anti-imperialist zeal that they were not prepared to grant unconditional independence to the Philippines and withdraw definitely and completely from this imperialist adventure in the Far East.

In commenting on Secretary Stimson's visit to the League, Arthur Sweetser, then serving as an American member of the League Secretariat, reported: "A symbolic illustration of America's developing attitude occurred in April when for the first time in the history of the League a Secretary of State of the United States crossed the League's threshold and quietly and informally took his seat in a League meeting. Mr. Stimson was but following in the footsteps of Sir Austen Chamberlain, Aristide Briand, Gustav Stresemann and many others responsible for the foreign policies of their governments." 64 Indeed Secretary Stimson lent some countenance to this interpretation of his visit by announcing publicly: "Such personal contact is of the greatest assistance in promoting our best interests in the field of foreign affairs and contributes to a better understanding between the governments concerned and the individuals conducting those affairs." 65

But Great Britain and France were cold to Secretary Stimson's advances, and politely steered a course of neutrality. The League of Nations, after sponsoring an investigation, finally declined to risk belligerent action in line with Mr. Stimson's desires. The United States naval command, recognizing the inadequacy of the American fleet then in being, was unwilling at the moment to embark on war with Japan. Even so, American advocates of internationalism insisted on seeing in the maneuvers of Secretary Stimson a sign that the United States was about to become affiliated with the League of Nations; when as a matter of fact he was seeking, among other things, parallel support for American interests in the Orient, and seeking it through a "concert of nations" in the historic style set by John Hay, Secretary of State during the imperialist outburst at the beginning of the twentieth century.

About the only thing that came out of the Manchurian affair immediately was an official pronouncement on the part

J4. *American Year Book* (1932), p. 86.

55. *Ibid.* (1932).

of the United States on January 7, 1932. This pronouncement was called "the Hoover doctrine" by some observers; and "the Stimson doctrine" by friends of the Secretary.⁵⁶ Briefly, it was a declaration that the United States would not admit the legality or accept the validity of any situation, agreement, or treaty brought about in contravention of the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China and contrary to the Open Door policy, the Nine-Power Treaty of 1923, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 by which nearly all nations renounced war as an instrument of national policy (with significant reservations, especially by France and Great Britain). This action by the Department of State in proclaiming a non-recognition doctrine was greeted by internationalists as a movement in their direction, as a new fond or phase of internationalism for the United States—mild, it true, but promising and to be encouraged.

Thus Secretary Stimson's pronouncements and diplomatic maneuvers afforded some grounds for the charge or the claim; that the Republicans were more internationalist than the Democrats in 1932. But to American citizens bogged down; in the slough of unemployment, poverty, and distress known as "the Great Depression," Secretary Stimson's "new" internationalism offered few promises of relief. At all events, they were at the moment in no mood for a war with Japan over the Manchurian "incident." Nor did staunch internationalists among the Democrats become so disgruntled over Governor Roosevelt's repudiation of the League of Nations that they were ready for a wholesale desertion of the party at the polls

in November, 1932. Such conclusions at least seem to be warranted by the fact that on election day Governor Roosevelt

56. Indeed there were, apparently, two doctrines: one conceived and followed by President Hoover, with moral implications only; and another by Secretary Stimson, with imperialist and internationalist implications involving unless the doctrine was to be futile, the agency of sanctions, and war in case sanctions failed. Myers, *op. cit.*, pp. 166, 167, 229 n., 253, and *passim*. See below pp. 134 ff.

57. *American Year Book* (1932), pp. 39 ff.

CHAPTER

President Roosevelt Adheres to an Isolationist Policy in 1933

As a candidate for President, Mr. Roosevelt was free to avoid saying anything about foreign policy during his campaign; but after his victory at the polls, and particularly after his inauguration on March 4, 1933, he confronted four inescapable issues of that nature. Three of the issues involved, or were made to involve, the tenets of isolation and internationalism. The fourth, though given an internationalist flavor, was mainly imperialist in origins and practical upshot. All of them had specific bearings on the program of national action which Mr. Roosevelt and his close advisers had formulated with a view to recovery and reform in the United States and hence brought to a test the quality of his political and social philosophy.

At the center of the controversy lay one thorny question: In order to bring about a rapid rise in production, widen the market for American goods, and overcome the cyclical disasters that had long beset American economy, shall the United States rely mainly on domestic measures of reform or shall it seek an enlargement of the foreign markets by some process of negotiation and agreement with foreign governments? There was the crux of the matter as Mr. Roosevelt and his immediate counselors saw it.

Leading Republicans had long insisted that the pot of gold—ever-expanding markets—lay under the rainbow of imperialism. Old-line Democrats had long offered free trade or tariff reductions as the way to never-failing prosperity. President Hoover had been maintaining that the latest of the great depressions originated largely in European disorders and that **certain** actions in the international sphere were necessary to **recovery** in the United States. Mr. Roosevelt and his “brain

trust," on the other hand, regarded these expedients of prosperity as exploded by the experiences of history and were of the opinion that, whatever was done in the international sphere, the United States must depend mainly and emphatically on domestic measures in striving to conquer the economic depression and stabilize prosperity.

One of the imperatives in foreign relations that confronted Mr. Roosevelt was a decision as to the debts which the associates of the United States in the first World War owed to the Federal Government. Most of these debts had been formally recognized and funded after the conclusion of the war. Debtors had been making payments bond until late in December, 1931, when Congress, at the solicitation of President Hoover, had sought to ease the tension in European economy by granting a year's moratorium. In December, 1932, however, on the expiration of the moratorium, the whole question of payment was opened again; France defaulted on her payment then due; and a general default was in sight.

Although apparently a mere matter of finance and good faith, the debts were entangled, in fact or by design, in primary conceptions of foreign policy. By internationalists, American and European, it was claimed that the tariff laws of the United States rendered payment impossible and that a cancellation or material reduction of the debts, coupled with a lowering of customs duties, was a prerequisite to economic recovery in this country and abroad. It was further asserted by American friends of the Entente Allies that cancellation would be an act of justice to them—an overdue recognition of the blood and treasure they sacrificed in common cause of democracy and liberty before the United States saw fit to take up its own defense of these matters. To isolationists and indeed to most Senators and Representatives, in Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, such opinions were anathema: above

deemed the late war and the Versailles settlement to be the sour fruits of a great imperialistic quarrel.¹

Powerful economic interests, as well as internationalist sentiments, were behind the movement to cancel the war debts or at least scale them to negligible amounts. American bankers had floated foreign loans by the billions during the years of Republican supremacy, including loans to German governments, central and local, and to German industries; and American investors—private persons, banks, and institutions—were in peril of losing heavily, perhaps all they had risked. If the war debts owed to the Government of the United States could be scaled, if expenditures for armaments in Europe could be cut down, then the prospects of collecting interest and installments on the other debts, owed to American banks and investors, would be brighter. So, many bankers and investors, caught in the falling structure of European economy (if it deserved that name), were eager to cancel the governmental war debts and transfer the cost of carrying that burden to the taxpayers of the United States. Their agents and the press which reflected their interests were actively engaged, along with the internationalists, in creating an opinion that prosperity could be recovered only if Congress would settle the debt question by wiping out the debts or reducing them to nominal sums. In this way, it was argued, Europeans could begin to buy American goods in large quantities and set the wheels of American industries revolving at high speed.

With these positions on the issue of the foreign debts, Mr. Roosevelt and his counselors were thoroughly familiar. Mr. Roosevelt had rejected them, as well as the League of Nations, in his Grange address of February 2, 1932; and, while willing to be considerate in dealing with the debtors, he was opposed to a cancellation or drastic reduction of the debts. Moreover, during the campaign he had refused to adopt Cordell Hull's proposal to attack the protective tariff by the

1. For a definition of imperialism, see p. 113 n.

traditional method of radically reducing the high rates all along the line by one stroke. j

A few days after his election to the presidency, the issue of the war debts was brought urgently to Governor Roosevelt's attention by a letter from President Hoover, dated at the White House November 12, 1932, inviting him to a personal conference in Washington on the subject. In his message to the Governor, President Hoover took a position on the question that was pleasing, if not wholly satisfactory, to internationalists. To be sure he stated that he did not favor cancellation. Whatever his private opinion may have been, his endorsement of cancellation would have been futile in view of the open hostility in both houses of such project. |

But President Hoover declared to Governor Roosevelt that "we should be receptive to proposals from our debtors of tangible compensation in other forms than direct [cash], payment in expansion of markets for the products of our labor and our farms." He also connected the debts with disarmament: "substantial reduction of world armament which will relieve our own and world burdens and dangers has a bearing upon this question." Mr. Hoover likewise informed the Governor that he had recommended to Congress the creation of a debt commission to make a study of the subject. This expedient was perhaps the only concession he could wring from Congress. At any rate President Hoover hoped that through it he might set in train the solution of the debt!!! problem.² 1

Governor Roosevelt and his advisers had a very definite idea of what it was that President Hoover was contemplating: commitment of the new Administration to a policy that was internationalist in conception. Raymond Moley later wrote that Mr. Roosevelt and he talked over the problems raised by the Hoover proposal and that to them the situation seemed to be "something like this": 'd

2. For the correspondence, see Roosevelt, *Public Papers*, I, 873 ff.

The World War had been financed in large part, both before and after 1917, by the billions of dollars of loans we had made and credits we had granted to the Allies. At the end of the war the Allies had proposed to draw from Germany, in the form of reparations, at least enough to pay back what they owed us. This fantastic burden of debt Germany could not discharge, even if she was permitted to export goods which competed with their own. At the same time we had found that our farmers and industrial producers could not continue to find expanding markets abroad as Europe's production reached and exceeded prewar levels. Hence we had *lent* Europe the money to buy our products, or, if you will, to pay us what she owed us.

This jerry-built structure had begun to crumble the instant we ceased to make foreign loans, and the aftermath of its disintegration was political and economic crisis in Europe and the collapse of the system of international economics which had, up to that time, prevailed.

Those who believed that such a collapse must mark the end of civilization, those to whom the gold-standard and free-trade ideals were the twin deities of an unshakable orthodoxy—the international bankers, the majority of our economists, and almost every graduate of every Eastern university who had dipped into the fields of foreign relations or economics—had undertaken to discover a remedy for it. By common consent they had settled upon the reparations and the war debts. If these were canceled (these particular debts among all debts—public and private) or traded for general European disarmament or British resumption of the gold standard or what not, we would root out the cause of our troubles, they had announced. And so ponderous were the arguments that buttressed this formula in the Atlantic states—in academic and presumably “intellectual” circles, at any rate

—that it was actually unrespectable not to accept them. There and in Europe, the more vociferously they were championed the more passionately they were believed. Only their prospective dupes, the majority of American citizens, stubbornly refused to swallow them.³

3. *After Seven Years*, p. 69.

and conferred with President Hoover and his Secretary of the Treasury, Ogden Mills. At the conference and in a subsequent statement to the press, Mr. Roosevelt lent no countenance to President Hoover's idea of easing down the debts or appointing a commission to start actions which might be headed in that direction. He indicated to Mr. Hoover that any measures proposed by the debtors should be duly considered, but neither at the conference nor in his statement about it to the press did he give the slightest consolation to international bankers, the majority of American economists, or the advocates of internationalism.

Of Mr. Roosevelt's statement, his aide, Raymond Moley, afterward wrote: "Viewed wholly apart from the debt question, the statement was of profound importance because it was the first spectacular step Roosevelt took to differentiate his foreign policy from that of the internationalists. It served notice on the League advocates, the pro-sanctionists, and those who desired a revival of foreign lending that Roosevelt was likely to be no Herbert Hoover or Henry Stimson on foreign affairs. It was a warning that the New Deal rejected the point of view of those who would make us parties to a political and economic alliance with England and France—policing the world, maintaining the international *status quo*, and seeking to enforce peace through threats of war. . . . The kickback in the Eastern papers, after Roosevelt's statement of November 23 was sharp."

Neither in his subsequent negotiations with President Hoover over the war debts and related subjects, nor after he was inaugurated, did Mr. Roosevelt reveal any modification of his hostility to the internationalist thesis that a cancellation of the debts was indispensable to national recovery. He demonstrated that, as he had promised, he would listen to proposals of the debtors for alterations in the bond and that he cherished hopes of friendly cooperation among the nations; but nothing came of the debt negotiations which ensued in the spring and summer of 1933. Congress remained obdurate

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 78 f.

in its refusal to cancel. President Roosevelt was able to drive his domestic measures for recovery through both houses of Congress with a rapidity that was breath-taking: in other words, his power of leadership was extraordinary; and yet, if he had any faith whatever in debt cancellation as a design for recovery, he made no evident effort to convert Congress to that faith.

The second item on the calendar of foreign affairs that Mr. Roosevelt encountered after his election to the presidency was the issue of the policy to be pursued by the United States at the Disarmament Conference then in session at Geneva. This international assembly had been convened in February, 1932, under the auspices of the League of Nations, in a tardy fulfilment of a pledge made in the Treaty of Versailles; and delegates from the United States, sent by President Hoover, were cooperating in the proceedings through out that year.

From the outset this Conference had been snarled in political controversies over collective security; for several of the nations represented in it, France in particular, were unwilling to approve real reductions in armaments without having guarantees of protection against possible aggressors, especially against Germany. Hence the question had arisen at Geneva whether, in case disarmament could be agreed upon, the United States would join in a pact of nations binding all the signatories to employ sanctions and if need be armed force against any aggressor designated by a common council. For internationalists this seemed to be an opportunity, in the name of peace, to get the signature of the United States to a covenant akin to that of the League of Nations—a covenant for designating aggressors and suppressing them by force, economic, discriminatory, or military. Accordingly Americans opposed to political entanglements in European and Asiatic conflicts were suspicious of all the maneuvers connected with “disarmament.”

In December, 1932, several weeks before his inauguration

as President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt was asked to consider the matter of what was to be done at the Disarmament Conference. Norman Davis, an American delegate to that assembly, an internationalist of the Woodrow Wilson school, fresh from Europe, laid the problem squarely before Mr. Roosevelt late in that month, at more than one long session. What commitments, if any, the Governor then made to Mr. Davis do not seem to be a matter of record, but there are grounds for inferring that he privately encouraged him to hope for American participation of some kind in collective action to protect nations against possible aggressors in case they agreed to a substantial or general reduction of armaments.

For this inference certain fragments of evidence offer justification. On January 11, 1933, for instance, Mr. Roosevelt, without consulting the aides who had served him during the campaign, issued a statement endorsing President Hoover's message to Congress on January 10, 1933, asking for legislation empowering the President at his discretion to prohibit the shipment of arms for military purposes. Such measure, President Hoover declared, "would at least enable the Executive in special cases to place the United States in line with other nations who are willing to make sacrifices in the prevention of military conflicts."⁵

After his inauguration, however, President Roosevelt did not press upon Congress any measure binding the Executive to embargo the export of arms to an aggressor designated in Europe. But in March, 1933, he appointed Norman Davis ambassador-at-large in charge of the American delegation at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Early in May, 1933, subsequent to a long conference with President Roosevelt held at Washington in April, the British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, issued a statement in London intimating that the United States was willing to take its part;

5. R. L. Wilbur and A. M. Hyde, *The Hoover Policies* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 604.

in consultative pacts against war, on certain conditions. Norman Davis followed this lead by making a similar announcement, as head of the American delegation to Geneva.

By such incidents American internationalists were led to believe that the peace sentiments of the United States, now running parallel to imperialist sentiments in respect of pressure on Japan, could be channeled, through "disarmament" negotiations, into a positive commitment for putting down aggressors by "collective" action. For the moment this was the type of endeavor most promising to internationalists. To be sure, in his speech of February 2, 1932, Mr. Roosevelt had openly and emphatically declared himself against joining the League and against entanglements in the power politics of Europe; and during his campaign for President he had ignored all pleas for even a gesture in the direction of internationalism. But leaders among American internationalists, aware that a frontal assault would be forlorn, took a new line: if the United States would enter a "consultative pact" with other nations in connection with disarmament, the principle of "collective security" could be realized and at the same time Germany and Japan could be held down. Furthermore, some general statements made by Mr. Roosevelt, or in his name, led new directionists to believe that he would support them.

The expectation that President Roosevelt would repudiate in May, 1933, his repudiation of February 2, 1932, and adopt a policy of "collective security" for the United States was, however, soon dispelled by specifications which admitted of no doubt. That he still adhered to his commitment of February 2 was forcefully illustrated at his press conference of May 10, 1933, on the subject of "Foreign consultative pacts—Disarmament—Foreign debts and the Economic Conference [at London].®

The press interview was opened by the question: "did you see the speech that Ramsay MacDonald made yesterday in

6. *Public Papers*, II, 169 ff.

which he said that an agreement had been reached that we should enter into a consultative pact?" The President replied: "Careful; don't misquote him, get it right."

After some word-play, President Roosevelt read Prime Minister MacDonald's statement as published in a morning newspaper in New York:

...I am very happy to say that the United States Government is prepared to play a further part in tranquilizing Europe by agreeing, if the Disarmament Conference comes to anything like a satisfactory issue, to take its part in consultative pacts, the effect of which will be to increase the security of Europe and the safety of threatened Nations against war.

This is a very considerable advance. Secretary of State Stimson began it in that courageous statement he made before he went out of office regarding the need to redefine neutrality and the present Government has expressed its intention of going further in making its obligations quite definite and authoritative.....⁷

In commenting on the Prime Minister's statement, President Roosevelt minimized the idea of "a very considerable advance" on the part of the United States in the direction of collective security and unmistakably declared himself against restricting the independence of the United States. He said consultative pacts and that if some kind of machinery was set up for consultation the United States would be very glad to have somebody to consult. But, he warned the journalists, consultation "does not tie the hands of the United States in any shape . . . We in no way—in no way—are limiting our own right to determine our own action after the facts are brought out . . . there would be a report to Washington as to what the other Nations think and then we will be entirely free to do whatever we want to do. In other words, we would not be bound by the American who happened to be sitting in the consultative pact. He would report home."

At this point a journalist broke in and the following colloquy occurred:

7. For Mr. Stimson's outlook on foreign affairs, see below, pp. 133 ff.

Q. Mr. President, it seems to me that the consultative pact is al

most identical to our relations with the League of Nations.

The President : It is an entirely different thing. You cannot use comparisons in that connection.

Q. But we always took the stand that we would consult as things came up but do nothing obligatory—not be obliged to consult. With this new arrangement, would we be obliged to consult?

The President : We would say quite frankly that we would sit in and consult. There is nothing particularly startling about that, when you come down to it.

Q. But we have that machinery now.

The President : Sure. In other words, it sounds like a huge change in policy, but it is very little change in policy. It is an announcement that we are going to do something that we

These comments on Prime Minister MacDonald's statement about what the United States was prepared to do were "off the record," that is, made for the information of journalists, who cannot quote a president without his consent. But the President was positive in asserting that he would not agree to any consultative pact that bound the United States to implement the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the outlawry of war, such as internationalists were then urging upon him and upon this nation. Nor did he in his public statements on American foreign policy in that or in any other connection give the slightest hint that he would support the Stimson doctrine or any kind of internationalism for enforcing "collective security."

President Roosevelt's unwillingness to assume for the United States the obligation of helping to coerce aggressors was also made abundantly clear in his direct relations to the ill-fated Disarmament Conference. On May 12, 1933, the Conference reached the verge of collapse when it learned that Chancellor Hitler had called the Reichstag to hear an address criticizing the Conference and threatening a revolt against it. The British, French, and American delegates at

Geneva, fearing disruption of the Conference, decided that nothing except a firm declaration by the President could act as a real check on the intransigence of the German Chancellor. But President Roosevelt's "Appeal to the Nations" on May 16 put an end to the hopes of internationalists that he would in this extremity make a positive pledge of American official cooperation in a system of collective guarantees. In France and England, as well as in the United States, his appeal was understood as involving no guarantees of that kind. In his "Appeal to the Nations" President Roosevelt referred to excessive armaments as related to fear of aggression, declared that the United States was prepared to participate in an effective reduction of armaments, called for a definite pact of non-aggression, and made a plea for an agreement among nations that they "will send no armed force of whatever nature across their frontiers" against any other country.

But in making this appeal and offer of cooperation in reducing the burden of armaments, he gave no sign of any intention to reverse or materially modify his pronouncement of February 2, 1932, against the League of Nations and entanglement in the political conflicts of Europe. On the contrary, he adhered to the policy of independence—freedom of judgment and action for the United States.

If the Appeal left the slightest uncertainty on this point, it was soon removed by the fate of another trial balloon sent up by Norman Davis, head of the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Six days after the Appeal was issued, Mr. Davis proposed that, if some kind of arms limitation could be agreed upon at Geneva, the United States would consult other nations in case of a threat of war and, if it concurred in a judgment as to the guilty party, it would not interfere with a collective effort of other nations to restore peace.

At that time there was hanging fire in the Senate a resolu-

■ §

8. There has never been any generally accepted definition, in spite of many efforts, of the term "aggressor." This is convenient to the powers who with

tion allowing the President to impose an embargo on the export of munitions to any nation about to disturb or actually then disturbing the peace of the world. Internationalists now saw another chance to work the United States into a scheme of collective security. By a combination of the Davis proposal with the resolution permitting the President to embargo the export of munitions to peace breakers, the United States could be morally bound to cooperate with the League of Nations or a concert of powers in applying sanctions to a government designated as an aggressor. But this elaborate project came to naught.

Although Mr. Davis' proposal was watered down with qualifications, even in that form it received little support from President Roosevelt. Moreover the Senate expressed an adverse opinion on the issue by amending the proposed arms embargo resolution in such a way as to make any embargo apply not merely to "aggressors" but to all parties to an international dispute affected by it.

After Hitler took Germany out of the Disarmament Conference and international cooperation began to deteriorate rapidly, Mr. Davis announced that the United States was not aligned politically with any European power and would take no part in the political negotiations that were being carried on in Europe. In Washington, Secretary Hull reassured American isolationists by issuing an official statement to the effect that the United States would remain aloof from the Disarmament Conference until the question of arms reduction as distinguished from political understandings became again the subject of consideration. Thus internationalists in Europe and the United States were definitely warned that the Roosevelt Administration was hostile to foreign entanglements even remotely akin to those arising from membership in the League of Nations.

Whether a commitment of the United States to a program for the collective action of nations against Germany and Japan would have made the Disarmament Conference a success is a question purely speculative in nature. What na-

tions, how many nations, including particularly Great Britain, would have joined such a combination in the final showdown—this too is a matter for speculation. History merely records that, in connection with the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, President Roosevelt did not endorse any scheme which would have bound the United States to join other nations in designating an aggressor by name and in taking effective action, by arms if necessary, against the designee. And the Disarmament Conference simply dragged on through 1933 and subsequent years to a death of inanition.

By events not of his own ordering, Mr. Roosevelt was brought face to face with a third challenge relative to foreign affairs: the necessity of passing upon the policy to be followed by the United States at the coming World Economic and Financial Conference, called under the sponsorship of the League of Nations and to be shortly convened in London. In inception and purpose the Conference, arrangements for which were far advanced by November, 1932, represented the faith of internationalists and promoters of collaboration among nations in the power of a world assembly of diplomats and experts to mitigate substantially, if not overcome, the economic depression that was tormenting the nations of the earth, as well as to advance the cause of peace. President Hoover had accepted the League's invitation and, with an authorization from Congress had appointed American agents to participate in framing the Agenda for the Conference—a document that finally embodied the internationalist doctrine of economic salvation by an ever-larger foreign trade.

In respect of the World Economic Conference, Mr. Roosevelt displayed first a lack of sympathy with internationalist projects and finally open hostility to the designs of this particular undertaking. His interest was solicited in December, 1932, when President Hoover invited him to share in the business of planning for the Conference and to designate one or more of his party members to serve as delegates*

Owen D. Young or Colonel House, for instance. Mr. Roosevelt and his aides knew very well that the Agenda for the Conference constituted an obvious argument for an economic internationalism which based the hope for "recovery" in the United States and elsewhere on the traditional formulas: lower trade barriers, sound currency, monetary adjustments, stabilization, and so forth.⁹

But Mr. Roosevelt declined to assume any public responsibility for the proposed Conference prior to his installation in office. Referring to the internationalist thesis of the Agenda, Mr. Moley afterward wrote: "We simply did not believe that it was true. . . . If Franklin Roosevelt can be said to have had any philosophy at all, that philosophy rested on the fundamental belief that the success of concerted international action toward recovery presupposed the beginnings of recovery at home. He did not believe that our depression could be conquered by international measures. He certainly did not believe that reduction in the debts or even the partial opening of international trade channels would rout it." ¹⁰ Speaking on this general subject, Mr. Moley also declared: "We were agreed that the heart of the recovery program was and must be domestic. . . . Ralph Robey, Rex Tugwell, and Adolf Berle . . . agreed with me in opposition to traditional-internationalism." ¹¹

If, after the inauguration on March 4, 1933, some American citizens thought that President Roosevelt had any lingering faith in internationalism and international conferences as offering a promise of recovery for the United States, they must have been thoroughly disillusioned by his public actions and statements in relation to the Economic Conference at London, which was scheduled to open at London in June of that year. It is true that he carried out the obligation to take part in it which had been assumed by the previous Adminis-

9. For digest of the Agenda, see Beard, *The Open Door at Home* (The Macmillan Company, 1934), pp. 113 if.

10. *After Seven Years*, p. 88.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

tration and that he chose as head of the American delegations the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, a free trader of the Cobden-Bright variety and known as an internationalist off the Woodrow Wilson school; but he associated with Mr. Hull other delegates whose views were different if not antagonistic or nebulous. And his instructions to them, while allowing for diversities of interpretation, were certainly non-committal as to promises; moreover, when the Conference showed signs of floundering, he made no real effort to help it on the way to success, whatever success might have meant. On the contrary. While the Conference was tossing to and fro in a fever, the American delegation, importuned by representatives of other countries, formulated a message to the President in the hope of getting his approval for at least one simple proposition in international finance. This message was drafted at conferences attended by Mr. Moley, who had been sent to London after the opening of the sessions as the President's personal representative. The proposal transmitted to the President was cast in such language, as Mr. Moley later explained, that it could not have been objectionable to "the most fanatical isolationist." It was, he added, "completely harmless." Mr. Moley's own changes in the phraseology of the original document, he thought, merely devitalized it. He was thoroughly convinced that the President's approval at the end of two weeks of alarms and fears in London.

After a long delay, the President replied in a message which for practical purposes disrupted the London Conference and put an end to all projects for any kind of international agreement even on the mildest financial actions. The tone of this message, no less than its contents, shocked the American delegation and all other members of the Conference—indeed internationalists everywhere.

Besides charging the Conference with neglecting its large purposes and with wasting time on a temporary expedient, President Roosevelt proclaimed a nationalist doctrine in the name of the United States: "The sound internal economic

system of a nation is a greater factor in its well-being than the price of its currency in changing terms of the currencies of other nations.” He informed the Conference that the United States rejected the “old fetishes of so-called international bankers” and was planning its national currency with reference to its own needs and interests. The only comfort offered in the stinging message was a brief passage on the importance of mitigating embargoes on trade between nations.¹²

Stunned by the blow, the London Conference soon adjourned; and the inflated dreams that had attended its inauguration dissolved amid a loud verbal uproar. Notice was thus served on internationalists that the United States would pursue a domestic course to recovery.

The fourth dilemma in foreign affairs faced by Mr. Roosevelt after his election to the presidency was the problem of American policy in the Far East, specifically in the form given to it by Henry L. Stimson, President Hoover’s Secretary of State.¹³ In origins, this issue had been related to the imperialist designs promoted under Republican auspices in the Far East since 1898; but American internationalists had seen in Secretary Stimson’s operations a chance to “implement” the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact by inducing the United States to join or use the League of Nations for the purpose of thwarting Japanese imperialism. Thus the United States might be tied up closely with the League or the Great Powers that were managing it.¹⁴ Given the internationalist implications of the Stimson maneuver, the Far Eastern question presented a thorny problem to Mr. Roosevelt. He handled it ingeniously.

12. For an inside account of the affair, see Moley, *ibid.*, pp. 196-296.

13. See above, pp. 112 ff.

14. In respect of Great Britain, it should be said that the government of that country categorically refused to be a party to Secretary Stimson’s scheme. On February 27, 1933, Sir John Simon declared: “Under no circumstances will the Government authorize this country to be a party to the conflict.” *The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore* (Yale University Press, 1945), VI, 453. For the origin of the so-called Stimson doctrine see Benjamin B. Wallace, “How the United States ‘Led the League’ in 1931,” *American Political Science Review*, XXXIX (February, 1945), 101.

Mr. Roosevelt's decision on the Stimson doctrine as Far? Eastern policy was not made at a conference with President; Hoover. It was adopted at an informal and private meeting, with Secretary Stimson himself. On January 9, 1933, Mri| Roosevelt had the Secretary at a luncheon with him at Hyde?; Park; and it is noteworthy that he did not ask to this meeting® his intimate adviser, Raymond Moley, who had ideas of his.'? own on the subject and had been active in the negotiation^ with President Hoover.

Mr. Moley regarded the Stimson doctrine as positively^ dangerous to the American Republic and was strongly op*; posed to the adoption of that doctrine as policy for th® United States. In Mr. Moley's opinion, the acceptance of that! program "implied approval of the theory of collective sanc- tions and the approval of the fallacy that, as 'neutrals' in foreign war, we ought to discriminate against one side or the?, other by embargoes and similar measures." In Mr. Moley's" opinion it also meant "acquiescence in the Hoover-Stimson rejection of the traditional American concept of neutrality/: of disinterestedness, impartiality, and non-participation ill;; foreign quarrels. . . . It endorsed a policy that invited a; major war in the Far East—a war which the United States? and England might have had to wage against Japan had?! England not refused to go along with Stimson." 18

Inasmuch as President Hoover's name was commonly as4 sociated with the Stimson doctrine and particularly by Mr;; Moley at that time, it is necessary, in an attempt to grasp th® significance of the agreement reached by Mr. Roosevelt an® Secretary Stimson on January 9, 1933, to bear in mind tha® President Hoover had no part in the Hyde Park conference and was opposed to the non-recognition doctrine as Mr?'^ Stimson conceived it. In Secretary Stimson's conception, the formula included the imposition of economic sanctions1* and close collaboration, if possible, with other nations in1*6

15. Moley, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

16. William S. Myers, *The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933*, p. 166, 229 n.

enforcing sanctions, coupled with a willingness to accept the almost certain consequence—war, in case sanctions failed. In other words, the Stimson doctrine meant in 1933 precisely what it proved to be when tried out in 1941.

To President Hoover, Mr. Stimson's conception of the non-recognition doctrine was obnoxious. Although he and Secretary Stimson did not come to an open break over the issue, President Hoover was firmly opposed to economic sanctions and other coercive measures and he regarded non recognition as limited for use to moral persuasion, to an appeal to the moral sense and judgment of mankind.¹⁷ As Professor William Myers later declared in a comment on the passage quoted above from Mr. Moley's memoir: "It should be said in the most definite way, *and without reference to what may have been in the mind of Secretary Stimson*, that this statement on the part of Mr. Moley is *the exact opposite to the policies and ideas of President Hoover* as the record has abundantly shown."¹⁸

In a memorandum which he read at a meeting of his cabinet late in 1931, President Hoover had fully expounded his own program: "Our whole policy in connection with controversies is to exhaust the processes of peaceful negotiation. But in contemplating these we must make up our minds whether we consider war as the ultimate if these efforts fail. *"Neither our obligations to China, nor our own interest, nor our dignity require us to go to war over these questions* [in connection with the Manchurian conflict]. These acts [on the part of Japan] *do not imperil the freedom of the American people, the economic or moral future of our people. I do not propose ever to sacrifice American life for anything short of this.* If that were not enough reason,

17. Even as President Hoover conceived the non-recognition doctrine, it represented a departure from American foreign policy as maintained from the establishment of the government under the Constitution to the first Administration of President Woodrow Wilson. Charles A. Beard, *A Foreign Policy for America* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), pp. 3-35, pp. 134-154. For the significance of this departure, see note below, pp. 146-147 n.

18. Myers, *op. cit.*, p. 229 n. (Italics supplied.)

a long struggle at a time when civilization is already weak enough. To win such a war is not solely a naval operation; We must arm and train Chinese. We would find ourselves involved in China in a fashion that would excite the suspicions of the whole world. . . . We have a moral obligation to use every influence *short of war* to have the treaties upheld or terminated by mutual agreement.” After speaking of limiting collaborations with other nations to moral pressures, negotiation, and conciliation, President Hoover closed¹⁹ “But that is the limit. *We will not go along on war or any of the sanctions either economic or military for those are the roads to war.*”¹⁹

Without grossly violating these principles of American foreign policy, which he had so clearly and cogently presented to his cabinet, President Hoover, therefore, could not have followed Secretary Stimson’s program of sanctions and coercion on the almost certain road to war with Japan. If he was tempted, amid the tightening coils of the depression, free himself from their iron grip by resorting to a war and bringing on the inevitable economic boom that made brighter his prospects for a reelection, Mr. Hoover made not even an open gesture in that direction. On the contrary, he privately held in leash his Secretary of State who, he knew, was committed to sanctions and other measures which were called, in his communication to the cabinet, “roads to war.” And he clung to that line until the close of his Administration.

It was with Secretary Stimson, not President Hoover, that Mr. Roosevelt held the conference respecting the Far Eastern situation on January 9, 1933. The arrangement for the conference was mediated by a prominent Democrat who was later appointed to a high post under the Constitution by Mr. Roosevelt after he became President.²⁰ That Secretary Stimson went to Hyde Park with the knowledge and approval of President Hoover is reasonably certain, for the President has

19. Wilbur and Hyde, *op. cit.*, p. 601. (Italics supplied.)

20. This statement is based on what I regard as unimpeachable authority.,,

been earnestly seeking, in vain, for some time to reach understandings with Governor Roosevelt for the purpose of preserving continuity with regard to specific foreign policies. But no evidence is available to the effect that the Secretary presented to Mr. Roosevelt, at Hyde Park, President Hoover's non-recognition doctrine. In fact there is evidence to the contrary, namely, that he presented his own.

Secretary Stimson was then smarting from the rebuffs he had received at the hands of the British Government in respect of the Manchurian controversy, and also at the hands of the League of Nations which, besides refusing to apply economic sanctions to Japan, had buried the "incident" in a report by the Lytton Commission. There is no doubt, either, that the Secretary had all along chafed under President Hoover's insistence that the sanctions advocated by the Secretary meant setting out on the road to war and that the commercial interests of the United States in China would not justify the shedding of American blood in a Far Eastern war. If anything in history is certain, it is that Secretary Stimson had not given up before January 9, 1933, his longing to see Japan brought to book by sanctions or some other mode of action even if likely to result in war. That he and Mr. Roosevelt reviewed foreign affairs for five hours on that day and reached some kind of agreement without reference to the Stimson program of sanctions is so improbable as to be beyond credence.

Besides this reasonable inference, there is positive evidence of high credibility that it was the Stimson doctrine, not the Hoover doctrine, which Secretary Stimson brought up at Hyde Park on January 9, and Mr. Roosevelt considered and accepted. This evidence includes, first of all, the statements which Mr. Roosevelt made "off the record" to the press a few days later and were paraphrased in the *New York Times* report on Mr. Roosevelt's account of what had taken place at Hyde Park.²¹

In addition, by way of confirmation, there is available Mr.

Moley's memorandum on the affair contained in his volume, *After Seven Years*. It is true that Mr. Moley was under the mistaken impression that President Hoover was at one with Secretary Stimson on the non-recognition doctrine as including sanctions and other devices of coercion. It is true also that Mr. Moley did not participate in the conference on January 9, although he had shared other negotiations with the Hoover Administration in respect of foreign policies. But Mr. Moley was at the time firmly of the opinion that the so-called Hoover-Stimson doctrine of non-recognition, if adopted and applied by Mr. Roosevelt "invited a major war in the Far East"; and, at a conference which he and Mr. Tugwell held with Mr. Roosevelt a few days after the Hyde Park luncheon on January 9, Mr. Moley became convinced that Mr. Roosevelt had on that occasion actually committed himself to Secretary Stimson's version of the non-recognition doctrine.²⁸

When, at the conclusion of his meeting with Mr. Roosevelt on that day, Secretary Stimson was greeted by representatives of the press seeking information for the public, he evaded questions by remarking that he had enjoyed "a delightful lunch." But according to a dispatch from Washington, dated January 16, 1933, couched in the cautious language of diplomacy, Secretary Stimson in effect declared that he and Mr. Roosevelt had actually made a great decision at their conference, on January 9, 1933. The dispatch of January 16, 1933, informed the public that, on instruction of Secretary Stimson, the non-recognition policy enunciated by the United States in the Far Eastern emergency had been restated to European foreign offices and to the League of Nations through American diplomatic officers abroad; and that similar information had been given orally to foreign envoys who had called at the State Department in recent Administration.²³

Secretary Stimson's statement, however, did more than

22. Below, p. 142.

23. *New York Times*, January 17, 1933.

express his own views; the dispatch which reported it went on to intimate in ambiguous terms that Mr. Roosevelt had definitely committed himself to the Stimson policy—a policy which, if effectuated, would in all probability lead to war in the Far East.²⁴ The following passages of the *Times* dispatch from Washington on January 16 bear on the nature of the obligations assumed by Mr. Roosevelt at the Hyde Park conference with Secretary Stimson on January 9:

It is understood here [Washington] that there is no disposition on the part of President-elect Roosevelt to alter the administration's policy with respect to Manchuria, and a well-informed assumption is that the Secretary of State assured himself of this before re-enunciating the doctrine that the United States would not recognize any treaty or situation brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris.

It is apparent that repeated rumors abroad that the Roosevelt administration intended to drop the Hoover-Stimson Far Eastern policy were causing uncertainty concerning the future attitude of the United States, thus tending to weaken the position of this country over the Manchurian problem. The administration wished to offset this impression. . . .

Notification that this policy stood was sent recently to Ambassador Mellon in London, Ambassador Edge in Paris and chiefs of mission in other European capitals, as well as to Prentiss Gilbert, consular representative at Geneva. Those officials were instructed to explain, "if asked," that the United States position remained unchanged.

The State Department explained today that this was done because of reports that the United States was relaxing its attitude. *In diplomatic circles the opinion was general that Secretary*

24. Every student of Oriental affairs acquainted with the posture of affairs in Japan and China knew very well that the Stimson doctrine was a *brutum iulmen* unless backed up immediately by an increase in United States naval forces and an inflexible will to war in case Japan refused to accept Mr. Stimson's doctrine, which was regarded by Japanese imperialists as a mere cloak for American imperialism. Mr. Stimson was warned to this effect by Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, his own expert on the Far East (Pearson and Brown, *The American Diplomatic Game*, a book dedicated to "the pawns in the game," pp. 301 ff.). Informed American naval officers knew this very well also and

Stimson felt the Committee of Nineteen, as it was about to meet' on the thorny Manchurian problem, should have a fresh reminder, of the American position. . . .

The State Department denied emphatically a London press report today that President Hoover had instructed Mr. Mellon to inform the British Foreign Office that the United States believed, the League had wasted too much time in dealing with the Chino-Japanese situation and that, since all conciliatory measures had failed, the League should act in accordance with its covenant.²⁶

On January 17, 1933, the day following Secretary Stimson's announcement, Mr. Roosevelt, questioned by the press, Did he in fact take over that doctrine as his own?

The *New York Times* news "story" of the interview with Mr. Roosevelt on the Stimson statement was divided into two parts. One part, as if off the record and yet inspired, seemed to represent him as concurring with the Far Eastern policy hitherto pursued, in one form or another, by imperialist secretaries of state from John Hay to Henry O. Stimson. This part was broken into two sections.

Between the sections was sandwiched a direct and brief quotation from Mr. Roosevelt in which he declined to endorse explicitly and at the moment the Stimson policy for the Far East and then indulged in a generality which could be interpreted as approving that policy obliquely and yet, standing alone, signified little or nothing in relation to it.

The second part of the *Times* dispatch went beyond the bare non-recognition doctrine and definitely indicated that Mr. Roosevelt had also endorsed Secretary Stimson's whole program for the Far East, including the possibility of modifications in the naval limitations treaty to which party-

Both for its bearing on the immediate issue and as an illustration of Mr. Roosevelt's methods in dealing with the present and foreign affairs, the *New York Times* account of the interview on January 17, 1933, deserves close attention: J

25. *New York Times*, January 17, 1933, p. 1. (Italics supplied.)

Franklin D. Roosevelt, President-elect, *indicated* yesterday that there would be no change *in the Far Eastern policy* of the United States after he became President.

This *indication* that he would continue the Far Eastern policy of the Hoover administration came when Mr. Roosevelt was questioned by reporters about newspaper reports from Washington that Secretary of State Stimson had notified the interested European governments that the United States would continue its policy of non-recognition in the Chino-Japanese dispute.

Seated in the study of his city home at 49 East Sixty-fifth Street, Mr. Roosevelt borrowed a pencil from a reporter and *wrote out a statement in reply to the question as to whether he had agreed to support the Far Eastern policy of the present administration in his talk with Secretary Stimson a week ago.* The statement follows:

"Any statement relating to any particular foreign situation must, of course, come from the Secretary of State of the United States.

"I am, however, wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

Mr. Roosevelt refused to amplify this statement, *construed as a declaration for continuation of the "open-door" policy for China*, either to disclose details of his conversation with Secretary Stimson or to make it apply to war debts. The President elect said that this was all he had to say. . . .

It now appears that Mr. Roosevelt has endorsed not only the stand of President Hoover against recognizing gains won by Japan by means contrary to the Kellogg-Briand anti-war pact, but also *the insistence upon observance of the Nine-Power Treaty* with its *guarantee*²⁶ of the open-door policy and the integrity of China.

In addition *it is understood* Mr. Roosevelt has accepted the view Secretary Stimson set forth in his letter to Senator Borah on Feb. 24, 1932, that all the treaties of the Washington Conference were interdependent from the circumstance of their simul-

26. In the Nine-Power Treaty the signatories, including the United States.

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taneous negotiation, and that *the four-power Pacific pact and the*
®
Nine-Power Treaty.²⁷ ,

The day after the press interview on the Stimson agree- |
ment had appeared, Mr. Roosevelt was asked by his advisers, I
Mr. Moley and Mr. Tugwell, whom he had not consulted W
about this commitment prior to his action, why he had ac- 3
cepted the Stimson doctrine for the Far East. To their sur- |
prise Mr. Roosevelt merely recalled the fact that his ancestors |
had been in the China trade and added: "I have always had f
the deepest sympathy for the Chinese. How could you ex- ®
pect me not to go along with Stimson on Japan?" 28 Mr. |
Moley and Mr. Tugwell regarded this decision as a tragic is
mistake, but the step had been taken. .§

Mr. Roosevelt's own brief statement of January 17, 1933, ,]
on upholding the sanctity of treaties, contained not a word
about the Stimson doctrine. Hence it could be viewed, on its |
face, as giving no approval to that doctrine as such; but, con-J
sidered in relation to Secretary Stimson's previous statement,
1 it implied a promise to uphold the doctrine in dealing with |
Japan and, as Mr. Moley and Mr. Tugwell anticipated, this J
engagement bore fruit in years to come—1941-45. |

At all events, Mr. Roosevelt's own bare statement of Jan- |
uary 17 seemed to be in the domain of morals and awakened 1
no great alarms among isolationists. As Mr. Moley observed, 1
it was "quite without significance in itself." Indeed, Secretary
| Stimson's policy of blocking Japan in Manchuria had
suited. <3 imperialist interests in the United States, in spite of
his open a efforts to collaborate with the League of Nations
for collective W

Furthermore, Mr. Roosevelt was not unacquainted with9
imperialism and its works. He had been from 1913 to 1926S

27. *New York Times*, January 18, 1933, pp. 1-11. (Italics supplied.) Vol. I, chap, xxv of Roosevelt's *Public Papers*, which contains a few papers for theW period November, 1932-March 4, 1933, makes no reference to the important, '^ announcement of January 17, 1933. ■§&!

28. *After Seven Years*, pp. 94-95. Perhaps Mr. Moley and Mr. Tugwell were "h not as deeply entrenched in Mr. Roosevelt's confidence as they had imagined. J

Assistant Secretary of the Navy—in the department that had charge of naval operations against Mexico, Santo Domingo, and Haiti, in the classical imperialist style under President Wilson. Indeed during his campaign for Vice-President in 1920, Mr. Roosevelt had referred with pride to some of his own achievements in extending American power over the Caribbean.²⁹ Therefore, when on January 17, 1933, he referred to the “sanctity of treaties,” he could have been understood as allowing for exceptions to the rule.³⁰ In any case, on January 9, 1933, Secretary Stimson had achieved the great purpose on which he had set his heart and in due time he was to cooperate with President Roosevelt in realizing his design.³¹

If to adepts in international affairs Mr. Roosevelt’s statement of January 17, 1933, on the Stimson doctrine suggested that he might immediately take strong action, as President, against Japan, he gave to the public no hints later in 1933 that he had any such purpose in mind. Neither Manchuria nor Manchukuo is mentioned in the index of his *Public Papers* for the year; and Japan is mentioned only three times. The first reference to Japan touches upon a visit of a representative from Japan, as well as similar visits from agents of other governments, in the spring of 1933, to discuss “the world economic situation”; the second lists Japan among the nations to which the President’s “Appeal for Peace by Dis-

29. In August, 1920, during his campaign for Vice-President, Mr. Roosevelt boasted that the United States would control the votes of Haiti, Santo Domingo, Panama, Cuba, enough Central-American countries to make up a total quota of twelve votes in the Assembly of the League of Nations. *New York Times*, August 19, 1920, p. 15.

30. For American violation of the “sanctity” of a treaty, pledging peace and arbitration, by the seizure and occupation of Vera Cruz in an undeclared war against Mexico in 1914, see Moore, *op. cit.*, VI, 444-445.

31. In an eloquent tribute to Mr. Stimson on his retirement from the office of Secretary of War in September, 1945, Senator Joseph Guffey called attention to the fact that well before his inauguration on March 4, 1933, Mr. Roosevelt “had specifically endorsed Stimson’s policy in the Far East.” Senator Guffey thought that the country was to be congratulated for the eminent services rendered by Mr. Stimson. *Congressional Record*, September 25, 1945. This was after Russia had taken over certain ports and the strategic position in Manchuria formerly occupied by Japan.

armament” was sent, May 16, 1933; and the third is to a conversation between the President and Viscount Ishii. a

Only the third of these references—the conversation with Viscount Ishii—is more than formal in nature and the statement on this conversation conveyed an impression that relations between the United States and Japan were friendly. The President and the Viscount were “happy to note” that their views coincided on practical steps to solve outstanding economic problems of common interest to all nations; they hoped to see the countries of the Far East contribute substantially in the spirit of cooperation to laying the solid foundations for world peace and prosperity; they were “in close agreement” as to “many” measures necessary to economic and political health; they looked to the convening of the World Economic Conference and to the Disarmament Conference in the spirit of cooperation and expectancy.⁸² \$

Although President Roosevelt continued the policy of non-recognition in respect of Japan and her puppet state, Manchukuo, he made no public statement during the year, 1933 to the effect that he intended to “implement” it. A careful student of foreign affairs, John M. Mathews, after remarking that the use of sanctions to enforce it “would probably have involved us in war,” reported that at the end of the year “the ultimate policy of the Roosevelt administration in the Far East has not yet been disclosed.”⁸³ Japan, having given notice of her intention to withdraw from the League of Nations, showed no signs of a retreat in Manchuria; but neither the League of Nations nor any greedy European power was disposed to bring force to bear on her. And President Roosevelt made no sign that he contemplated drastic action against Japan, either alone or in cooperation with Great Britain or the League.

In dealing concretely with other phases of foreign policy during the year 1933—in addition to those connected with

32. *Public Papers*, II, 212 f.

33. *American Year Book* (1933), pp. 61 f.

the debts, the Disarmament Conference, the London Economic Conference, and the Stimson doctrine—President Roosevelt gave no encouragement to American internationalists. Early in his Administration he postponed action on the subject of American adherence to the World Court, subject to closely restrictive reservations. This proposition had been long pending. It had been endorsed by President Coolidge and President Hoover and only die-hard isolationists opposed it. To internationalists it seemed that this was the least possible gesture which the United States could make in the direction of world cooperation, and they looked to President Roosevelt for immediate help in expediting final action by the Senate of the United States. They looked in vain.

At a press conference on March 29, 1933, a journalist inquired of the President: "To get started on foreign affairs for a moment. I understand that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken action on the American adherence to the World Court. Is it your desire, can you tell us whether you want the Senate to act at this session?" replied: "Not even off the record. You can make a guess. . . ."³⁴

Also postponed until 1934 was action on the one measure of international implications which Mr. Roosevelt had so heavily underlined during his election campaign: modification of tariff barriers through the negotiation of reciprocal trade treaties. Not until June 12, 1934, did he sign the reciprocal tariff bill—that substitute for the flat cut in tariff rates which Mr. Hull had desired in 1932. By the middle of 1934 nearly all of President Roosevelt's great domestic measures directed toward recovery at home had been enacted

34. *Public Papers*, II, 98. The omission indicated in this official report was made by the editors in preparing Vol. I for publication. When in 1935 the Senate was on the verge of rejecting adherence to the World Court, President Roosevelt sent a message to the Senate urging favorable action, but, despite the fact that his party had an overwhelming majority in the Senate, he refrained from putting ratification on his program of "must" actions for that body. *American Year Book* (1933), pp. 67 f.

into law. First things had been put first and the time had come to deal with foreign trade. But as finally drawn the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 by no means conformed to the free and equal trade prescription of the third item in President Wilson's list of Fourteen Points.⁸⁵

Nor in according recognition to Soviet Russia in November, 1933, did President Roosevelt follow the line, established by President Wilson, of outlawing governments whose political forms and economic institutions were not in accord with American conceptions of peace, morality, and propriety.⁸⁶ Many practical considerations, no doubt, carried weight with President Roosevelt in restoring diplomatic relations with Russia. Even President Harding, President Coolidge, and President Hoover, in continuing the non-recognition policy pursued by President Wilson, had somewhat surreptitiously encouraged trade with Russia in the interest of American business enterprise; and in 1933 American industry, in the depths of the depression, was thought to need every crumb of commerce that could be found. Moreover, in view of his sympathy with the Stimson doctrine for the Far East, President Roosevelt could easily see in the recovery of Russia a great counterpoise to the growing strength of Japan.

In recognizing Russia, after about sixteen years of outlawry, President Roosevelt was returning to the policy that had been followed by the Government of the United States for more than a century after the foundation of the Republic; namely, the recognition of established governments without regard to their political forms and economic institutions. Hence his action in this respect was in harmony with the example set by George Washington, which had not been a contribution to internationalism as

35. The Trade Agreements Act was partly offset by the Johnson Act which made unlawful in the United States the sale of the bonds and securities of foreign governments (and subdivisions thereof) that had defaulted on the payment of obligations to the Government of the United States.

36. The significance of the recognition or non-recognition accorded to foreign governments seems to be almost if not entirely lost to the generation of

In two other relations during the year 1933 President Roosevelt gave expression to his foreign policy for the United States. He declared in his Inaugural Address of March 4: "In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor . . . the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Near the end of the year 1933 President Roosevelt in effect renounced imperialism as a policy to be followed by the United States, at least in the Western hemisphere. Imperialism had been opposed by the Democratic party since the memorable campaign of 1900, despite certain divagations in Latin America during President Wilson's Administration. On several occasions, in 1928 and later, Mr. Roosevelt had condemned it either in name or in substance. In December, 1933, he declared: "the definite policy of the United States from now on is opposed to armed intervention" in the affairs of other American republics.⁸⁷

Americans brought up in the school of "current affairs." Before 1913 the Government of the United States in deciding upon questions of recognition proceeded on the principle that it was under no obligation to reform the institutions, manners, and morals of any government seeking recognition or already recognized, as long as that government was willing to live at peace with the United States and fulfill the ordinary obligations of international intercourse. After 1913 President Wilson made a departure from the old rule, and it became popular in certain quarters to insist that the Government of the United States should break off relations with governments entertaining different conceptions of political and institutional forms; that it should only recognize governments that suited American conceptions of politics, economics, and morals. Communists in the United States and elsewhere now followed the one rule or the other according to "the Moscow line"; for example, they favored breaking off relations with "fascist" governments, except when Russia was bound to Hitler's Germany by a solemn pact (1939-41). They maintained in 1945 that the United States should automatically recognize any kind of government established in Eastern Europe under Russian tutelage and refrain from interfering with its internal affairs. For an examination of "recognition" in American policy, see Moore, *op. cit.*, especially IV, 355 ff. and VI, 470 ff. For Professor Moore's remarks on the "alarms" over relations with Communist Russia, see VI, 347 ff. Having served the country in the State Department for many years and devoted a long life to the study of international law and diplomatic history, Professor Moore could speak out of full knowledge. For the doctrine of non-recognition see article by Edwin Borchard and Phoebe Morrison in *Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict* (Institute of Pacific Relations), 1941, pp. 157-178.

Furthermore, President Roosevelt seemed ready to make good his words on imperialism by encouraging the movement for Philippine independence, which his good friend! Henry L. Stimson, had so actively opposed in the days of President Hoover's Administration. After the Philippine legislature had declined in October, 1933, to accept the terms of the Hawes-Cutting Independence Act of January, 1934, President Roosevelt reviewed the problem thus posed; and in March, 1934, he sent a message to Congress recommending that new legislation be passed for the purpose of giving effect to Philippine independence. Thus an old pledge of the Democratic party appeared on the eve of fulfillment. If, as Mr. Stimson had stoutly maintained in 1931, this would mean disturbing the imperialist situation in the Far East, the disturbance at last loomed on the

By his intense concentration on his domestic program for recovery in 1933, as well as by his various pronouncements on foreign policy, President Roosevelt indicated his break with internationalism. From the first day of his administration to the end of 1933 he devoted his energies primarily to framing measures in respect of national economy, pressing them through Congress, and putting them into effect. In other words, he labored hard at promoting the general welfare in the United States by independent action as distinguished from lowering trade barriers, seeking outlets for "surpluses" through imperialist expedients, or relying upon designs adopted at international conferences of similar kind.

Support for this statement is provided by the second volume of the President's *Public Papers*, entitled *The Year of Crisis, 1933*, published under his supervision. No person can read that work, document by document, line by line, without discovering how firmly he centered his interest on domestic measures for domestic recovery through all the trying

38. The matter of American naval bases in the Philippines was reserved, however, though the final decision was postponed.

months of the period. Additional evidence for this statement is supplied by the President's own report to the nation on his designs and labors of the year, entitled *On Our Way*: of the thirteen chapters in this volume, twelve deal with domestic affairs and only one with foreign affairs.

Except for a few items dealing with foreign affairs, to the major points of which references have been made in the preceding pages, all the documents in the *Public Papers* for 1933 reveal the President as a man whose heart and mind were concerned above everything else with the interests, resources, industries, and welfare of the United States. They reveal his persistent contention that the American people, with the aid of their Government, could raise themselves out of the unemployment, poverty, and degradation into which they had fallen and his confidence in their capacity to do this without the assistance of international conferences.³⁹

President Roosevelt's Inaugural Address on March 4, 1933, opened with the ringing declaration: "This is a day of national consecration." ⁴⁰ Not a sentence in it asked the American people to seek relief through international conferences, negotiations, and trade manipulations. From start to finish it was a call to the American people to make "a disciplined attack upon our common problems" and a promise of leadership in that national undertaking. The President recognized that "our international trade relations" are "vastly important," but he declared that "in point of time and necessity" they are "secondary to the establishment of a sound national economy. I favor as a practical policy the putting of

39. Anyone who desires to test the validity of this statement relative to the President's fundamental interests in 1933, and yet does not have the time and patience to read all the documents in this volume of the *Public Papers*, may at least check general impressions by studying the titles of the 195 items as given in the table of contents, pp. vii-xxi.

40. This sentence does not appear in the Inaugural Address as printed in the *Public Papers*, II, 11; but it appears in the address as printed in the President's volume entitled *On Our Way*. It seems that the address as given in the *Public Papers* was taken from the official copy issued by the Government Printing

first things first. I shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic readjustment, but the emergency at home can not wait on that accomplishment."

As if aware that this statement would be attacked as isolationist in sentiment, the President immediately elaborated his views: "The basic thought that guides these specific means of national recovery is not narrowly nationalistic. It is the insistence, as a first consideration, upon the interdependence of the various elements in and parts of the United States of America—a recognition of the old and permanently important manifestation of the American spirit of the pioneer. It is the way to recovery. It is the immediate way. It is the strongest assurance that recovery will endure." 41

Not only did President Roosevelt's domestic measures for recovery ignore cooperation with foreign powers. The most vital of them, dealing with industry, agriculture, employment, and currency, either provided for, or were predicated upon, national insulation against impacts, fluctuations, and manipulations of foreign trade and finance. In many cases this insulation was explicit in the new measures and subsidiary orders. In others it was afforded by laws already in existence which remained unchanged. Taken collectively these measures presented a four-square contradiction to all the main features of economic theory and practice sponsored by the internationalists who had sought to divert President Roosevelt from the course upon which he had resolved.

Take as an example of the new "insulation" the Industry Recovery Act of 1933. Section 3 of the Act provided that on his own motion or on application of any labor, industrial or trade organization which had complied with the terms of the Act, the President could direct the Tariff Commission to inquire whether imports of any foreign article or article were cutting into the maintenance of hour-wage-price conditions

41. This was a clear and definite warning to the internationalists who believed that American recovery could and should be effected by international agreements designed to "stabilize" the world exchange and "lower trade barriers."

created under the Act; and after a finding of facts he could prescribe such limitations on the import of such article or articles as he might deem necessary to uphold the domestic code, with its hour-wage-price schedules. Under this section of the Act President Roosevelt raised the duties imposed by the Tariff Act of 1930 on a number of commodities; that is, he imposed special fees on the import of such articles, in addition to the duties laid by the Tariff Act. Under the Recovery Act, also, quotas were fixed for sugar imported into the continental United States.⁴²

Only once during the year 1933 did President Roosevelt speak generally on the League of Nations. That was on December 28, 1933, when he made an address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation. Apart from references to this address, the index to his *Public Papers* for 1933 contains only two items relative to the League. The first refers to the so-called "Consultative Pact" and the League⁴³ and the second to the efforts made by the League of Nations in the interests of peace between Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco.⁴⁴ And in neither of these statements by the President is any sympathy exhibited for the idea that the United States should join in the suppression of aggressors by collective action or become a member of the League of Nations.

Nor in his address before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation did President Roosevelt in any way modify the opposition to American membership in the League expressed in his speech of February 2, 1932. On the contrary he reaffirmed that opposition. After dwelling in this address at some length on Woodrow Wilson's domestic policies and his contribution to better relations with other countries in this, hemisphere, Roosevelt turned to foreign affairs in the large. "In the wider world field, however," he said, "a chain of events has led of late, we fear, away from, rather than toward, the ultimate objectives of Woodrow Wilson."

42. *American Year Book* (1934), pp. 485 ff.

43. This item is discussed above, pp. 125 ff.

44. *Public Papers*, II, 521 S.

How had this reversal of tendencies come about? Dealing with this question, President Roosevelt made two points which had long been emphasized by American opponents of membership in the League.

First, he exonerated the people of the world from responsibility and laid the blame on politicians: "The superficial observer charges this failure to the growth of the spirit of nationalism. But, in so doing he suggests a nationalism in the wrong sense, a nationalism in its narrower, restricted sense; he suggests a nationalism of that kind supported by the overwhelming masses of the people themselves in each Nation.

"I challenge that description of the world population today.

"The blame for the danger to world peace lies not in the world population but in the political leaders of that population."

Second, President Roosevelt scoffed at many of the politicians who had dominated the scene at Paris in 1919 and made the alleged settlement of that year; and he did it in language akin to that used by Senators who objected to ratification of the Versailles Treaty in 1919-20. ". . . fifteen years ago," the President declared, "the imagination of the masses of world population was stirred, as never before, by President Wilson's gallant appeal to them—to the masses—to banish future war. His appeal meant much to them, but it meant little to the imagination or the hearts of a large number of the so-called statesmen who gathered in Paris to assemble a treaty of so-called peace in 1919. I saw that with my own eyes. I heard that with my own ears. Political profit, personal prestige, national aggrandizement attended the birth of the League of Nations, and handicapped it from its infancy."

Yet on this occasion President Roosevelt did not speak bitterly about the League as he had in his speech of February 2, 1932. In that address he had said that "the League has developed through these years along the course contemplated

by its founder, nor have the principal members shown a disposition to divert the huge sums spent on armament into the channels of legitimate trade, balanced budgets, and the payment of obligations." On December 28, 1933, he paid some tribute to the League and differentiated between its political aspects and its activities relative to social and economic co-operation and welfare.

"... through the League directly, or through its guiding motives indirectly," he now maintained, "the States of the world, in the years that have gone by, have groped forward to find something better than the old way of composing their differences.

"The League has provided a common meeting place; it has provided machinery which serves for international discussion; and in very many practical instances of which you and I know it has helped labor and health and commerce and education, and last but not least, the actual settlement of many disputes great and small between Nations great and small. . . . The League of Nations, encouraging as it does the extension of non-aggression pacts, of reduction of armament agreements, is a prop in the world peace structure, and it must remain."

What then should be the relation of the United States to the League in such circumstances? President Roosevelt answered that question squarely: "We are not members and we do not contemplate membership. We are giving cooperation to the League in every matter which is not primarily political and in every matter which obviously represents the views and the good of the peoples of the world as distinguished from the views and the good of political leaders, of privileged classes and of imperialistic aims."

Having made clear his own position on the League and power politics, President Roosevelt expounded his constructive program. He declared that about 90 per cent of the world's population were content with their territorial boundaries and willing to reduce armaments if the other 10 per cent would go along with them and abide by a policy

peace. On this ground he proposed that all nations pledge themselves to eliminate, in a short period of time, every weapon of offense and to refrain from allowing any of their armed forces to invade the territory of another nation. If an overwhelming majority of the nations would sign such an agreement, Mr. Roosevelt contended, the sheep would be separated from the goats.

But apart from making the suggestion that the nations so pledging themselves to peace should allow an international inspection of their armaments in the interest of preventing the production and maintenance of "offensive weapons," the President proposed no machinery for action after the goats had been separated from the sheep, the aggressors from the peace-loving nations. He hewed strictly to the line that he had followed during the previous months in dealing with the Disarmament Conference and the London Economic Conference: the United States would seek peace, agree to a reduction of armaments, and offer to consult in the interest of preserving peace; but he did not so much as intimate that he would recommend any participation of the United States in the political activities of the League or in any association of nations to designate aggressors and apply sanctions or force in suppressing them.

In short, on December 28, 1933, President Roosevelt gave no encouragement to those American citizens who were laboring then "to implement the Kellogg-Briand Pact" or to make the United States a member of the League of

In sum and substance, none of President Roosevelt's public pronouncements in 1933 indicated any break with the foreign policy he had proclaimed on February 2, 1932, after Mr. Hearst's demand for a repudiation of the League of Nations and political entanglements with Europe.

Of this internationalists were well aware. In a report for the year on "The United States and the League of Nations" for the *American Year Book*, "the Associates at the Geneva

Research Center” sought to make all the capital they could for their cause by emphasizing “American cooperation” with the League; but in the end they were compelled to concede defeat. Even in their highest pitch of enthusiasm, they could only resort to ambiguities: “It was not surprising that the President of the Assembly was able to say that American cooperation with the League had never been ‘so important, so close, and so varied’ as in 1933. There had been no change of principle or juridical relationship; there was, however, an accentuation and extension of normal and helpful cooperation. This was due, not so much to any conscious programme, as to a combination of factors: in part the frequency and gravity of the various crises, in part the wide sweep of League influence and the convenience of its methods, and in part also to the freer psychology in Washington.”⁴⁵

Having cited all the credits on their side of the ledger, the Associates took account of the countervailing items on the other side. They noted: “In view, however, of ‘erroneous and misleading reports,’ Secretary of State Hull declared on September 19, that the Government was ‘not contemplating any change whatever in its political relations with the League.’” They also quoted President Roosevelt’s reservation set forth in his address of December 28 to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation: “We are not members [of the League], and we do not contemplate membership. We are giving cooperation to the League in every matter which is not primarily political, and in every matter which obviously represents the views and good of the peoples of the world, as distinguished from the views and good of political leaders, of privileged classes or of imperialistic aims.” Such had been President Roosevelt’s warning to internationalists in general and also to those of imperialist inclinations in particular.

So the year ended with the foreign policy of non-entanglement, neutrality, and peace for the United States reaffirmed and reinforced.

4j. *American Year Book* (1933), p. 89.

Note to Chapter VI

In sources other than President Hoover's public papers there is supporting evidence for the proposition that Secretary Stimson believed strongly in the enforcement of the non-recognition doctrine by the application of sanctions, as distinguished from President Hoover's view of the doctrine. While Secretary Stimson was in Geneva in 1932 (above, p. 114), the Under-Secretary of State, William R. Castle, delivered an address before American Conference on International Justice in Washington May 4, 1932, in which he touched upon the subject of sanctions. The address was published by the American Peace Society in journal, *World Affairs*, for June, 1932. In this paper Mr. Castle rejected, as out of keeping with the American tradition, a proposal for putting "teeth in the [Kellogg] Pact" by an amendment binding the signatories to make war on the nation that breaks the pledge to settle disputes by peaceful means. The idea of war to prevent war Mr. Castle regarded as a contradiction in terms. He likewise rejected the idea of using such sanctions as the embargo or official boycott as an instrument for bringing pledge-breakers to book. "This idea also," he said, "is opposed by the [Hoover] administration, primarily because an official boycott is an act which would almost surely lead to war."

In response to an inquiry which I directed to Mr. Castle in January, 1946, he replied that he had showed this address to President Hoover before it was delivered and that the President had approved it.

On May 5, 1932, Mr. Castle, also with the approval of President Hoover, delivered an address before the Methodist Convention at Atlantic City, in which he reiterated his objection to the use of sanctions, such as the boycott, in attempts to enforce the Kellogg Pact. After his return from Europe, Secretary Stimson informed Mr. Castle that he recorded the Atlantic City address as ill advised and as

CHAPTER VII

Hewing to the Isolationist Line in 1934, 1935, and 1936

Although during the year 1934 the war clouds grew and blacker on the world horizon, President Roosevelt adhered to the course of non-entanglement in foreign quarrels. In his annual message to Congress in January, he devoted nearly all his attention to the progress of the domestic recovery. To foreign affairs he granted only a few paragraphs.

The President confessed that he could not present to Congress "a picture of complete optimism regarding world affairs." Outside this hemisphere, he said, fear of immediate or future aggression, vast expenditures for armaments, and the continued building up of trade barriers prevented "any great progress in peace or trade agreements." As to the war debts, the President expressed the hope that he could report later on these obligations "owed the Government and people of this country by the Governments and peoples of other countries." He referred to small payments made by several nations during the previous year and noted that Finland had paid her obligation in full.

And what in these circumstances was the policy to be pursued by the United States? President Roosevelt announced that he was opposed to political entanglements with Europe, although ready to cooperate on certain terms: "I have made it clear that the United States cannot take part in political arrangements in Europe but that we stand ready to cooperate at any time in practicable measures on a world basis looking to immediate reduction of armaments and the lowering of the barriers against commerce."²

Few indeed are the references to international affairs in

1. For definition of isolationism, see above, p. 17 n.

2. *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt*, III, 12.